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LETTER

TO

Mr *DODWELL*;

Wherein all the Arguments in his *Epiſtolary Diſcourſe* againſt the Immortality of the SOUL are particularly anſwered, and the Judgment of the Fathers concerning that Matter truly repreſented.

Together with

A Defenſe of an Argument made uſe of in the above-mentioned Letter to Mr *Dodwell*, to prove the Immateriality and *Natural Immortality* of the Soul.

In *Four* Letters to the Author of *Some Remarks* on a pretended Demonſtration of the Immateriality and Natural Immortality of the Soul, in Dr *Clark*'s Anſwer to Mr *Dodwell*'s late *Epiſtolary Diſcourſe*, &c.

To which is added,

Some Reflections on that Part of a Book called *Amyntor*, or the Defenſe of *Milton*'s Life, which relates to the Writings of the Primitive Fathers, and the Canon of the New Teſtament.

By *SAMUEL CLARKE*, D. D. Rector of St *James*'s *Weſtminſter*.

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
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A LETTER TO Mr *DODWELL*, &c.

SIR,

IT is a thing of very ill Conſequence, when Men of great Reputation in the World for Learning, in their Diſcourſes upon the moſt important Doctrines of Religion, raſhly and upon very little Grounds, allow themſelves to advance new and crude Notions, and extravagant Hypotheſes; which the Profane *will* not, and the Weak are not *able* to ſeparate, from the principal and fundamental and moſt neceſſary Doctrines themſelves.

For, as in Natural Philoſophy and in the ſearch after Phyſical Truth, the Syſtems and Hypotheſes which ingenious Men invent for explaining the appearances of Nature, and which for ſome time are received with Applauſe, but afterwards are confuted by Reaſon and Experience; are apt to make Men think the Natural Cauſes of things abſolutely impoſſible to be diſcovered at all; and have really ſuch an effect upon very Many, as to make them reject for their ſake, or

at leaſt to call in queſtion, even the certaineſt Truths which have been diſcovered by plain Experiments or clear Mathematical Demonſtration it ſelf: So in Matters of Religion likewiſe, the inconſiderate and groundleſs Notions which Men of great Learning and much Reading, have with too little Judgment ſometimes joined and intermixed with their Explications of ſome of the greateſt and moſt important Doctrines of Religion; when upon due Examination, the abſurdity and inconſiſtency of ſuch Schemes plainly appears; have been apt to raiſe Doubts in many Mens Minds concerning the Truth even of the certaineſt Doctrines themſelves, which are either the moſt plainly diſcovered by right Reaſon, or are moſt clearly delivered in Scripture.

You teach that the *Soul of Man is naturally mortal*, and will of it ſelf periſh and come to nothing, if not upheld by the extraordinary Power of God, in a præternatural way. Many, who ſee the imprudent Title of your Diſcourſe, and will not take the pains to read the Book it ſelf, will conclude that you ſuppoſe the Soul to periſh at the diſſolution of the Body; And all Libertines, when they *have* read and conſidered all that you offer, will ſtill conclude, that if (as you grant to them) the Soul muſt of it ſelf naturally periſh ſometime or other, there is no time ſo probable when it ſhould periſh, as at the diſſolution of the Body; and they will eaſily perſwade themſelves to rely upon this, that God will not work a perpetual Miracle to preſerve them præternaturally by his omnipotent Power, on purpoſe to inflict upon them an eternal Puniſhment, which by Nature they were not capable of undergoing.

Theſe

Theſe Mens Concluſion indeed is by no means right; But it is ſuch a one, as is very natural for Men of looſe Principles and vitious Lives to draw from your Doctrine; and therefore you ought to have been very careful not to give them ſuch an Occaſion of deceiving themſelves, unleſs you had firſt been very ſure that your Notion was either very plainly contained in Scripture, or very clearly demonſtrable by right Reaſon: Which that it is not, I preſume will appear from the following Obſervations.

You begin with a Diſtinction (*Præmon. Sect.* 3.) that the Souls of ſome Men are made immortal by the *Spirit* of God, to Happineſs; and the Souls of ſome others, by the *Will* of God, to Puniſhment. Now what can be more precarious and groundleſs than this Diſtinction? For what real difference is there in the thing it ſelf, between being immortalized by the *Spirit*, and by the *Will* of God; Eternal *Life and Happineſs* is indeed conſtantly attributed to the *Spirit of God*; that is, thoſe only who have the *Spirit of God*, and are *guided by it*, who obey the Will of God, and live in conformity to his holy Laws, ſhall be partakers of *Eternal Happineſs:* And thus the *Spirit of God* is indeed neceſſary to qualify Men for, and to make them capable of, the *Happineſs of Heaven.* But if, to make good Men capable of an *Eternal Duration* in order to that Happineſs, it be neceſſary that the *Spirit of God* give them a new *Principle of Subſiſtence*, or ſuperadd a *new Subſtance to their Souls*; (as your obſcure Expreſſions concerning *the Acceſſion of an adſcititious Spirit* &c. frequently ſeem to ſignify; and without which, there is no other difference than only in Words, between being immortalized by the *Spirit* and by the *Will* of God;) then nothing

can be more contrary to reaſon, than to ſuppoſe any Men made immortal without the addition of that new Principle; nor can any repreſentation of God's Proceedings, be more harſh and incredible, than to ſuppoſe him by his Omnipotent *Will* and Power, eternally and miraculouſly preſerving ſuch Creatures unto endleſs Puniſhment, who never had in them, either *originally* or *additionally*, any *Principle of* Immortality at all. How *plainly* and how *very much* more agreeable to Reaſon and to our natural Notions of God is it, to ſay that all Creatures who ſhall ever undergo eternal Puniſhment, are ſuch as having been created *naturally* immortal, and by wilful continuance in Sin, having ſo far depraved themſelves as to become uncapable of eternal Happineſs, muſt conſequently by the juſt Judgment of God fall into ſuch Miſery, as their immortal Nature ſo corrupted neceſſarily makes them liable to. When we ſpeak of the Soul as created *naturally* immortal, we mean that it is by the *Divine Pleaſure* created ſuch a Subſtance, as not having in it ſelf any Compoſition, or any Principles of Corruption, will *naturally* or *of it ſelf* continue for ever; that is, will not by any natural decay, or by any Power of Nature, be diſſolved or deſtroyed; But yet nevertheleſs depends continually upon God, who has power to deſtroy or annihilate it, if he ſhould ſo think fit. When therefore you ſay that the *Original of the Immortality of ſuch Souls as ſhall be eternally puniſhed, may be more agreeably derived from the Divine Pleaſure, than from the Nature of the Soul*; if thereby you mean that the Soul was made immortal by the *mere pleaſure* of God, in oppoſition to its being immortal by the *neceſſity of its own Nature*, in the ſenſe that God is immortal; then indeed not

not *Plato* only, but all others alſo that ever held the Immortality of the Soul, have been and are of the ſame Opinion: But if by thoſe Words you mean, as through the whole of your Diſcourſe you expreſſly declare, that the Soul was created mortal, but by the Divine Omnipotence is upheld eternally; then it is, on the contrary, evidently far more agreeable to right Reaſon and to our Notions of God, to derive the Immortality of the Soul, and eſpecially of a miſerable one, from its *own Nature*, than from the *Divine Pleaſure*; that is, to ſuppoſe the Soul to have been at firſt created ſuch a Subſtance, as by the ordinary concourſe of Divine Providence would continue for ever; than that it was created of a mortal and periſhable Nature, but by the extraordinary and miraculous Power of God, is continually ſupported, only to endure Torment and Puniſhment, beyond the capacity of its own Nature, to all Eternity.

There cannot eaſily be made a worſe repreſentation of God's dealings with Mankind, than what you affirm (*Præmon. Sect.* 4.) that *if the Devils had not fallen, there had been no Hell at all*; and that *Mankind is no otherwiſe concerned in it, than as, by joining themſelves to the Devil's Party, they intitle themſelves* alſo *to his Puniſhment*. 'Tis true, the Fire of Hell was *firſt and originally* prepared for the Devils, becauſe they were the *firſt and original* Offenders. But to ſay that, without their Fall, there *never* would have been *any* Hell *at all*; and that the ſame or equal Puniſhment ſhould not then have been inflicted upon Wicked Men for the ſame Crimes, as there now ſhall; is repreſenting God like an Arbitrary Tyrant, who without caring to make an exact, equal, and particular diſtribution of Juſtice, deals with all

Offenders of all ranks and degrees alike, becauſe they have all *interpretatively* joined in oppoſing his Authority.

You affirm expreſly (*ibid.*) that the Soul does *not depend on our groſs Organical Bodies, nor periſhes upon its diſſolution from thoſe Bodies.* I beſeech you, if the Soul be ſuch a Subſtance as is incapable of being hurt by ſo great a change and diſſolution, as is cauſed in us by a violent Death, ſuppoſe by Fire; upon what Principle can it be imagined to be naturally mortal; or what Revolutions in Nature will it not be able to reſiſt and ſupervive? You explain this further, by ſaying, that Mens *Souls do not ſo depend on any other created Being, but that they may ſtill continue in their duration, whatſoever other created Influences be withdrawn from them, if God be pleaſed ſtill to continue that ordinary Providence, which is eſſentially neceſſary for their continuance.* And is not this the *very definition* of *Immortality?* or did ever any Man mean more than this, when he affirmed the Soul to be *naturally Immortal?* You diſtinguiſh it indeed from the Natural *Immortality of Angels*; but by ſuch a *diſtinction*, as includes not in it any the leaſt *difference.* For what difference is there between affirming concerning *Angels*, that *it is in the Power and Pleaſure of God, to annihilate them when he thinks fit*; and concerning *Humane Souls that they do not ſo depend on any other created Beings, but that they may ſtill continue in their Duration, whatſoever other created Influences be withdrawn from them, if God be pleaſed ſtill to continue that ordinary Providence, which is eſſentially neceſſary for their Preſervation?* And yet in the very next Words, you very inconſiſtently imagine the Soul, as being a mere *Flatus*, to have a *more immediate Dependence on God than other*

other Creatures, than even the meaneſt Particles of lifeleſs Matter have; *which muſt make it ceaſe to be, whenever he is pleaſed to ceaſe to breath it; as being unable to continue its Duration, by the Powers given it at its firſt Production, and the continuance of thoſe general Influences which are requiſite for the ſupport of Created Beings in general.* According to theſe laſt Words, the Soul not being ſo much as a Subſtance of any kind at all, is likely to be more effectually deſtroyed by Death, than even the Body it ſelf. Whereas according to the Words juſt preceding, your Scheme ought to have been on the contrary, that the Soul is *by Nature Immortal*, and muſt be *mortalized* by the Omnipotence of God, if ever it periſh; and not, that it is by *Nature Mortal*, and muſt be *immortalized* by a new Act of Omnipotence, to enable it to ſubſiſt for ever. So that here, you ſeem to have framed no conſiſtent Notion even of your own Scheme.

What you advance *(Præmon. Sect. 5.)* concerning its not having been culpable to hold communication and joyn with the Devil, before the Publication of the Goſpel; and that the Devil was not to be looked upon as a publick Enemy, before his being declared ſo by the Goſpel; is ſo extravagant, that it needs no Confutation. Was not the Devil an Enemy when he tempted our firſt Parent? And was he not publickly declared to be ſo, in the Curſe pronounced to him thereupon? Is not the Devil deſcribed as a publick Enemy to God and good Men, in the Hiſtory of *Job*? And as an Enemy to *Iſrael*, 1 *Chron.* 21, 1? Or was he known to be an Enemy in *Temporal* Affairs only, *(Præmon. pag.* 41,) and could not be known to be ſo in things relating to the Life to come? Or had the Patriarchs,

triarchs, no expectation at all of a *better City* to come, after the preſent *Tabernacle* was diſſolved? Is not *Idolatry* in the Old Teſtament conſtantly branded with as ſevere a character of *Rebellion* againſt God, as in the New? And in the Heathen World, before the Goſpel was begun to be preached, (though *the times of that Ignorance God* did indeed *wink at*, that is, would not be ſo ſevere in puniſhing them, as thoſe who ſhould afterwards ſin againſt greater Light:) yet was it no Crime, to *worſhip the Creature more than the Creator?* was it no Fault that the World did κεῖσθαι ἐν τῷ πονηρῷ, lie under entire ſubjection to the *Evil One*, 1 Joh. 5. 19? and in the *Power of Satan*, Acts 26. 18? Were not the abominable Rites of the Heathen, plainly a ſacrificing to Devils? And do not all the Ancient Fathers, for whoſe Judgment you expreſs ſo great an eſteem, ſuppoſe in all their Writings againſt the Pagans, that before the propoſing of the Goſpel to them, they ought to have known from the Light of Nature and Right Reaſon, that thoſe impure Spirits whoſe worſhip was attended with all manner of beſtiality and wickedneſs, were profeſſed Enemies to God and Goodneſs? Nay, does not St. *Paul* himſelf expreſſly affirm, that *That which may be known of God*, was *manifeſt* enough to them, to have preſerved them from Idolatry? and that, becauſe *they did not like to retain God in their knowledge*, but *changed the Truth of God into a Lie*, for that Reaſon *God gave them up unto vile affections*, &c.

Nor is it leſs abſurd, to found (as you do in the ſame place) the Heinouſneſs of Sin and the Reaſonableneſs of the Severity of its Puniſhment, principally upon its being *interpreted* as a joyning with the Devil. Idolatry indeed, and Witchcraft,

Witchcraft, and Profane Scoffing at God and all Religion, may juſtly enough come directly under this Charge; and all other Sins alſo may in effect and in event, not improperly be looked upon as a promoting the Intereſt of the Devil, and an oppoſing the eſtabliſhment of the Kingdom of God. But to make the *formal Reaſon*, the heinouſneſs and demerit, not only of Idolatry, Witchcraft and Profane open Oppoſition of Religion, but alſo of all other Sins whatſoever, to conſiſt not ſo much in the original depravity of the Actions themſelves, in their contrariety to Right Reaſon, and to the Light of Nature and Conſcience, in their oppoſition to the Nature and Will and Law and Authority of God, as in their being *interpretatively* a joyning and communication with the Devil; To ſuppoſe God inflicting upon Men ſuch a Puniſhment, not as their Sins deſerve in their own Nature, and ſuch as the Nature of their own Souls makes them capable of falling into by wilful and obſtinate corruption and depravation of themſelves, but ſuch as * is *diſproportionable to their Nature*, and † *exceeding the natural Powers of their degree of Being*; and to account for this, only by ſaying, that Chriſt *will* ſo *interpret* their not joyning with Him, as if they had joyned themſelves to the Devil; Is not all this, to make God, in the hardeſt Senſe, act * *arbitrarily?*

* *Præmon.* p. 35.
† *Ibid.* p. 28.
* *Præmon.* pag. 27.

Your Interpretation of *Rom.* 2, 12. and of *Joh.* 3, 19. (*Præmon. Sect.* 6.) is ſo looſe and Groundleſs, that *any Text* may in the ſame manner be brought to prove *any thing*, or rather no *Text* can really prove *any thing* at all. For if when St. *Paul* ſays, *Rom.* 2, 12. *that as many as have ſinned without Law, ſhall alſo periſh without Law; and as many as have ſinned in the Law, ſhall be judged by the*

the Law; the Word *periſh* be not evidently Synonymous to being *judged or condemned*, and ſignifies that every Sinner's Condemnation or Puniſhment ſhall be proportionable to the heinouſneſs of his Sin with reſpect to the Light he ſinned againſt; but on the contrary from the Word [ἀπολοῦνται] *ſhall periſh*, it can be concluded that the Perſons ſpoken of ſhall only barely ceaſe to be, in oppoſition to the Word [κριθήσονται] *ſhall be judged or condemned*; It will follow equally from the uſe of the ſame Word in other places of Scripture, that neither Rejecters of the Goſpel, nor wicked Chriſtians, nor even the Devils themſelves, ſhall be condemned to any other Puniſhment, than bare ceaſing to be: For of all theſe it is ſaid in ſeveral Places of Scripture, that [ἀπολοῦνται] *they ſhall periſh* or *be deſtroyed*: And thus you unwarily overthrow all the Threatnings of the Goſpel. Again, if when our Saviour ſays, *Joh.* 3. 19. that *This is the condemnation, that Light is come into the World, and Men love Darkneſs rather than Light*: his plain meaning be not this, that the clear Revelation of the Will of God made to Mankind in the Goſpel, and the expreſs denunciation of his Wrath againſt Sin, is the great *Aggravation* of impenitence, and that which makes Men obſtinately continuing in their Sins utterly inexcuſable, and their condemnation evidently moſt juſt, becauſe they cannot now pretend ignorance of their Duty; but the Words [Αυτη ἡ κρίσις] *This is the Condemnation*, muſt ſignifie a *particular Kind* of Puniſhment to be inflicted upon Men for *Aſſociating with the Devil* as being the *Prince of Darkneſs*; I cannot ſee but by the ſame Liberty, any Aſſerter of any new Opinion may interpret any part of Scripture ſo as to countenance

tenance any the moſt groundleſs Fancy or Imagination whatſoever.

Is it not a very weak Hypotheſis, to imagine that the Souls of Men muſt needs be naturally Mortal, becauſe otherwiſe God would not know how to diſpoſe of the Souls of the Heathen; *ſince there cannot be any third Eternal State, ſuitable to the Nature of a Rational Soul; neither happy, nor miſerable; as there muſt be, if thoſe Souls be naturally Immortal? (Præmon.* p 43.) Is not the Univerſe large enough, for God to diſpoſe of all his Creatures into States ſuitable to their Natures? Are there not in Gods *Houſe many Manſions?* Or will Heaven and Hell be two ſuch Places, in which there will be no Differences of States, no Space for Order and variety of degrees? Does not our Saviour himſelf expreſly tell us, that they who *knew not their Maſters will, and yet did things worthy of ſtripes, ſhall be beaten with few ſtripes?* And does not St. *Paul*, in the whole 2d Chapter to the Romans, plainly declare that Gentiles as well as Jews ſhall be judged according to their Works?

The reſt of your Præmonition, being upon a different Subject, I forbear to conſider at this time.

IN the Diſcourſe it ſelf (*Sect.* 2.) you propoſe a moſt dark and unintelligible Notion, concerning [ψυχὴ and πνεῦμα] *Soul* and *Spirit*; not only diſtinguiſhing the *rational Soul* from the *ſenſitive*; which was the Philoſophy of many of the Antients; but moreover making the *Spirit* different from both, and wholly præternatural to Man. The whole *natural* Soul (ψυχὴ) including both the *ſenſitive* and *Rational* part, (which

(which you elſewhere call the two Souls, *pag.* 220,) you ſuppoſe to be of it ſelf mortal, but to be made immortal in good Chriſtians by the addition of the *Spirit*, (by the *Acceſſion of an Adſcititious Spirit*, as you ſometimes expreſs it) and in the Rejecters of the Goſpel to be made immortal without it. If by the *Spirit* you mean only an *Operation* of the Spirit of God upon our Souls, then (as I obſerved before) there is no real difference between being immortalized by the *Spirit* and by the *Will* of God. But if by the *Spirit* you mean the addition of a new Subſtance or Principle of Subſiſtence to the Souls of good Chriſtians in order to immortalize them, which yet in them that reject the Goſpel are immortalized without that addition; is not this juſt ſuch another ſuppoſition, as if you ſhould ſuppoſe the *Underſtanding* to be one Subſtance in a Man, and the *Will* another, and the *Habit of Virtue* a third; notwithſtanding that at the ſame time it be confeſſed that all theſe things may be Faculties or Powers of one and the ſame Subſtance? And your perverting the Words of St *Paul* to ſerve your obſcure Hypotheſis is very groſs. Does St *Paul* when he diſtinguiſhes the *natural Body* [ψυχικὸν σῶμα] from the *Spiritual Body* [πνευματικὸν σῶμα] and calls the one *corruptible*, the other *incorruptible*; mean that the *natural Body* [ψυχικὸν σῶμα] is therefore *corruptible* or *mortal*, becauſe the *Soul* [ψυχὴ] or *Principle of Life* which is in it, is it ſelf a * *mortal* Principle? or that the *Spiritual Body* [πνευματικὸν σῶμα,] is made *incorruptible* by the ſuperaddition of a *Spirit* to the Soul that animates it? The plain meaning of St *Paul* is only this, that the Body which in this preſent ſtate is diſſolvible and *corruptible*, ſhall after the Reſurrection, by the Power of

* *Pag.* 1.

of God, be made *incorruptible*; without having any reſpect at all to the *Soul*, or the *Nature* of it, in his whole Diſcourſe. Again, when St *Paul* derives our Title to the *Reſurrection* of the *Body*, wholly from Chriſt; does he thereby mean to affirm, that, without the Reſurrection of Chriſt, the *Souls* of Men muſt alſo have ceaſed to exiſt? On the contrary, for that very reaſon, becauſe the Souls of Men would not have ceaſed to exiſt; therefore Chriſt thought them of value to redeem them from Miſery, by the Purchaſe of his Blood, by his Death and Reſurrection. And 'tis the worſt repreſentation of Chriſtianity, that can be; ſomething that might indeed * *be thought hard dealing*; to ſuppoſe (as you do) that the Goſpel of Chriſt, which is every where in Scripture repreſented as the greateſt Inſtance of God's tender Mercy and Compaſſion towards Men, ſhould upon the whole ſo *very diſproportionably* increaſe the Miſery of ſinful Men, as that whoever diſbelieved or neglected that new Offer of Grace and Favour, ſhould from thenceforth be condemned to everlaſting Torments; notwithſtanding that otherwiſe Sin, in its own Nature, againſt the Light of Reaſon and Conſcience and the natural Law of God, was ſo little heinous, that had it not been for the Offer of this new extraordinary Grace and Favour, they that had lived in the utmoſt contempt of God and of his natural and eternal Law written in their Hearts, and in the moſt unreſtrained practice of all poſſible wickedneſs, might have been ſafe from the fear of any other danger, than that of periſhing finally by a natural Mortality.

* *Pag.* 5.

Your

Your Concluſion from our Saviour's deſcription of the laſt Judgment, *Mat.* 25. is very extraordinary; [*Sect.* 3;] that becauſe the *rewardableneſs* of the good Works of the Righteous, is there aſcribed to their having been done for *Chriſt*'s ſake; therefore no other *Perſons* ſhall be concerned in that Judgment but thoſe to whom the Goſpel had been made known. You might exactly as well have concluded, that becauſe *Charity* and *Uncharitableneſs* are the only particular Actions there mentioned, for which Men ſhall be adjudged to Reward or Puniſhment; therefore no regard ſhall be had to any other *Virtues* or *Crimes* in that final Judgment. It is evident by comparing other places of Scripture, that all kinds of *Actions* ſhall then be examined; and it is as evident, that all ſorts of *Perſons* ſhall be ſo too. Thoſe who never heard of the Goſpel, 'tis true, cannot be judged by the *ſame Rule or Form*, as thoſe who did hear of it; But is it not very wonderful, to conclude from thence, that becauſe

* *Pag.* 7. * *ſuch perſons muſt be judged by another form* not fully and expreſſly (ſuppoſe) mentioned in Scripture, therefore that *form cannot at all be known*, what it is; and if that *form could not be known, yet that therefore it ought not to be believed* that there is any ſuch form at all? Does not the ſame Light of Reaſon, which makes Men a *Law to themſelves*, neceſſarily diſcover alſo to them at the ſame time what Rule they ſhall be judged by? Neither is it true therefore, that no ſuch Form can be proved from the Scriptures: For does not St *Paul*, in the whole 2d *Chapter* to the *Romans*, largely declare that there is ſuch a Form, and alſo what that Form is? And does not the Scripture every where plainly ſuppoſe,

poſe, that the Judgment ſhall be univerſal? The Phraſe of *judging the World* Acts 17, 31, manifeſtly implies it; and the oppoſition between Death and Judgment, *Heb.* 9, 27, though the ſtreſs of the Apoſtles Argument does not indeed lie upon it, and the univerſal particle [*All*] is not added, yet very evidently ſuppoſes the *Judgment* to extend to the very ſame Perſons as *Death* doth. And what difference is there, between ſaying that 'tis appointed for *Men* once to die, or that 'tis appointed for *All Men* once to die? It is not a juſt anſwer here, to ſay that Univerſal Aſſertions are frequently in Scripture to be underſtood in a limited Senſe. That can only be ſo, when either the common acceptation of the words, evidently limits their ſignification; as in that place you mention, *Joh.* 12, 19; or when ſome other parallel places of Scripture, expreſsly add a Limitation. Where this is not the caſe, as it is not in the phraſe of Gods *judging the World*, Acts 17, 31; the ſame expreſſion being in all other places of Scripture likewiſe univerſal; if limitations may be added arbitrarily and at pleaſure, there will then be no way left to diſtinguiſh at all, when any declaration is to be looked upon as *univerſal*, and when as only *particular*. You your ſelf are forced to allow the Jews, who lived before our Saviours coming, to be concerned in the Judgment; and not them only, but alſo Others who lived before the Law, in the Times of *Noah* and the Patriarchs; becauſe (*pag.* 11,) *as they were intitled to the Spirit; in Reverſion, ſo they might be intitled to the Conſequences of the Spirit, one of which is Immortality.* I ſuppoſe you will eaſily grant, that the Knowledge many of theſe Men had of Chriſt, was

but implicit and very obſcure: And if that was ſufficient to intitle them to Immortality, why is it not as eaſie to ſuppoſe that the Promiſe God made to *Adam* might intitle all Mankind to have ſome benefit of the Redemption purchaſed by Chriſt, according to their different proportions and capacities, tho' they never heard of him explicitly?

It may here be obſerved alſo by the by, that, according to your obſcure and indeed confuſed manner of expreſſing your ſelf, you in this Section (*pag.* 8,) ſuppoſe *the Holy Spirit to immortalize Men to Puniſhment*; and again (*pag.* 31,) that Men are *qualified* for *the higher degree of Puniſhment, by the Acceſſion of the adſcititious Spirit, which makes them* ἰσάγγελοι: Not very conſiſtently with your firſt diſtinction, (*Præmon. Sect.* 2,) that the actually immortalizing Souls to Puniſhment, may better be aſcribed to the *Pleaſure* of God, than to the *Divine Spirit*. Unleſs you will ſay, that bad Men within the Covenant, are immortalized to Puniſhment by one Principle; and bad Men without the Covenant, or Rejecters of it, immortalized to Puniſhment by another Principle. And ſo there is no end of vain and groundleſs Imaginations.

That there ſhall be, as you ſay, (*Sect.* 4,) *a very great difference in the Puniſhment of thoſe who reſiſt and reject the Goſpel, from what it would have been if they had never heard of the Goſpel*; is undoubtedly very true. But does it from thence
† *pag.* 11. follow, that God did not † *oblige* Men at all to
& 12. *worſhip himſelf*, before any *revealed* Religion was
* *pag.* 13. inſtituted? Becauſe *the* * *Scripture does* indeed *every where ſuppoſe the Condition of thoſe who reſiſt*

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the Goſpel diſpenſation worſe than that of the worſt ſort of Criminals who never heard of the Goſpel; does it from thence follow, that they that never heard of the Goſpel, had therefore *no concern at all* in the final judgment? Becauſe our Saviour declares that it ſhall be *more tolerable* for *Sodom and Gomorrha* in the Day of Judgment, than for thoſe who rejected the Goſpel when offered them; does it from thence follow, that thoſe wicked People ſhall not be caſt into * *outer darkneſs* at all? When our Saviour threatens that *Capernaum, which was exalted to Heaven, ſhould be brought down to Hell*; is it not a very extraordinary Interpretation of the meaning of thoſe Words, and as wonderful an Inference from them, to conclude that thoſe People, if our Saviour had not preached to them, would have † *had no reaſon to fear the Puniſhment of Hell* at all? An unprejudiced Perſon would rather conclude on the contrary, that for that very reaſon, becauſe they *were in danger of it*, therefore our Saviour preached to them and exhorted them to *repent* and *flee from the* wrath to come. Laſtly, if they that never heard of the Goſpel, ſhall not indeed for their Unbelief be ſentenced to ‖ *that Hell*, which was prepared for the Devil and his Angels; that is, to the *ſame Degree of Puniſhment* with thoſe who reject or diſobey the Goſpel; yet does it at at all from thence follow, that they ſhall have *no concern* in the general Judgment, upon account of their having obeyed or diſobeyed the Law of Nature?

* pag. 14.

† pag. 14.

‖ pag. 18.

The Caſe (*Sect.* 6.) of that Text in St *John*, *John* 5. 28 and 29; *The Hour is coming, in the which all that are in the Graves ſhall hear his Voice,*

and ſhall come forth, they that have done good, unto the Reſurrection of Life, and they that have done evil, unto the Reſurrection of Damnation, is exactly the ſame with that before-mentioned, *Acts* 17, 31. The Words are *univerſal*; and the Inſtances you bring of other *univerſal* Affirmations, which muſt be underſtood in a *limited* Senſe, have not the leaſt ſimilitude with the Text you are conſidering. If the *Gibeonites univerſal* Declaration to *David*, that *for them he ſhould not kill any Man in Iſrael*, muſt needs indeed be underſtood in a *limited* Senſe, becauſe they themſelves expreſſly *limited* it by demanding ſeven of *Saul*'s Poſterity to be deliver'd to them to be put to death: If *Ahab*'s ſending to *all* Nations and Kingdoms to ſearch for *Elijah*, muſt indeed of neceſſity, in the Nature of the thing it ſelf, be underſtood *only of thoſe that bordered* upon him; If St *Paul*'s *univerſal* Declaration, that he baptized none of the *Corinthians*, muſt indeed be underſtood with *an exception*; becauſe he himſelf in the very next Words adds an *exception* expreſſly: Is it juſt to infer from theſe Inſtances, that our Saviour's *univerſal* Affirmation in this place, concerning the Reſurrection, may likewiſe be underſtood in a *limited* Senſe, though neither in the Nature of the thing it ſelf, nor from the Context, there be any the leaſt Ground for ſuch limitation? Nay though on the contrary, all the parallel Texts, which are very many, be likewiſe *univerſal*? It is a wonderful thing, to ſee in what manner *Learned* Men can argue, when Prejudices prevail over their *Judgment*.

Your

Your 7th Section, to ordinary Underſtandings, ſeems to be mere Confuſion. *You* ſuppoſe Man to conſiſt of three diſtinct parts, *Body*, *Soul* and *Spirit*: *But* they who made this diſtinction, ſuppoſed theſe three parts to be in *all* Men by *Nature*; which will not ſerve *your* purpoſe. *You* bring in *Plato* diſtinguiſhing *Mind* [Νῦς] from [ψυχὴ] *Soul*, and making the one mortal, the other immortal: *But* this likewiſe, being ſpoken concerning the natural Formation of all Men, is nothing to your purpoſe; For in *your* Hypotheſis, you make the *whole* Man by nature Mortal. *You* mention *Plato* here (*pag.* 22 and 24, and again *pag.* 59 & 96, and *Praemon. pag.* 21,) as avowing your own Notions: *And* yet in other places, (as *pag.* 33, 60, & 66,) you inconſiſtently ſpeak of him as juſtly blamed for holding the contrary Opinion, *for aſſerting* Our *Doctrine of the Souls natural Immortality*, *pag.* 33. *You* affirm (*pag.* 23,) that there is no real difference between the Platonical Notions and thoſe of the New Teſtament, only that That which the Platoniſts call Mind [Νῦς] and make it Immortal, the Sacred Writers call [πνεῦμα] *Spirit*, as being the *Divine Breathing*, Gen. 2. 7: *Here* you openly contradict your ſelf, making the immortal [πνεῦμα] *Spirit*, common to all Men by their original Formation, and confounding it with what you elſewhere ſo * often, in alluſion to that very Text, diſtinguiſh by the Name [πνοὴ] *Breath*, and make it mortal. *You* bring in *Philo* diſtinguiſhing the Immortal Soul from the *ſenſible formed Man*, as you darkly expreſs it; *But* even this alſo is directly againſt you: For *Philo* oppoſing the *immortal Mind* of Man, that is,

* *Praemon. Pag.* 21 & 25 *and in the Diſcourſe it ſelf*, pag. 160 and 216.

the rational Soul, both to the Body and to the ſenſitive Soul, ſtill ſpeaks of them all as *original* and *natural* Parts of the Man; and therefore when you apply to your Hypotheſis of an *adſcititious Spirit*, what he ſays concerning this [πνεῦμα θεῖον] *Divine Spirit or Soul* infuſed into Man by God's *breathing*, Gen. 2. 7; you again directly contradict your ſelf, by confounding the *Spirit* [πνεῦμα] which you ſuppoſe immortal, with the [πνοὴν] *Breath* or *Soul* which you make to be mortal. You cite (*pag.* 26) the Words of *Aratus*, Τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμεν as approved by St *Paul*, Acts 17, 28: *But* if thoſe Words prove any thing, they prove directly againſt you: For γένος θεοῦ, if it ſignifies any thing, ſignifies *Off-ſpring of God* in that Senſe which you oppoſe, (*pag.* 66.) And though you are pleaſed to underſtand them (*pag.* 66.) only of thoſe that are immortalized by receiving or rejecting the Goſpel, yet St *Paul* on the contrary as plainly applies them to all that *dwell on the Face of the Earth*, as it could be expreſſed in Words.

In the ſame Section, (*pag.* 22.) you call it *a precarious Fancy, to make every cauſe of Motion diſtinct from Matter, to be properly what we call a Spirit, Independent on Matter, and Immortal:* Here you ſeem to ſuppoſe the *Soul* of Man, to be ſomething *diſtinct from Matter*; yet not a *Spirit*, nor *Independent on Matter*, leaſt from thence it ſhould follow that it was naturally immortal. In your Præmonition, *p.* 25. you make the *Soul*, as being a mere *Flatus*, to have a more precarious ſubſiſtence, even than *mere Matter it ſelf*, ſaying that *it is unable to continue its own Duration by the Powers given it at its firſt Production, and the continuance of thoſe* general Influences

fluences *which are requiſite for the ſupport of Created Beings in general*: Yet in the ſame page (as I obſerved before) you ſay that Souls *do not ſo depend on any other Created Being, but that they may ſtill continue in their Duration, whatſoever other created Influences be withdrawn from them, if God be pleaſed ſtill to continue that* ordinary Providence *which is eſſentially neceſſary for their continuance*: This is making them properly Immortal. In the *Diſcourſe* it ſelf, *pag.* 51, you ſuppoſe again that the Soul *may depend on Matter, as to* its *Being and Preſervation*, though it be not a *Modification of Matter*, but *diſtinct from it*: Here you expreſs your ſelf, as if you thought it a *Subſtantial Form*, a contradictory Chimæra, which aroſe merely from the miſconſtruction of a Greek Word in *Ariſtotle*, ſignifying indifferently either *Subſtantial* or *Eſſential*: And again, *pag.* 91, you ſuppoſe in like manner, that the Soul is *ſomething diſtinct* both *from Spirit*, and alſo *from Matter and Motion*; that is to ſay, a *Material Form*; an *active Subſtantial Principle, diſtinct from Matter, yet depending on Matter*, in eſſe, in fieri, in operari, *and which muſt accordingly be diſſolved on the diſſolution of that Matter on which it depends.* In *pag.* 220, you ſuppoſe, on the other hand, the *Two Souls* (as you call them) to be not only *diſtinct*, but alſo *ſeparable*: And *pag.* 218, you ſeem to incline to the Notion of thoſe Philoſophers, who *owned the* πνοὴ *to be material like the ſteams of odoriferous Bodies*; *Which Conſideration alone*, you ſay, *is ſufficient to cut it off from any pretentions to any proper natural Immortality.* Is not all this, the greateſt Extravagancy and Confuſion that can be? Did not the World know you to be a ſerious Perſon, theſe things would look

much more like the Raillery of an Unbeliever, than the Reaſonings of one that in earneſt intended to eſtabliſh any conſiſtent Notion. In reality, That the Soul cannot poſſibly be *Material*, is evident not only from the conſideration of its noble Faculties, Capacities and Improvements, its large Comprehenſion and Memory; its Judgment, Power of Reaſoning, and Moral Faculties; which Arguments have been urged with unanſwerable Strength by the wiſeſt and moſt conſiderate Men in all Ages from the times of *Socrates* and *Plato* to this very Day; but the ſame thing is moreover demonſtrable from the ſingle conſideration, even of bare Senſe or Conſciouſneſs it ſelf. For *Matter* being a diviſible Subſtance, conſiſting always of ſeparable, nay of actually ſeparate and diſtinct parts, 'tis plain, that unleſs it were eſſentially Conſcious, in which caſe every particle of Matter muſt conſiſt of innumerable ſeparate and diſtinct Conſciouſneſſes, no Syſtem of it in any poſſible Compoſition or Diviſion, can be an individual Conſcious Being: For, ſuppoſe three or three hundred Particles of Matter, at a Mile or any given diſtance one from another; is it poſſible that all thoſe ſeparate parts ſhould in that State be one individual Conſcious Being? Suppoſe then all theſe Particles brought together into one Syſtem, ſo as to touch one another; will they thereby, or by any Motion or Compoſition whatſoever, become any whit leſs truly diſtinct Beings, than they were when at the greateſt diſtance? How then can their being diſpoſed in any poſſible Syſtem, make them one individual conſcious Being? If you will ſuppoſe God by his infinite Power ſuperadding Conſciouſneſs to the united

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Particles, yet ſtill thoſe Particles, being really and neceſſarily as diſtinct Beings as ever, cannot be themſelves the Subject in which that individual Conſciouſneſs inheres, but the Conſciouſneſs can only be ſuperadded by the addition of Something, which in all the Particles muſt ſtill it ſelf be but one individual Being. The Soul therefore, whoſe Power of Thinking is undeniably one Individual Conſciouſneſs, cannot poſſibly be a *Material* Subſtance. And if it be neither *Matter* nor any *Modification of Matter*, then (though you are pleaſed to † affirm ſomewhat raſhly, and without offering any reaſon for your affirmation, that ſuch *Reaſoning is far from being Self-evident*) yet it is really as notoriouſly Self-evident as any thing in Nature, that it *cannot poſſibly depend upon Matter, as to its Being and Preſervation.* For if even one particle of Matter *cannot poſſibly depend upon another, as to its Being and Preſervation*, (which I believe you will confeſs to be Self-evident,) becauſe they are each of them diſtinct Beings; muſt it not be even yet leſs poſſible, for a Being which is neither Matter it ſelf, nor a Modification of Matter, but intirely *diſtinct* from Matter, (*pag.* 51;) *to depend on Matter as to its Being and Preſervation?*

† *pag.* 51.

It is not indeed of any great Moment in the preſent diſpute; but it ſeems to ſhow in general ſomething of haſt and inconſiſtency in your Notions; what you affirm concerning the Giants, (*Sect.* 8.) who you ſay, deſcended from the *Sons of Seth* and the *Daughters of Cain*; and yet in the very ſame Paragraph you call them the *Offſpring of the fallen Angels*; and, upon their account, make two *defections* of Angels, one before the Fall of *Adam*, the other before the Flood.

You

You proceed (*Sect.* 9) to the Authority of the Fathers. *Juſtin Martyr*, whom you begin with, ſays indeed expreſly, that the Soul ought not properly to be called *Immortal*: But this he ſays, not as you repreſent him, in oppoſition to *our* Doctrine, nor yet in oppoſition to *Plato*, but in oppoſition to the extravagant Notions of ſome † *pretended Platoniſts*, who taught ſuch an *Immortality* as implied *neceſſity of exiſtence*. For the reaſon he gives why Souls ought not to be called *Immortal*, is becauſe * *they had a beginning*, and *depend continually upon God for the Preſervation of their Being*. In which Senſe, neither are *Angels* Immortal; but † *God only*. All that he ſays therefore, does not in the leaſt imply, but that the Soul may be ſuch a ſubſtance, as is able to continue its own Duration for ever, by the Powers given it at its firſt Production, and the continuance of thoſe general Influences which are requiſite for the ſupport of Created Beings in general: Which is all that we mean by *natural Immortality*. Nay, that he did actually think the Soul to be in this ſenſe *Immortal*, may juſtly be gathered from thoſe very words which you your ſelf cite from him: Ὅτι αὐτὸς μὲν καὶ φθαρτὸς, &c. *What Plato thought concerning the World, that it muſt needs indeed be in its Nature capable of being deſtroyed and brought to an End, becauſe it had a Beginning; yet that God would never actually de-*

† Εἰ ἀθάνατός ἐστι ψυχὴ, ἀγέννητος δηλαδή. Ἀγέννητος δὲ καὶ ἀθάνατος ἐστι κατὰ πάντας λεγομένους πλατωνικούς. *Dialog. cum Tryph.*

* Ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς γεγενῆσθαι—ἐκ ἄρα καὶ ἀθάνατοι. *ibid.*

† Μόνος γὰρ ἀγέννητος καὶ ἄφθαρτος ὁ Θεός *ibid.*

deſtroy it : The ſame may be thought concerning the Soul, and concerning all things that are or can be, excepting only God himſelf (διατι ἐξαφανισθῆναι) *that they are capable of being deſtroyed :* Which laſt words ſeem clearly to explain what he means by the word [φθαρτὸν] *corruptible*, which he applies not only to the Soul of Man, but alſo to all Created Beings whatſoever; namely, not to ſignify any Tendency to Corruption in the Nature of the thing it ſelf, but only a Dependence upon the Will of God, in oppoſition to Self-exiſtence. He does indeed ſay, that the Souls of the Damned ſhall continue to exiſt *as long as God thinks fit*; and implies as if he thought they ſhould finally be deſtroyed, after very long Puniſhment : But this, not by a natural Mortality, but by the Will of God, who is as able to deſtroy if he thinks fit, as to create : Which Opinion, if there was any ground for it, would yet ſignifie nothing at all to your purpoſe.

Tatians Opinion, if it was of any Authority, would prove too much for you. For he fancied that the Soul was diſſolved with the Body, and roſe again with it at the Reſurrection. This part you pleaſantly call his *Humane Reaſoning* (*Sect.* 10;) as if you thought all the reſt of what he ſays in the very ſame Sentence, was *immediately Divine*. Yet even *He* alſo is expreſſly againſt you. For as he makes *all* Souls to die with the Body, ſo he makes them *all* to riſe again with it alſo; leaving none of them in their natural Mortality; but raiſing them all either to eternal Happineſs, or [θάνατον διὰ πονηρίαν ἐν ἀθανασίᾳ λαμβάνοντα] to immortal Puniſhment.

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Irenæus is ſo very full and expreſs againſt you, and your perverting of his words ſo very groſs, that with the ſame liberty any perſon might eaſily make any Author ſeem to countenance any Hereſy or abſurd Opinion whatſoever, even from the very Words themſelves, wherein he with all poſſible clearneſs expreſſes himſelf againſt it. The Paſſages which you your ſelf cite, are as clear and plain as can be deſired. He in expreſs words (as you your ſelf cite them,) declares the Soul *to* * *be immortal in its own Nature*, and affirms that it does † *not die*. To evade this, you ſuppoſe he means only, that the Soul does not *die in the ſame Manner* that the Body does, namely by *ceaſing to breathe*; A more ſurprizing evaſion could not poſſibly have been invented; His Words, which the Reader would expect you ſhould have tranſcribed at length, are theſe; that † *'tis the Body only that dies, not the Soul: For, to die, is to loſe the Powers of Life*; Breath, *Senſe and Motion*; *and to be ſeparated into its firſt Principles of Compoſition*; *which the Soul, the Flatus vitæ, and the Spirit which is a ſimple and uncompounded and indiſſolvible ſubſtance, cannot be*: is not the word [*Spiramen*] *Breath*, in this Sentence an excellent ground for your diſtinction; that *Irenæus* by denying that the Soul dies, does not mean to deny that it dies,

* Quæ ſunt natura immortalia; quibus a ſua natura adeſt vivere. *lib.* 5. *c.* 4. o † *ibid. c.* 7.

† Hæc [*caro*] enim eſt, quæ morietur & ſolvitur; ſed non Anima, neq; Spiritus. Mori enim, eſt vitalem amittere habilitatem, & *ſine Spiramine* in poſterum, & inanimalem & immobilem fieri, & deperire in illa, ex quibus & initium ſubſtantiæ habuit. Hoc autem neq; Animæ evenit; flatus eſt enim vitæ: neq; Spiritui; incompoſitus eſt enim & ſimplex Spiritus, qui reſolvi non poteſt, *lib.* 5. §. 7.

dies, but only to deny that it dies in the ſame Manner the Body does, *viz.* by ceaſing to breathe? Again, He expreſſly affirms that † *the Soul and Spirit is not mortal*: By this you ſay he means only, that the Soul does not *actually* die *when the Body dies*; but, being aſhamed of this Interpretation, you add immediately, that he means alſo further, that the Soul *in its own Nature, does not conſiſt of contrary Principles, tending to a Diſſolution by its own Nature, as the Body does*: This is expreſſly giving up the whole Queſtion; and directly contrary to what you add preſently after, that *Death is natural to the Soul on account of its natural Conſtitution.* It is here further to be obſerved alſo, that theſe laſt words which you your ſelf cite out of *Irenæus*, that *the Soul and Spirit is not Mortal*, [οὔτε ἡ ψυχὴ οὔτε τὸ πνεῦμα,] are directly contradictory to the Notion you advance, *pag.* 3, concerning [σῶμα ψυχικὸν] *the natural Body*'s being therefore oppoſed to [πνευματικὸν] 1 *Cor.* 15, 44, becauſe it has only a *Mortal* Principle [ψυχὴ] in it; and alſo directly contradictory to what you inſinuate *pag.* 41, concerning *Irenæus*'s underſtanding [πνοὴ ζωῆς] *the Breath of Life*, Gen. 2, 7, to be, what *You* all along would diſtinguiſh it to be, a *Mortal* Principle: Which he is indeed ſo far from from doing, that, on the contrary, he, in that very Chapter from whence you have taken moſt of your Citations, declares [ψυχὴ] *the Soul*, not to be mortal, for * that very reaſon becauſe it is [πνοὴ ζωῆς] *the Breath of Life*, Gen. 2, 7. Notwithſtanding that he does indeed, at the ſame time, con-

† Οὔτε γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ ὅλη ἐστὶν, οὔτε τὸ πνεῦμα, *lib.* 5. 12. as the Words are cited by you: & *lib.* 5. 7, *almoſt the ſame Words again.*

* Quæ ſunt ergo mortalia corpora? nunquidam Animæ? Sed incorruptibiles Animæ quantum ad comparationem mortalium corporum. Inſufflavit enim in faciem hominis

tradiſtinguiſh

Deus *flatum vitæ* (Gen. 2, 7.) & factus est in animam viventem; *Flatus* autem *vitæ*, incorporalis est. Sed ne mortalem quidem possunt dicere hominem ipsum flatum vitæ existentem. Et propter hoc David ait; & anima mea illi vivet; tanquam immortali substantia una ejus existente. *l.b.* 5. *c.* 7.

tradistinguish it, as St. *Paul* does, from πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν; The πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν being plainly with him, as it is with St. *Paul*, that divine Power which Spiritualizes and Immortalizes, not the Soul, but the *Body*, at the Resurrection.

Irenæus does indeed, with other Antient Writers, allow, that whatever is γεννητὸν *or had a beginning*, must be φθαρτὸν, that is, as *Justin Martyr* expresses it, Οἱόν τε ἐξαφανισθῆναι, *capable of being destroyed*. But this is only meant (as the Antithesis of the Words [γεννητὸν] and [φθαρτὸν] evidently shows) of the Nature of the Soul as opposed, together with that of Angels and of all other the highest Created Beings whatsoever, to That Immortality which arises from *Necessity of Existence*, which must needs be peculiar to God alone; Which is nothing to your purpose.

I cannot see how you collect any thing at all from *Athenagoras*, (*Sect.* 12) He does indeed distinguish Νῶς from ψυχὴ according to the old Philosophy; but he does not found any thing upon that distinction, which is in the least to your purpose. He neither affirms the *Soul* to be mortal, nor makes any doubt but the *Bodies* of all Men shall rise again unto Judgment. All you pretend to gather from him, is, that the *Soul* is not it self sufficient to immortalize the *Body*: But to this you have your self given a full answer, that *No Body* ever thought it was.

The

The Words you cite from *Theophilus Antiochenus*, (*Sect.* 13,) relate wholly to the Queſtion concerning the ſtate of *Adam* in Paradiſe, whether he was created Mortal or Immortal in *that State*: Nothing therefore can be gathered from thence, concerning the Nature of a *ſeparate* Soul. *Theophilus* determines, that He was *neither Mortal nor Immortal* * originally by his Creation; that is (as you your ſelf explain it, *pag.* 46.) God neither deſign'd for him *Corporal Death*, nor *Corporal Immortality*; but he was capable of being either, according as he ſhould behave himſelf: But whether *Adam* before his Fall was in that Senſe naturally *immortal*, or naturally *mortal*; what is this to the *Soul?* which, ſuppoſing *Adam* never ſo *mortal*, you your ſelf acknowledge does not periſh by *that Mortality* which denominates a Man *Mortal*, that is, the Diſſolution of the Body.

* Note; your Emendation, ἐγῶμαι for ἐγῶ μὲν, in this Paſſage of *Theophilus*, is without ground. For the Senſe is not, [οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἐγῶμαι] *nor ſo, I ſuppoſe*; but [οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἐγὼ μὲν,] *I dare not aſſert That neither, for my part*; anſwering to [οὐδὲ τοῦτο ῥαμὲν] in the preceding line; As any one that pleaſes to compare your Book, may obſerve.

His ſaying that from that Text, *Gen.* 2, 7, *moſt Men* [πλείονες] ſtiled the *Soul immortal*; does not imply (as you imagine) that *Theophilus* himſelf thought it *Mortal*; but it implies ſome doubt concerning the proper uſe of the Word ἀθάνατος, which (as has been before noted) ſeemed to many of the Antients to imply as much as ἀγέννητος *Neceſſarily exiſting*, (in the Senſe that St *Paul* ſays of God, 1 *Tim* 6, 16, ὁ Μόνος ἔχων ἀθανασίαν that *He only hath Immortality*;) or at leaſt to ſignify an *indefectible State* of Virtue and Happineſs: And therefore it is, that

that he ſays concerning *Adam*, Ἐι ἀθάνατον αὐτὸν απ' ἀρχῆς ἐποιήσει, θεὸν ἂν ἐποιήσει: *If Adam had been made originally immortal, he had been made a God.*

It is alſo further to be obſerved from this paſſage of *Theophilus*, that the Text you ſo frequently allude to, *Gen.* 2, 7, was παρὰ τοῖς πλείοσι *by moſt of the Antient*, underſtood in a Senſe directly contrary to your Notion of the πνοὴ ſignifying in that place a *Mortal* Principle. And it is with very extraordinary difficulty, that you here labour to ſuppoſe, that [πλείονες] thoſe *moſt Men* whom *Theophilus* affirms to have collected the *Immortality of the Soul* from this *Text of Scripture*, were not *Chriſtians*, but either *Jewiſh Phariſees* or *Heathen Philoſophers*: which Suppoſition of Heathen Philoſophers proving the Immortality of the Soul from a Text of Scripture; and that a Chriſtian Writer ſpeaking of moſt Mens Senſe concerning a Text of Scripture, ſhould thereby mean the Senſe of Heathen Philoſophers; This, I ſay, with all that follows in that Section, is ſo extremely abſurd, as to need no Confutation.

Tertullian does indeed ſuppoſe the Soul to be *Material*; from whence it muſt alſo neceſſarily be confeſſed to follow that it would be *naturally Mortal*; and no one can (as you ſay, *Sect.* 14.) believe ſuch a Soul as he ſuppoſes, to be independent on Matter in its own Nature. All this is very true; and yet *even This* ſeems to be nothing to your purpoſe. For though the *natural Mortality* of the Soul is indeed a neceſſary *Conſequence* of *Tertullian*'s Doctrine; yet, ſince *Tertullian* did not ſee nor own that Conſequence; and,

if

if he had ſeen the Conſequence, would have diſowned the Doctrine; his *Authority* (which is what you would make uſe of) is not for you, though the *Conſequence of his Doctrine* be; And therefore you are guilty of a very manifeſt Fallacy, when you ſay (*pag.* 55.) that *the Church had not declared againſt this Doctrine of* Tertullian, *which ſuppoſed the Souls natural Mortality:* For his Doctrine did not *then* ſuppoſe it, tho' *our* Philoſophy ſhows it to be indeed a Conſequence. He ſays expreſſly in many places of his Book *de Anima*, that the Soul *is immortal:* He reckons this among thoſe Opinions of the Philoſophers which gave occaſion to Hereſies, that * *ſome of them denied the Immortality of the Soul:* He denied † *that the Soul grew or increaſed in ſubſtance*, notwithſtanding he thought it Material; *leaſt it ſhould follow from thence, that it was capable likewiſe of periſhing:* He ſtrongly ‖ *oppoſes* the Opinion of thoſe who thought the Soul *received Nouriſhment*; *leaſt from thence likewiſe it ſhould follow that it was liable to periſh:* He expreſſly affirms, * that *all Mankind*, without exception, *ſhall riſe again to eternal Happineſs or Puniſhment:* And many other ſuch Paſſages are to be found in his Works. You ſeem to be aware of this, when you ſay, that *Tertullian does indeed own the actual Immortality of the Soul:* But then, what you inſinuate in your next Words, [Eſpecially *of all*

* Alii immortalem negant Animam. *cap.* 5.

† Cæterum animam ſubſtantia creſcere negandum eſt, ne veriam decreſcere ſubſtantia dicatur atq; ita & defectum credatur. *cap.* 37.

‖ Auferenda eſt Argumentatoris occaſio, qui, quod anima deſiderare videatur alimenta, hinc quoq; mortalem eam intelligi cupit, quæ cibis ſuſtineatur, deniq; derogatis eis evigeſcat, poſtremo ſubtractis intercidat. *cap.* 38.

* Reſtituetur *omne humanum genus* —— exinde in immenſam æternitatis perpetuitatem. *Id. in Apologetico.*

who were, upon that account, obliged to come over as Proſelites upon the Publication of the Goſpel,] is extremely unfair; ſince *Tertullian*'s Words, being every where as univerſal as can be, are directly contrary to what *you* would inſinuate by the Word *Eſpecially.*

And here upon occaſion of the Paſſages you cite out of *Tertullian*, concerning *the Propagation of the Soul ex traduce*, and its having a *Humane Shape and Difference of Sex*; I cannot forbear propoſing it to your more calm and ſerious conſideration, whether your manner of citing the Fathers, by picking out chiefly ſuch Sentences, wherein for want of Philoſophy they were evidently miſtaken, and which can only be of diſſervice to Religion, and tend to confirm profane Men in their Mockery and Contempt; is not a very ill repreſentation of thoſe Writers, and a very ill manner of ſhowing your regard to them. I believe, ſhould any other Perſon do the like upon any other Philoſophical Subject, you would immediately look upon him as doing it with an ill deſign, and deſerving a very ſevere Cenſure.

What you ſay (*Sect.* 16.) concerning *Tertullian*'s deriving the Humane Soul from the *Flatus Vitæ* mention'd *Gen.* 2, 7; proves, not that he thought the Soul Mortal, becauſe you groundleſsly interpret that Text ſo; but that he underſtood that Text contrary to what you have done, becauſe he clearly declares the Soul derived thence to be immortal: As I have before ſhown particularly concerning *Irenæus.* And what you offer in the reſt of that Paragraph, concerning *proper Immortality* belonging only to God, is all entirely againſt your ſelf, and not in the leaſt againſt our Notion; as has likewiſe been proved before.

The

The Words you cite out of St *Cyprian*, (*Sect.* 18.) are evidently nothing to your purpoſe; being ſpoken only concerning *regeneration* or the *new birth* in the *moral* Senſe, without any the leaſt hint of any *natural* mortality of the *Souls* of thoſe who are *not regenerated*. *Arnobius*, you your ſelf acknowledge to *have his Paradoxes on this Subject*; that *he was but a Catechumen, when he wrote his Book*; and *was not truly inſtructed in the Chriſtian Doctrine*. *But*, you ſay, *he is more to be regarded when he ſpeaks conformably to the Senſe of other Catholick Doctors of that early Age*, that is, when you think he ſays any thing agreeable to that Notion which you not truly attribute to the Fathers. And yet even *He*, does not ſay any thing really agreeable to that Notion. For though he does indeed blame the boldneſs of certain Platoniſts for ſuppoſing the Soul to be * *neceſſarily Immortal*, to have come from Heaven, and to return thither again of courſe at the diſſolution of the Body; running out with much oratorical Liberty upon the weakneſs of thoſe Mens Arguments for the Immortality of the Soul; and does Himſelf contend that the Soul is of a † middle Nature, neither mortal, nor immortal, but capable of either condition according to its behaviour; yet all this he does purely upon *That* Argument, that whatever had a beginning muſt alſo neceſſarily be capable of being deſtroyed; and that whatever is *poſſible*, muſt needs in its Nature be liable to periſh; and accordingly therefore applies it to Angels * and all other Created Beings whatſoever,

* Animus, qui immortalis a vobis & *Deus* eſſe narratur, &c. *lib.* 2.

† Medietas ergo quædam, & animarum anceps ambiguaq; natura, *&c. lib.* 2.

* Omnes omnino. Dii, Angeli, Dæmones, aut nomine

quocunq; ſunt alio, qualitatis & ipſi ſunt mediæ, & ambiguæ ſortis conditione mutabiles. *lib.* 2.

ſoever, in the very ſame Senſe as he does to Men: which is not the Notion of Mortality *You* are contending for. And when he ſuppoſes the Souls of the Wicked to periſh finally, (which you imagine to be for your purpoſe:) he underſtands it of *all* the damned, as well thoſe that *had heard* the Goſpel, as thoſe that *had not*; and thoſe that *had received the Spirit*, as thoſe *that had not*; conceiving them *all* to be deſtroyed by the Power of God inflicting ſuch Puniſhment upon them, and not that *any* die by a *natural* mortality.

Lactantius is throughout his whole Work as full and expreſs againſt you, as any Author that ever wrote either before or ſince. So that your perverting his Words to favour your Notion, is really, what upon ſecond Thoughts you your ſelf will hardly excuſe. I ſhall firſt ſhow briefly, how clearly he aſſerts the natural Immortality of the Soul, and then conſider in how very extraordinary a manner you miſrepreſent him.

He approves * that Notion of *Plato*, which you ‖ ſo often condemn, concerning the natural Immortality of the Soul: He declares that * *the Soul does not periſh nor is diſſolved, but endures for ever:* He is very large and particular ‖ in confuting all *Lucretius*'s Arguments againſt the natural Immortality of the Soul: He affirms, that * at Death *the Body returns to the Earth*; *but That part of ourſelves, which God breathed into us, endures*

* Licet verum de animæ immortalitate ſentiret, *&c. lib.* 7. § 8.

‖ *pag.* 33, 66, *&c.*

* Apparet animam non interire, neq; diſſolvi, ſed manere in Sempiternum *lib.* 7. § 9.

‖ *lib.* 7. § 12 &c.

* Quod ex terra fuit, in Terram revolvitur; quod ex cæleſti Spiritu, id conſtat ac viget Semper, quoniam divinus Spiritus ſempiternus eſt. *lib.* 7. § 12.

endures and lives for ever; And again, that * *the Soul is not corruptible, but endures for ever*; *because it proceeded from an eternal Original:* And concludes; ‖ *I think*, ſaith he, *I have ſufficiently proved the Soul is not diſſolvible.* He expreſſes himſelf in the very ſame manner concerning the natural duration of wicked Souls, as of good ones. *The Effect of that Death*, ſaith * he, *which wicked Souls are ſubject to, is not the extinguiſhing of them, but the puniſhing them eternally: This Puniſhment we call the ſecond Death; which is it ſelf alſo perpetual, as eternal Happineſs is; The ſecond Death is the ſuffering eternal Torment; the damnation of Souls to eternal Puniſhment, according to their Deſerts.* Again: *As the Life of the Soul*, ſaith ‖ he, *is eternal, in which it injoys divine and unſpeakable Happineſs; ſo its Death alſo muſt needs be eternal, in which it indures everlaſting Puniſhment and endleſs Torments for its Sins.* And again: *Death*, ſaith * he, *does not deſtroy and extinguiſh the Soul, but ſubjects it to eternal Torments.* And that all this might not poſſibly be underſtood either of your *immortalizing Spirit*, or of the *mere Will and Pleaſure of God*, ſuſtaining the Soul and cauſing it to endure beyond the origi-

* Ergo anima, quæ fragilis non eſt, in æternum manet, quoniam Origo ejus æterna eſt. *ibid.*

‖ Declaravi, ut opinor animam non eſſe ſolubilem. *lib.* 7. § 13.

* Cujus [mortis] non ea vis eſt, ut iujuſtas animas extinguat omnino, ſed ut puniat in æternum. Eam pœnam, ſecundam mortem nominamus, quæ eſt & ipſa perpetua, ſicut & immortalitas. ——Mors Secunda, eſt æterni doloris perpeſſio; Mors eſt animarum pro meritis ad æterna ſupplicia damnatio. *lib.* 2. § 12.

‖ Sicut Vita Animæ ſempiterna eſt, in qua divinos & ineloquibiles immortalitatis ſuæ fructus capit; ita & mors ejus perpetua ſit neceſſe eſt, in qua perennes pœnas & infinita tormenta pro peccatis ſuis pendet. *lib.* 7. § 11.

* Mors autem non funditus perimit ac delet, ſed æternis afficit cruciatibus. *lib.* 7, § 12.

original capacity of its own Nature; he adds expreſsly in the very next Words, (as if he had foreſeen and deſigned to prevent your Hypotheſis,) that the reaſon why the Soul is ſubject to ſuch endleſs Puniſhments, is becauſe it was created originally immortal, and therefore cannot die: For *the Soul*, ‖ ſays he, *cannot utterly periſh and be extinguiſhed, becauſe it has its Original from the Spirit of God* [he means that which you call the πνεῦ Gen. 2, 7,] *which is eternal.* And again; in Anſwer to that Objection, * *how that which is immortal, can be capable of ſuffering*; he has theſe remarkable Words: *Mens Souls*, ſaith ‖ he, *though they are not capable of being utterly extinguiſhed, becauſe they are of Divine Original; yet by being immerſed in Senſe, and depraved by Sin, they become liable to Miſery and Torment.* And again: * *What wonder is it*, ſaith he, *if Souls, notwithſtanding that they are immortal, are yet capable of having Puniſhment inflicted upon them by God?*

‖ Nam interire prorſus anima non poteſt; quoniam ex Dei Spiritu, qui eſt aeternus, originem cepit. *ibid.*

* Si eſt immortalis Anima, quomodo patibilis inducitur & paenae ſentiens? *lib.* 7, 20.

‖ Eius naturae reddi animas ut, ſi non extinguibiles in totum, quoniam ex Deo ſunt, tamen cruciabiles fiant per corporis molem, quae peccatis inſita ſenſum doloris attribuit. *ibid.*

* Quid ergo mirum, ſi cum ſint immortales animae, tamen patibiles ſint Deo? *ibid.*

Moſt of theſe Paſſages, which are as remarkably full and clear againſt you, as if the Author had written on purpoſe to oppoſe your Hypotheſis, you inexcuſably paſs over without notice. And from theſe Paſſages any one may eaſily obſerve, how very groſly, I had almoſt ſaid beyond Example, you miſrepreſent thoſe other places which you *do* cite from him. The Paſſages which you cite, *pag.* 70, wherein *Lactantius* affirms *Immortality*, not to be the neceſſary Condition

of

of our *Nature*, but the Reward of our *Virtue*; are all plainly meant, not of Perpetuity of Duration, (which he every where affirms to belong neceſſarily to our Nature) but of the eternal indefectible Happineſs of Heaven; which this Author always means by the word *Immortality*, as alone deſerving that glorious Title; notwithſtanding that at the ſame time he expreſsly and conſtantly affirms the oppoſite ſtate to be of equal duration and perpetuity. Thus when, ſpeaking of that ſecond Death, *which* he ſays ‖ *does not extinguiſh wicked Souls, but ſubjects them to end'leſs Miſery*, he ſays, that That likewiſe is of *perpetual Duration*, as *Immortality* alſo is; 'tis evident that by *Immortality* he means to expreſs, not Duration, but Happineſs: And in the place which you cite to prove that he did not think *Immortality* natural to Men, he in expreſs words declares that by *Immortality* he means * *the unſpeakable and eternal Happineſs of Heaven*: and when he ſays ‖ *there would be no difference betwixt juſt and unjuſt, no ſuch thing as Reward and Puniſhment, if all Men were born* Immortal; 'tis very evident from the Thread of his Diſcourſe, that he means, if Men were born originally, and without undergoing any Trial, into ſuch a State, as * the *Good Angels* are now in, and the Saints ſhall be in after the Reſurrection, namely a State of Indefectible

‖ Cujus non ea vis eſt, ut injuſtas animas extinguat omnino, ſed ut puniat in æternum. Eam pœnam, ſecundam mortem nominamus; quæ eſt & ipſa *perpetua*, ſicut & *immortalitas*. *lib.* 2, 12.

* Ne *Immortalitatem* delicare aſſequerentur ac molliter, ſed ad *illud æternæ vitæ ineloquibile præmium* ſummis cum difficultate, &c. *lib.* 2. §. 6.

‖ Nam nihil intereſſet inter juſtum & injuſtum; ſiquidem omnis homo natus, *immortalis* fieret. *ibid.*

* Cum poſſet ſemper Spiritibus ſuis immortalibus innumerabiles animas præparare, ſicut *Angelos* genuit, quibus *Immortalitas* ſine ullo malorum

periculo ac metu conſtat, &c. *ibid.*

fectible Virtue and Happineſs; then the Nature of Rewards and Puniſhments, would be taken away. Again; Theſe Paſſages which you cite *pag.* 71, wherein you ſuppoſe that *Lactantius* by that *immortal Spirit* which *God put or inſpired into an Earthly Body*, means, not the *natural Soul of Man*, but the *Divine Spirit received in our Saviours regenerating Baptiſm*, as a new *Principle of Immortality*; Theſe Paſſages, I ſay, if to any one that pleaſes to compare the places, they do not appear to be * all and every one of them clearly ſpoken on the contrary, concerning that *natural Soul*, which God is ſaid to have breathed into Man, *Gen.* 2, 7; it will not be eaſie to conceive how any Man can poſſibly expreſs his meaning in Words: And when from this Paſſage, [*Ficto corpore, ſpiravit ei animam degitali ſorte Spiritus ſui, qui eſt perennis; ut ſi Anima ſuperaverit, quæ ex Deo oritur, ſit* Immortalis *& in perpetua luce verſetur*] you infer that the Soul is Immortal, only *conditionally, if it be victorious*; your miſrepreſentation of the Paſſage, is very extraordinary: For the Words are not one entire Sentence, as any one would imagine them to be by your manner of citing them; but two Paſſages, at a Page diſtance from each other; and not *Anima* (as you ſeem to underſtand it) but *Homo* is the Nominative Caſe to *ſit immortalis & in perpetua Luce verſetur*; And ſo far is the Author from making the Souls immortality *conditional*, by theſe Words; that directly on the contrary he in this very Sentence means to ſay, that the Soul muſt of Neceſſity be *Immortal* in all circumſtances; only with this difference, that || if *a Man lives after the Spirit, his* Immortality *ſhall be a* Happy *one*;

* *lib.* 7, 2. *lib.* 2, 12. *lib.* 7, 4 & 5.

|| Ex rebus diverſis ac repugnantibus *Homo* factus eſt;

but

ut if he live after the Fleſh, his immortality muſt be a Miſerable *one.* When therefore you ſay, that *the way, according to Lactantius, taken by Providence, for making Mans actual Mortality or Immortality the Reward or Puniſhment of his Free-will was to joyn his Soul to his Body immediately, which being it ſelf Frail and Mortal, could not ſecure the Soul from actual Mortality*; and That *this he ſuppoſes would make the Complex of the Soul and Body actually Mortal*; you might with the *ſame Truth*; and with as much *appearance of Reaſon*, have ſaid, that *Lactantius* wrote his Book with a deſign to diſprove the whole Chriſtian Religion, or any other particular Article of it whatſoever.

——ut, ſi Anima ſuperaverit quæ ex Deo oritur, ſit immortalis & in perpetua luce verſetur; ſi autem Corpus vicerit,——ſit in tenebris ſempiternis & in Morte. Cujus [Mortis] non ea vis eſt, ut injuſtas animas extinguat omnino, ſed ut puniat in æternum. *lib.* 2, 12,

Again, when *Lactantius* ſays, that * *ſince this Temporal Life is ſucceeded by Temporal Death, it follows that the Soul muſt* riſe again *to eternal Life, becauſe temporal Death has an End*; It is a very great and palpable miſrepreſentation, to infer from theſe words, (as you do, *pag.* 73,) that *Lactantius was ſo far from owning the Immortality of the Soul, as natural to it, that he ſeems to own its actual Death, for the ſpace between the Death of the Body and the Reſurrection*; *and therefore aſcribes the Reſurrection to the Soul as well as the Body*: For what can be a groſſer miſrepreſentation of any Author, than from one ſingle Paſſage (even ſuppoſing that Paſſage not reconcileable with the reſt,) to affirm that his Opinion was juſt contrary to what he largely and expreſsly

* Quia temporalem vitam temporalis mors ſequitur, conſequens eſt ut *reſurgant* animæ ad vitam perennem, quia finem mors temporalis accepit. *lib.* 7. § 10.

preſſly almoſt in every Page of his Book declares it to be? But after all, this Paſſage is not difficult to be reconciled: For when he who ſays a hundred times in his Book, that the Soul has no dependence on the Body, but ſubſiſts as well and better after it is ſeparated from it, ſays in one ſingle Paſſage that Mens Souls do [*reſurgere*] *riſe again* to eternal Life; can any thing be more evident than that his meaning is, that the Souls ſhall be ‖ *united again* to their Bodies at the *Reſurrection* before the Judgment? It is an eaſie Figure, and very uſual in the beſt Authors, and in the Scripture it ſelf, to ſignify by the Word [*Soul*] the ſame as [*Perſon*] in general: Thus *Gen.* 46, 26, *All the Souls that came with Jacob into Egypt, &c.* And *Lev.* 5, 2. *If a Soul touch any unclean thing*, &c. In which places nothing can be more abſurd than to underſtand *Soul* in the ſtrict and proper Senſe of the Word: And yet there is juſt as much Reaſon ſo to do, as, from the Paſſage now cited, to conclude that *Lactantius*, contrary to what he expreſſly declares in almoſt every Page of his Book, was of Opinion that *the Soul died with the Body*. Had not the World deſervedly an Opinion of your great Learning, there would be no need to take notice of ſuch extraordinary miſconſtructions: Which really, Sir, in your repreſentation of this Author, appear to have proceeded from greater Prejudice, or greater Want of Care, than Men of your known Abilities are ordinarily guilty of. At laſt you come off, *pag.* 75, with ſaying that *Lactantius*'s Reaſonings *either prove or are conſiſtent with a precarious Immortality; at leaſt even by our modern Reaſonings, do not imply any Neceſſity of*

‖ A Deo corporibus induentur. *lib.* 7, 23. rurſus carne induentur. *ibid.* 21.

an Immortality by Nature : And who, I beſeech you, ever taught any other Immortality of the Soul, than a *precarious* one; that is, depending on the pleaſure of God Almighty? or who ever imagin'd, that any thing which was γεννητὸν and had a beginning, was not alſo capable of Being deſtroy'd and having an end, if God ſhould ſo pleaſe?

You begin with St. *Athanaſius* (*Sect.* 21.) very ominouſly; Acknowledging that *he does indeed own the Doctrine of the Souls Immortality, as a Doctrine of the Church :* Which he does, not only in † the Words you cite from him, but alſo largely and fully in many other places of his *Oratio contra Gentes*; ſtiling the Soul * *rational and immortal*; affirming that ‖ *when it is ſeparated from the Body, it will have a much clearer knowledge of its own Immortality*; *and* proving its Immortality diſtinctly, from ſeveral Topicks and Arguments: *If the Soul*, ſaith * he, *be diſtinct from the Body*; *as we have before ſhown*; *and the Body is mortal*; *It follows neceſſarily, that the Soul, being diſtinct from the Body, muſt be immortal:* And again; *The Soul*, ſaith † he, *therefore meditates and thinks upon things immortal and eternal, becauſe it is it ſelf Immortal*; *For as the Body, being it ſelf Mortal, has all its Senſes emp'oyed about mortal things*; *ſo the Soul, whoſe Ex-*

† Ὅπ ὃ καὶ ἀθάνατος γέγονεν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον εἰδέναι ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησιαστικῇ διδασκαλίᾳ. *Orat. cont. Gent.*

* τί οὖν ἂν εἴη τοῦτο πάλιν, ἢ ψυχὴ λογικὴ καὶ ἀθάνατος, *ibid.*

‖ Πῶς οὐχὶ μᾶλλον καὶ πολλῷ πλέον, ἀπολυθεῖσα τοῦ σώματος, —— φανερωτέραν ἕξει τὴν τῆς ἀθανασίας γνῶσιν. *ibid.*

* Εἰ γὰρ ἄλλως αὐτὴν ὁ λόγος ἀπέδειξε παρὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ σῶμα φύσει θνητὸν· ἀνάγκη τὴν ψυχὴν ἀθάνατον εἶναι, πρὸ ὧν εἶναι καὶ τὸ σῶμα. *ibid.*

† Διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ ἀθάνατα καὶ ἀεὶ τὰ λογίζεται καὶ φρονεῖ, ὅτι ἐστὶ καὶ ἀθάνατος ὅτι. Καὶ ὥσπερ τὸ σῶμα θνητὸν ὑπάρχον, θνητὰ καὶ αἱ τούτου αἰσθήσεις πρὸς θνητὰ πεφυκυῖαι· οὕτω καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ, ἀθάνατα θεωρήσασα καὶ λογισαμένη τὰ ἀθάνατα, καὶ αὐτὴ ἀθάνατον εἶναι καὶ ἀεὶ ζῆν. *ibid.*

cellent

culties are employed about immortal things, muſt it ſelf of neceſſity be immortal and live for ever: Theſe Arguments are plainly drawn from the *Nature* of the *Soul it ſelf*, and are directly contrary to your Notion of an *Immortalizing Spirit or Will* of God: And accordingly, ſpeaking of the Heathens, he expreſſes himſelf in the very ſame manner concerning *Their* Souls in particular; *If they pretend to believe*, ſaith † he, *that they have a Soul, and value themſelves upon their Rational Faculties, as they juſtly may; why, as if they had no Soul, do they act contrary to Reaſon, and not think as they ought to do, but make God a Being meaner than themſelves? For having themſelves an* immortal *and inviſible Soul, yet they make God like to things viſible and mortal.* When therefore to *Athanaſius*'s general Aſſertion concerning the *Immortality of the Soul*, you anſwer, that That does not concern your Cauſe, becauſe your Queſtion is not whether the Soul be *Immortal*, but whether it be *Immortal in its own Nature*; you are guilty of a very great Fallacy: For if by the Souls being *Immortal in its own Nature*, you intend to expreſs what we mean, that the Soul by the powers given it at its firſt Creation is naturally able to continue for ever; then *Athanaſius*'s Aſſertion *does concern* your Cauſe; becauſe, in all the places now cited, he expreſsly maintains the *natural Immortality* of the Soul in that Senſe: But if by *Immortal in its own Nature*, you mean *neceſſarily Immortal*, as God is; then neither *Athanaſius*, nor we, nor perhaps any

† Εἰ ὃ ψυχὴν ἀξιοῦσιν [al. αὐχοῦσιν] ἔχειν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ λογικῷ μέγα φρονοῦσιν, εἰκότως τοῦτο ποιοῦντες· διατὶ ὡς μὴ ἔχοντες ψυχὴν, παρὰ λόγον πλανῶσι, καὶ οὐκ ἃ δεῖ φρονεῖν φρονοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ κρείττονας ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τῷ Θείῳ ποιοῦσι, ψυχὴν μὲν ἀθάνατον ἔχοντες καὶ μὴ βλεπομένην, τὸν δὲ Θεὸν ἐν τοῖς βλεπομένοις καὶ θνητοῖς ἀπεικάζουσιν. *ibid.*

any Body elſe, ever meant that the Soul was *Immortal in its own Nature.*

From the Paſſages therefore now cited, wherein *Athanaſius* ſo expreſsly and very largely aſſerts the *natural Immortality* of the Soul, 'tis very reaſonable to conclude, that all thoſe Paſſages in His Book *de Incarnatione verbi Dei*, which you underſtand to imply a *natural Mortality of the Soul*, ought (that they may not be inconſiſtent with what he ſo fully and expreſsly aſſerts elſewhere.) to be underſtood concerning that natural Mortality which is the Diſſolution of the Body and Separation of the Soul, without determining what becomes of the Soul after that Separation. And thoſe Paſſages may the better be underſtood in that Senſe, becauſe they are all ſpoken concerning that Mortality *Adam* incurred by his Sin in Paradice; the Conſequence of which Mortality, with reſpect to the State of the Soul ſeparated thereby from the Body, antecedent to the Promiſe of Chriſt, was not a Queſtion neceſſary to be entered into. And this is ſtill the more confirmed by This, that even thoſe Phraſes, θανάτῳ κρατήσαντος, φθορᾶς παραμενούσης, ἐν τῷ τοῦ θανάτου φθορᾷ μένειν and the like; which ſeems at firſt ſight to make the moſt for your purpoſe; 'tis plain need not be underſtood to expreſs the *total Extinction or utter Annihilation* of *Adam*, if Chriſt had never been promiſed; but either his having no ground to expect any Reſtoration to his former ſtate by a *Reſurrection of the Body*; which ſeems to be the meaning of them in ſome places; or elſe (which is evidently their Signification in ſome other places,) *Death's continuing to prevail and extend it ſelf over his Poſterity*: Thus,

Thus, *When Adam had ſinned,* ſaith * he, *Death entred into the World; and this Deſtruction prevailed more and more over the whole Race of Mankind. For Men encreaſed and multiplied their Sins beyond meaſure: And therefore Death prevailing more and more, and this Deſtruction continuing to have Dominion over Men, the whole Race of Mankind was loſt.*

* Τάτῳ ὃ γενομένῳ, οἱ μὲν ἄνθρωποι ἀπέθνησκον, ἡ δὲ φθορὰ λοιπὸν κατ' αὐτῶν ἴσχυεν· καὶ πλεῖον τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἰσχύσα καθ' ὅλα τ γένος· καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πλημμελήμασιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι οὐκ ἄχρις ὅρων ᾠκείωσαν εἰσήκεισαν, ἀλλὰ κατ' ὀλίγον ἐπεκτεινόμενοι, λοιπὸν καὶ εἰς ἄμετρον ἐλελύθασι.— Διὰ δὴ ταῦτα πλεῖον τοῖς θανάτῳ κρατήσαι, καὶ τ φθορᾶς παραμένούσης καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὸ μὲν τ ἀνθρώπων γένος ἐφθείρετο. *De Incarnat. Verbi.*

The ſame thing (namely that the Phraſes before-mentioned do not ſignifie the total extinction of *Adam* both Soul and Body, if Chriſt had never been promiſed; but only That Mortality which is the Diſſolution of the Body and ſeparation of the Soul;) may alſo be gathered from thoſe other Expreſſions of the ſame Author in his Book *de Incarnatione Chriſti*, from ſome of which you very unreaſonably endeavour (*pag.* 85.) to conclude the direct contrary. For when he ſpeaks of the Souls being held [ἐν δεσμοῖς] *in Bonds*, and [ἐν δεσμοῖς θανάτου] *in the Bonds of Death*; 'tis plain this does not ſignify *the Extinction* of the Soul, but its confinement to [Ἅιδης] *the ſeparate State*. And therefore, ſpeaking of Chriſt's delivering Men from that Mortality which was the Conſequence of *Adam*'s Sin, he ſaith; * *To that place where the Body of Man was corrupted, thither did the Body of Chriſt go; and to that Place, where the Soul of Man was detained in Death, thither did Chriſt go with his Humane Soul,* &c. In which

* Διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὅπου διεφθάρη τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων σῶμα, ἐκεῖ παρεγένετο Ἰησοῦς τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα· καὶ ὅπου κατείχετο ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη ἐν θανάτῳ ἐκεῖ ἐπεδείκνυτο ὁ Χριστὸς τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ψυχὴν ἰδίαν οὖσαν, &c. *De Incarn. Chriſti contra Apollinar. lib.* 1.

which Paſſage 'tis evident, that by the Words [κατέστη ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη ἐν θανάτῳ] *the Soul of Man was detained in Death*, is not meant the *Extinction* of the Soul, but its *Confinement to* [Ἅιδης] *that ſeparate State*, to which the Soul of Chriſt deſcended. And in that very Paſſage, where from the Souls being concerned in the Sentence [θανάτῳ ἀποθανῇ] *thou ſhalt ſurely die*, you would infer the *Extinction* of the Soul; if you had cited the Words at length, it would have appeared that *juſt the contrary* was intended: The Words are theſe; *God*, ſaith † he, *paſſed upon Man a double Sentence of Puniſhment; ſaying to his earthly Body, Duſt thou art, and unto Duſt ſhalt thou return; and ſo the Body turned into Corruption; And to his Soul, Thou ſhalt ſurely die; and ſo the Man was ſeparated, and condemned to depart into two different places:* From the laſt of which Words it is very evident, that by applying that Threatning [θανάτῳ ἀποθανῇ] *thou ſhalt ſurely die*, to the Soul; he did not mean its *Extinction*, but its *Separation* and *Confinement to* [Ἅιδης] *the ſeparate State.*

† Διπλῆς τὴν πυωείας τλὼ ἀποφασιν δέδωκε τῷ μὲν γηίνῳ εἰρηκὼς, Γῆ εἶ, καὶ εἰς γῆν ἀπελεύσῃ· καὶ ὅπως ὑποδέχεται φθορὰ τὸ σῶμα, δεσπότης ἀποφαινόμενος τῇ δὲ ψυχῇ, θανάτῳ ἀποθανῇ καὶ ὅπω διχ διαιρεῖται ὁ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ἐν δυσὶ τόποις ὑπάρχειν καταδικάζεται. ibid.

Your laſt Citation out of this Author, (*pag.* 86,) is very remarkable. Againſt certain Heretics who taught that the Soul was *corporeal*, he argues from thoſe Words of our Saviour, *Fear not them that kill the Body, but cannot kill the Soul. If*, ſaith * he, *the Soul be, as you Appollinariſts contend, corporeal; why cannot it be killed and periſh with the Body? and why doth* St Peter, *ſpeaking of*

* Πῶς εἰ σαρκικὴ ἡ ψυχὴ καθ' ὑμᾶς, οὐ σωθήσεται πῶς σώματι καὶ συμθήσεται: πῶς δὲ καὶ ὁ Πέτρος τὰς ἐν Ἅιδῃ κατεχομένας ψυχὰς, πνεύ-

ſeparate

ματα ὀνομάσας, &c. *De adventu Chriſti contra Apollinar. lib.* 2.

ſeparate Souls, call them Spirits? *Here* you ſay, *the* [σαρκικὴ ψυχὴ] fleſhly or corporeal Soul, *is plainly oppoſed to the* [πνευματικὴ] Spiritual Soul, *and for that reaſon is ſuppoſed as capable of being killed by Men, as the Body it ſelf.* Is not this very extraordinary? when the plain and expreſs meaning of *Athanaſius*, is to ſhow that there can be no ſuch thing at all as [σαρκικὴ ψυχὴ] *a fleſhly or corporeal Soul*; becauſe, if there was, it would be capable of being killed, which our Saviour ſays cannot be.

All that you ſay, *Sect.* 23, ſeems to be utterly Unintelligible: And thoſe words in particular, *pag.* 91, (which I have before had an occaſion to take notice of,) where you ſuppoſe the Soul to be *Something diſtinct* both *from Spirit*, and alſo from *Matter and Motion*; that is to ſay, a *Material Form*; an *active Subſtantial Principle, diſtinct from Matter, yet depending on Matter* in eſſe, in fieri, in operari, *and which muſt accordingly be diſſolved on the diſſolution of that Matter on which it depends:* Theſe words, I ſay, appear ſo very abſurd and contradictory in themſelves, that no Confutation of them can be ſtronger than the bare tranſcribing them.

You ſeem very certain, *Sect.* 24, that your Doctrine can have no *ill Influence* upon Mens preſent *Practiſe*; becauſe, tho' you aſſert indeed the *natural Mortality* of the Soul, yet you teach at the ſame time. that the Souls of all thoſe, who hear of the Goſpel, whether they imbrace it or no, ſhall be *actually immortalized*; and ſo bad Men can take no advantage of the Doctrine concerning

concerning the *Natural Mortality* of the Soul, to encourage themſelves in their Wickedneſs with the Hopes of Impunity. But can you really think, Sir, that it is a thing of no ill conſequence in Practiſe, to raiſe new diſputes, to fill the Minds of weak and unſtable Men with endleſs Doubts and Scruples, and the Mouths of the Profane with new Topicks of Scepticiſm and Raillery, againſt the moſt important and fundamental Doctrines of all Religion? Or can you be indeed perſwaded, that ſuch Men as are pleaſed with ſome of your Notions, will as readily admit all the reſt alſo? You are forced to make a new and diſtinct Hypotheſis upon every particular occaſion. You firſt ſuppoſe the Soul of Man naturally Mortal; and then, to ſecure to good Men the Unchangeable State of Heaven, you are forced to ſuppoſe *their* Souls præternaturally immortalized to Happineſs by the Divine Spirit: Yet, becauſe all who receive that Divine Spirit, do not ſo behave themſelves as to be capable of the Happineſs of Heaven, you are forced (though † unwillingly) to ſuppoſe ſome of them immortalized by the ſame Divine Spirit to Puniſhment; And after this, leaſt thoſe who reject the Goſpel and never receive the Divine immortalizing Spirit at all, ſhould take advantage of the Souls natural Mortality to encourage themſelves with hopes of Impunity in their Wickedneſs, you are forced to ſuppoſe *Their* Souls made immortal without any immortalizing Principle at all, by the mere Omnipotence and Arbitrary Pleaſure of God. Now, all theſe Hypotheſes appearing very precarious and independent on each other; is it not very obvious to perceive that profane Men will very

† *Preſent pag.* 22, compared with your *Diſcourſe pag.* 8 & 31.

gladly and with great advantage make uſe of all your Arguments for the *Natural Mortality* of the Soul; and drop the following parts of your Hypotheſis? And indeed I cannot ſee, but you muſt in ſome meaſure be anſwerable for this ill Conſequence. For it is not enough to prevent the natural and obvious ill Conſequences of an Hypotheſis, that a learned and ingenious Man is able to invent ſuch further Suppoſitions, and to find out ſuch Shifts and Diſtinctions, by which he ſhall think he can evade the force of thoſe Conſequences. There is hardly any Opinion ſo extravagant or of ſo miſchievous conſequence, but an ingenious Man may maintain it in ſuch manner, as that upon his whole Hypotheſis it ſhall not be eaſie to charge him with any ill conſequence, for which he will not be able to find ſome evaſion: And yet he that maintains it, muſt nevertheleſs be anſwerable for ſuch ill Conſequences, as are naturally apt to follow from the Opinion it ſelf, without the additional Hypotheſis which are made uſe of it to ſalve it. The Epicureans, who taught that *Pleaſure was the Chief Good*, when they were charged with the obvious ill Conſequences of that Doctrine, were provided to make ſuch ingenious Explications of it, that they thought themſelves abundantly able to evade all thoſe ill Conſequences that could be drawn from it: Yet that Doctrine was evidently a very pernicious Doctrine; and they who maintained it, could not be excuſed (as *Cicero* has largely ſhown) from being anſwerable for thoſe Conſequences, which were but * too naturally drawn from it by the generality of Men, who would not attend to

* Quaſi ego id curem quid ille *aiat* aut *neget*: illud quæro, quid ei *conſentaneum* ſit dicere, qui &c. *Cicero.*

to the Subtilties and Diſtinctions of thoſe Philoſophers. He that will ſuppoſe Men to have *no Soul at all*, but that their Life is entirely extinguiſhed at the Diſſolution of the Body; and at the ſame time ſuppoſes that at the Reſurrection their Life ſhall be reſtored again, and continue for ever; will be ſure to pretend that no ill Conſequence can be drawn from his Doctrine, becauſe he ſuppoſes Men actually and in event as much Immortal, as if they *had Soul's really diſtinct from their Bodies*: And yet I believe you your ſelf make no doubt but That Opinion is a very pernicious one. He that will affirm that there is no other Subſtance in the World but *Matter*; and at the ſame time ſuppoſes Matter capable of all the ſame Powers and Attributes, which we aſcribe to Spirit; may likewiſe with the ſame Reaſon pretend, that no ill Conſequence can be drawn from his Opinion: And yet no Body can doubt but ſuch an Opinion leads directly to Atheiſm. 'Tis not therefore ſo very clear, as you ſeem to ſuppoſe it to be, that none of thoſe Conſequences are to be charged upon you, which (if your whole Hypotheſis be granted) you can find indeed a way of evading.

You attempt to prove (*Sect.* 25) that *the Immortalizing Principle was generally believed no Ingredient in the Nature of the Humane Soul among the Heathens themſelves*; by ſaying, *that the popular Heathens believed only their firſt Anceſtors to have been Gods, their next to have been Heroes or Demi-Gods, and the later Generations to have been pure Men; Unleſs the Supreme Being were pleaſed (even in the degenerous Ages) to conſer the nobler Principle on ſome choice Favourites.* Here you ſeem to *forget*, that the *popular Heathens* (as you

call them) had all a notion of *Elyſian Fields* and of a *Tartarus*, that is, of a Place of future Happineſs or Miſery, where the Souls of thoſe which you call *pure* or mere *Men* were to be diſpoſed of, either to continue there for ever, or to come out upon new revolutions, but not to be extinguiſhed. Yet preſently after, (*pag.* 96) you ſay that by the oldeſt Tradition, *all Souls were ſuppoſed to have the Divine Principle connatural to them*; And the reſt of the Section is wholly ſpent in explaining the Notions of thoſe whom you call (*pag.* 100) the *Traditional travelling Philoſophers*, who believed that Human Souls underwent many Purgations and different Revolutions, but that *no part of the divine ſeed might periſh finally*; and that *all Humane Souls were thus far at leaſt of a divine extraction, not as the Notion of the Divine might intitle them to infinite Perfection, but as it might at leaſt intitle them to Immortality.* All which is ſo far from being any thing to your purpoſe, of proving that the *Immortalizing Principle was generally believed no ingredient, in the Nature of the Humane Soul among the Heathens themſelves*; that on the contrary it ſeems to me to prove rather directly againſt you.

Sect 26. You all along confound either *neceſſary Immortality*, or elſe the Notion of *Pre-exiſtence* and Revolutions of Souls, with *natural ImMortality*. That which any of the Primitive Chriſtians blamed *Plato* and *Origen* for, was not their aſſerting the *Immortality* of the Soul, but its *Pre-exiſtence* and everlaſting *Revolutions*. Their Maxim, that *whatever had a Beginning, muſt therefore be capable likewiſe of having an End*, does not at all prove againſt *natural*, but only againſt *neceſſary*

ceſſary Immortality, that is, *neceſſary and independent Exiſtence*: As is evident from what you your ſelf obſerve, that *upon this Principle they owned none Immortal but God himſelf*; *No, not the Angels*; And that the Apoſtle affirms of God, [Ὁ μόνος ἔχων ἀθανασίαν, 1 *Tim.* 6, 16,] that *He only* has Immortality, *as being the* αὐτο ἀθανασία *from whom All that will pretend to Immortality, muſt derive it, and not from their own Nature*; that is, not from the *Neceſſity of their own Nature*, but from the *Will* of God: who was pleaſed to create them *Immortal*, and upon whom (notwithſtanding their Immortality, that is, notwithſtanding their natural Power of continuing for ever, without being liable to be deſtroyed by any created Force,) they nevertheleſs continually depend for their Preſervation.

Ariſtotle by affirming the immortal Soul to be [θυραθεν] *from without*, means plainly that it is *Something diſtinct from the Body*, and not (as you interpret him *pag.* 101.) that it is *not ingredient in the Conſtitution of Mankind in general*, or (as you * elſewhere expreſs your ſelf) that it is a *præternatural Principle*; as if, *naturally*, Men had no rational Souls at all.

* *Præmon. pag.* 24, & *Diſcourſe pag.* 300.

The other Maxim you mention, *That nothing that is paſſible can be Immortal*, proves likewiſe only againſt *neceſſary*, not againſt *natural Immortality*. For a Thing's being capable to be acted upon, does not all prove that it is capable of being deſtroyed by any natural Power. Every perfectly ſolid Particle of Matter it ſelf, is incapable of being deſtroyed or even divided by any Power of Nature, though it is as capable of being moved and agitated and acted upon, as any compound Body. The Soul may in like manner be very capable of ſuffering and of being acted upon; and yet it will not t

all follow, that it is capable of being deſtroyed by any natural Power. Thoſe of the Antients who *pretended that the Soul of the rich Man in the Parable muſt have been Corruptible, becauſe it ſuffered Torment*; you acknowledge, prove at the ſame time that it *muſt* likewiſe *have been Coporeal*: But the *Corporality* of the Soul, you know, was taught only by one or two Men. The reſt were all of a different Opinion. And *Lactantius* is very particular and expreſs in anſwering that Objection; * *If the Soul be immortal how then is it paſſible and capable of enduring Puniſhment? and if it be capable of pain, how is it not capable of Diſſolution?* The Anſwer he gives, is; firſt, † *that* (according to the Notion of the Stoicks) *the Soul's of Men, though by reaſon of their Divine Original they cannot indeed be extinguiſhed, yet by being immerſed in Senſe and depraved by Sin, they may become liable to Miſery and Puniſhment*: Secondly, * *that tho' we indeed do not know how Immaterial Things can be acted upon, yet God has as much Power over them, as over corporeal Things*: And laſtly, ‖ *that in order to endure Puniſhment, the Souls ſhall again be united to their Bodies.* All which Paſſages undeniably ſhow that *Lactantius* did not think the Soul naturally corruptible, and preſerved præternaturally by the Power of God; but on the contrary, that the Soul was naturally

* Si eſt immortalis anima; quomodo patibilis inducitur, ac pœnæ ſentiens? *lib.* 7. § 20.

† Eas naturæ reddi animas, ut ſi non extinguibiles in totum, quoniam ex Deo ſunt, tamen cruciabiles fiant per corporis maculam, &c. *ibid.*

* Tantam eſſe Dei poteſtatem ut etiam incorporalia comprehendat, & quemadmodum voluerit, afficiat. Nam & Angeli Deum metuunt, &c. Quid ergo mirum, ſi cum ſint immortales animæ, tamen patibles ſint Deo? *ibid.* § 21.

‖ Sed tamen docent nos ſanctæ literæ, quemadmodum pœnas impii ſint luituri. Nam quia peccata in corporibus contraxerunt, rurſus carne inducentur, ut in corporibus piaculum ſolvant. *ibid.*

turally Immortal, but by the Power of God made capable of enduring Puniſhment.

If there was any ſtrength in the Argument you make uſe of, *Sect.* 27; that *becauſe the* actual *Immortality of the Soul is a Revelation of the Goſpel, therefore it is not capable of being proved by Reaſon from the Nature of the Soul it ſelf*; It would follow by the ſame Argument, that *Moral Obligations* becauſe they are *Revelations* of the Will of God in the Goſpel, therefore are not capable of being proved by Reaſon, from the Nature of God, of Men, and of Things. Some things revealed in the Goſpel, are indeed of ſuch a Nature that they could not have been known *at all* without Revelation: But others (of which the *Immortality of the Soul* is one,) are ſuch as were capable of being in great meaſure diſcovered by the Light of Nature and right Reaſon; but yet by the Revelation of the Goſpel, are made known with much greater *Certainty*, greater *Clearneſs*, greater *Authority*, and in a *Manner* much better *fitted* to all *Capacities*. This ſeems to be the proper meaning of the Word [φωτίσαντος 2 *Tim.* 1, 10,] *has brought to Light*, has *clearly diſcovered*, has *univerſally and evidently made known*, that which before was but *obſcurely* and *difficultly* and *imperfectly* underſtood. The Alluſion you ſuppoſe to be between the Words [*has brought Life and Immortality to* Light *through the Goſpel*,] and thoſe other words of the Apoſtle, [*an Inheritance incorruptible, that fadeth not away, of the Saints in* Light,] is indeed ſome little Similitude of Words; the word *Light* being uſed in both places; but not the leaſt Alluſion or Similitude in Senſe. And indeed you ſeem your ſelf to be con-

ſcious of the weakneſs of your Argument in this whole Matter; by your ſaying that the Im-
† *pag.* 106. mortality of the Soul, *at leaſt* † *in Heaven*, is plainly ſuppoſed not to be known without divine
* *pag.* 104. Revelation; and again, *At leaſt* * *as to the giving us that immortal Life in Heaven*; and, That the Immortality of the Soul could not have been o-
‖ *pag.* 105. therwiſe known with ‖ *that Certainty* that might *ſupport the Practiſe which Religion expects in conſequence of it*; and again, That it could not have
* *pag.* 104. been known, at *leaſt* * *with that Aſſurance* which was *requiſite for the Practiſe which Religion requires purſuant to the Belief of it.*

That the *Sadducees* (*Sect.* 28,) denied the *Immortality of the Soul*, is very true: But then it is worth obſerving, that the ſame Men aſſerted alſo that there was *no Reſurrection, neither Angel nor Spirit*, Acts 23, 6. Your interpretation of which words, is very extraordinary. *What is the meaning of* Spirit *here, as it is joyned with* Angel, you ſay *is manifeſt*: *It is that* Immortalizing Spirit *which makes us* Ἰσαγγέλους, *that is, Immortal and entitled to Heaven, as well as the Angels are*: *That ſame Spirit indeed by which the Angels themſelves are entitled to Immortality.*—— *This therefore oblig'd them* [the Sadducees] *to deny the actual Immortalizing of either Angels or Humane Souls, when they denied them Both that Spirit which could alone immortalize them.* Theſe Words, I think, need no Reflexion to be made upon them.

Your Interpretation (*Sect.* 21,) of that Text, 1 *Cor.* 15, 22, *As in Adam all die, even ſo in Chriſt ſhall all be made alive*; ſeems very forced and unnatural. You underſtand it to ſignifie, that as All who deſcended from *Adam*, muſt die; ſo

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All who are in Chriſt, that is, all Chriſtians, ſhall be made alive. But this Interpretation, if it was true, would prove too much for you; namely, that thoſe only who embraced, not thoſe who rejected the Goſpel, ſhould be raiſed again: And the general tenor of Scripture, which every where declares that Unbelievers, who never were *in Chriſt*, ſhall be raiſed to Condemnation; ſhows plainly that your Interpretation of this Text is wrong. And how the falſe Notion certain Hereticks had of a metaphorical Reſurrection, 2 *Tim.* 2, 18, tends to prove that St *Pauls* true account of the literal Reſurrection, is to be underſtood in a particular and limited Senſe; is not eaſie to conceive.

Your Inference in the ſame place, againſt the Univerſality of the Reſurrection, from what the Apoſtle ſays concerning *Baptiſm*; ſeems likewiſe wholly precarious. For the Apoſtle does not in this Chapter ſay any thing, by which he might ſeem to ground the Reſurrection upon *Baptiſm:* But only, arguing againſt thoſe who pretended to be Chriſtians, and yet did not believe the Reſurrection of the Dead, he ſhows how abſurd it was for ſuch Perſons to be *baptized*, and thereby to expoſe themſelves to ſuch hazards as they muſt unavoidably do by their profeſſing Chriſtianity, if they had no expectation of a Reſurrection from the Dead. Whatever be the meaning of that difficult Phraſe, of being *baptized for the Dead*; the ſtreſs of the Argument plainly lies upon theſe Words. *And why ſtand we in Jeopardy every Hour?* That *Baptiſm*, whatever it was, expoſed them to ſome hazard, and gave occaſion to their being perſecuted; and the Apoſtles Argument is, that it was fooliſh for them to

to expoſe themſelves to ſuch danger needleſly and to no purpoſe, if there was to be no ſuch thing as a Reſurrection from the Dead. The Apoſtle grounds the reaſonableneſs of being baptized, and of embracing Chriſtianity, which was a perſecuted Religion; purely upon the Hopes of a Reſurrection from the Dead; But he does not at all ground the Reſurrection upon Baptiſm, nor ſays any thing which does in the leaſt inſinuate that the Reſurrection ſhould not be univerſal.

The Concluſion you draw (*Sect.* 32.) from what St. *Paul* teaches, *Rom.* 5. is very obſcure. The Sum of the Apoſtle's Doctrine, there, is that That Condemnation which was brought upon Men by *Adam*, they are delivered from by Chriſt. How you can infer any thing from thence, againſt the univerſal Immortality of the Soul, I do not perceive. You ſuppoſe that thoſe over whom Death reigned between the times of *Adam* and *Moſes*, were extinguiſhed by a total Mortality both of Soul Body; But the Death there ſpoken of, is plainly the ſame Death to which all other Men likewiſe are ſubject: For 'tis not ſaid, that Death reigned over *Them only*; but that Death reigned *even* over them alſo, as well as over the reſt of Mankind; notwithſtanding that they had not ſinned againſt any poſitive Law, as *Adam before*, and thoſe who lived under the Law did *after*; but were ſubject to Death, only as it was a natural Conſequence of *Adam*'s Tranſgreſſion: To infer from hence, that their Souls as well as Bodies, were ſubject to that Mortality, is begging the Queſtion which was undertaken to be proved. Thoſe who are ſubject

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to Death in conſequence of *Adam*'s Tranſgreſſion, are indeed ſtiled *Many*. *ver.* 15 and 19; as thoſe to whom the the Benefit of Chriſt's Death redounds, are alſo in the ſame place ſtiled *Many*: But thoſe *Many* who die thro' the Offence of One, are, *ver.* 12 and 18, expreſsly called *All Men*; and there is no good reaſon to ſuppoſe, but that the Death of Chriſt, who was promiſed immediately upon the Fall of *Adam*, may conditionally extend its Virtue, and Benefit under different Diſpenſations, to all Men likewiſe. To ſay that the Dominion of Death, ſignifies in this place ſomething peculiar, under which *all Men are not included*; becauſe the Apoſtle affirms that *Death reigned from Adam to Moſes, even over them that had not ſinned after the ſimilitude of Adam's Tranſgreſſion*; is very ſingular and groundleſs: For the Dominion of Death is not there *confined* (as you ſuppoſe it) *to the ſpace between Adam and Moſes*; ſo as to ſignifie a particular kind of Death prevailing at that Time, an extinction of Soul as well as diſſolution of the Body; But the Apoſtle's aſſertion is plainly This, that in Conſequence of *Adam's* Tranſgreſſion, Death (in the common acceptation of Mortality) reigned in that ſpace of time alſo, even over them that had not tranſgreſſed any poſitive Law *after the ſimilitude of Adam's Tranſgreſſion*, as well as over thoſe who had in their own Perſons diſobeyed poſitive Laws. From whence how any thing can be collected to *your* purpoſe, is very difficult to imagine.

Whether that Text, *Joh.* 1, 9, That *was the true Light, which lighteth every Man that cometh into the World*; was ever alledged by Any, *to prove* that

that an Immortalizing Spirit is given to every Particular by Christ himself; I cannot tell. But I think your Interpretation of it, (*Sect.* 33,) is utterly unintelligible. *The* πνεῦ, you * say, *is That which our Apostle* here *makes in all Men,* [*in every Man that cometh into the World,*] *inlightned by the visitation of the* Λόγ☉, *as an external Principle: Yet so as not to make any change in the Nature, in the Person so inlightned, without peculiar divine Favour, and dispositions in the recipient, for such an Union with the* Λόγ☉, *as may qualify it for the divine Favour of raising it above its own Nature: Till then, they are separable again, and this external Visitation of the* Λόγ☉, *leaves the visited* ψυχὴ, *as Mortal as it found it, where there is no particular design of God for Immortalizing it to Punishment.* What the meaning of this, and all that follows in that Section is; and how you collect it from the forecited Text of St. *John*; is not, I believe, possible to be understood.

* *pag.* 136.

When St. *Paul* says, 1 *Thess.* 4, 16, that the *dead in Christ* shall *rise first*; These words do not indeed prove that there must afterwards be a Resurrection of them that never heard of Christ: because the *dead in Christ*, which are here said to *rise first*, are not, 'tis true, opposed in this place to the dead *out of Christ*, but to them that shall be found *alive in Christ* at the time of the Judgment: (Where note by the by, that you † misinterpret this Text, by opposing the *dead in Christ*, and which are said to *rise first*, not, as the Apostle does, to them that shall be found *alive in Christ*, but to *those who had been formerly in Christ and did not die in him*, or to *those who might have been in him if they had pleased, but never were in him actually.*) But other places of Scripture, as has been

† *pag.* 141.

been before ſhown, do ſufficiently prove the Univerſality of the Reſurrection: And particularly that parallel Text, 1 *Cor.* 15, 23; where the ſame Apoſtle ſays, that *every Man* ſhall be raiſed *in his own Order*; *Chriſt the Firſt-fruits, afterwards they that are Chriſts at his coming*; And *then cometh the end*, &c. Which words being immediately ſubjoined to that univerſal declaration, *As in Adam all die, even ſo in Chriſt ſhall all be made alive*; cannot, without great force, be interpreted to any other Senſe, but that *the End* muſt ſignifie the general Reſurrection of all the Dead. See *Rev.* 20, *v.* 5. 12 & 13.

Your Interpretation (*Sect.* 25.) of that Text, Rom. 2, 12, *As many as have ſinned without Law, ſhall alſo periſh without Law, and as many as have ſinned in the Law, ſhall be judged by the Law*; is not only groundleſs; the word [ἀπολοῦνται *ſhall periſh*] which you underſtand to ſignifie *Annihilation* or *bare ceaſing to be*, being evidently Synonymous to [κριθήσονται *ſhall be judged*;] But alſo (as I before obſerved upon your *Præmonition*, *Sect.* 6.) you thereby overthrow all the Threatnings of the Goſpel, which frequently expreſs the Punihment even of the worſt of Sinners by that ſame word [ἀπολοῦνται *ſhall periſh*] which you here interpret to ſignifie only *a bare ceaſing to be*. You are your ſelf ſenſible of this difficulty, *pag.* 143; where you confeſs, that *though the word, Periſh, may bear that milder Senſe of only ceaſing to be, yet it is alſo uſed in the Scriptures, concerning them whom all muſt believe liable to the ſevereſt poſitive Inflictions*. You ſeem indeed ſenſible, I ſay, of this difficulty upon your Interpretation: But yet you give no anſwer to it: Only you ſay, *pag.* 144. that though *the word will indeed bear a larger Signification*,

on, yet in this place Annihilation may perhaps be more natural. Is not this a very ſingular manner of arguing? To * collect from the ſignification of the word ἀπολῦνται, that thoſe of whom it is here ſpoken, ſhall only ceaſe to be; and yet at the ſame time to confeſs that in other places of Scripture That word has no ſuch Signification; only *in this place, Annihilation may, perhaps, be more natural.*

* See *Præmon. pag.* 35.

Your Interpretation of thoſe other words of the Apoſtle, that *when the Gentiles which have not the Law, do by nature the things contained in the Law, theſe having not the Law, are a Law unto themſelves*; is no leſs extraordinary; Namely, that the Gentiles being a *Law unto themſelves*; does not ſignify their Obligation to obey the Law of nature, with reſpect to future Rewards and Puniſhments; but only there † *owning the Reaſonableneſs of the things impoſed as a Law by God on the Jews, but not on themſelves*; which *would no further oblige Them to the Obſervation of them, than as their own Intereſts might prevail with them to obſerve them, as they would avoid the Puniſhments and obtain the Rewards of Providence in This Life.* Is not this very wonderful; that the Gentiles ſhould be able to judge of the *Reaſonableneſs* of God's moral Law to the Jews, and yet not be ſenſible that the *Reaſonableneſs of the Thing* laid a ſtrong Obligation upon themſelves alſo? Or that they ſhould be ſenſible of an Obligation laid upon them to live virtuouſly (which it would ſometimes happen they could not do without expoſing even their Life it ſelf,) and yet not have any ground to expect a future Judgment, nor any other Rewards and Puniſhments than in the preſent Life? Is not this, deſtroying the very Nature of Virtue and Vice; and contrary to ſome of your own Arguments, *Sect.* 47, *and elſewhere?*

† *pag.* 114.

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It is not a very conſiſtent Notion, to ſuppoſe as you do, *(Sect.* 35, 36, *and elſewhere,)* that the Souls of Men, though naturally mortal, yet are neither diſſolved with their Bodies, nor yet periſh afterwards by any natural Decay; but ſurvive, and continue to ſubſiſt in a ſeparate State; and none of them ever periſh actually by that decay and Mortality which you ſuppoſe natural to Them; but that thoſe who ſhall neither be immortalized to Happineſs nor to Puniſhment, ſhall yet ſubſiſt till the general Judgment, and then be diſſolved by that *exquiſite fire which is to prevail in the laſt Conflagration, at leaſt ſo far as to deprive them of any ſenſibility of Pain.* Is not this Notion more properly a ſuppoſing them to be naturally Immortal, that is, capable of ſubſiſting for ever by the Powers given them at their original Production; but that God, by the interpoſition of his Almighty Power, præternaturally deſtroys at the laſt day, ſuch of them as are neither capable of eternal Happineſs, nor yet deſerve eternal Puniſhment? This certainly would have been rather the more conſiſtent Scheme of the two, and ſomewhat a more defenſible Explication of your Notion, (with reſpect to the *bare Reaſon* of the Thing,) than to affirm that all Souls are *naturally mortal*, and yet that none of them ever die by a *natural decay and Mortality.* But your Hypotheſis, however varied, would not yet have been truly conſiſtent. For why, I beſeech you, muſt it needs be ſuppoſed, that God cannot diſpoſe of all his rational Creatures into States ſuitable to their ſeveral Natures, and proportionable to their ſe-

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veral capacities and deſerts, without deſtroying and taking away their Being? And what can be more forced and diſagreeable to Reaſon, than to ſuppoſe that the Sodomites and Ninevites and other Heathens of all Sorts, muſt indeed all appear at the Day of Judgment, but yet that their appearance there will be † *with no Deſign of concerning them in the Judgment of the Day, but only in the retroſpective part of the day, for vindicating the Divine Providence, in relation to what had been tranſacted by it formerly*? You imagine indeed, ‖ that *the Sodomites and Eygptians* and other wicked Men to whom the Goſpel was never preached, *may endure the Sufferings of the future eternal State, during the time of their Duration*; *that is, from the time of their Death to the Day of Judgment*; And that * *the Infelicities good Heathens may have ſuffered in this Life, may be ſufficiently rewarded by the Happineſs of the intermediate ſpace between their Death and the Judgment, though they have no ſhare in thoſe Eternal Rewards which are to follow after the day of Judgment*: But, upon your Scheme, how can this be applied to thoſe who ſhall live at the End of the World, when there may be as good and as bad Men among the Heathens, as ever were in any other Age, and yet theſe, according to your Notion, muſt All periſh together at the Conflagration? And beſides, becauſe I preſume you will not be leſs moved by Authority than by Reaſon; is not this extremely like one of thoſe very Notions, which *Tertullian*, whoſe Authority you are otherwiſe ſo very deſirous to make uſe of, blames the * *Stoicks* for, and ridicules them as vainly and

† *pag.* 148.

‖ *pag.* 359.

* *pag.* 311.

* Qui animæ aliquod tempus indulgent, ab exceſſu uſq; in *conflagrationem* univerſitatis, ut Stoici, &c. *Tertull. de Anima.*

and † needleſly imagining, that the Souls of their Diſciples ſhould continue capable of Inſtruction and Improvement in the ſeparate State, when at the ſame time they believed they were all to periſh in the approaching *Conflagration?*

Τὴν δ' ψυχὴν γεννητὴν τε καὶ φθαρτὴν. Οὐκ εὐθὺς ὁ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν φθείρεσθαι. Ἀλλ' ἐπιμένειν τινὰς χρόνους καθ' ἑαυτὴν τὴν μὴ τῶν σπουδαίων, μέχρι τοῦ εἰς πῦρ ἀναλύσεως τῶν πάντων· &c. *Numenius apud Euſeb.* meaning

† Quis autem illis poſtumæ Eruditionis uſus ac fructus, jamjam *conflagratione* perituris? *Tertull. de Anima.*

What you advance in your 41*ſt and following Sections*, concerning the State and Condition of *ſeparate Souls*, is in every reſpect too uncertain to have any thing built upon it. Whether they who never heard of the Goſpel in This Life, ſhall hereafter have any new Offer made to them, and undergo any new Trial; or whether all Mankind, even thoſe who never heard of Chriſt at all, ſhall however, by virtue of the original Promiſe of the Meſſiah made to *Adam*, have ſo much benefit of the Redemption purchaſed by the Blood of Chriſt, as that at the general Judgment they ſhall all in ſome Proportions, and according to their ſeveral Capacities, have relief from the Equity and Mercy of the Goſpel-covenant; (which ſeems, of the two, to be much the more probable Opinion: For how ſhall they who are found alive at the end of the World, undergo any new Trial?) Which ſoever, I ſay, of theſe ways be true, it makes little difference as to the main Queſtion. That, upon the whole, God is no Reſpecter of Perſons; and *that* our Saviour *could not confine his deſign, as a Saviour of Souls*, to any particular People, (as you prove largely and well in your 47th Section,) but will certainly in ſome manner or other extend the offer of his gracious Covenant, or at leaſt the Be-

nefit and Equity of it in ſome Proportions, to Men of all Ages and Nations in the World; muſt undoubtedly be allowed by all conſidering Perſons: And this very conſideration alone, if you had not at other times reaſoned inconſiſtently with your ſelf, might eaſily have ſaved you the whole trouble of inventing your wonderful Hypotheſis concerning the natural Mortality of the Soul, in order to diſpoſe of thoſe Gentiles who never heard of Chriſt: But then as to the particular Manner, how the Equity and Mercy of the Goſpel ſhall be extended to thoſe to whom it never was preached; this, there is no Neceſſity of determining; And certainly your Notion, *(Sect.* 42,*)* concerning ſeparate Souls being of Neceſſity to be *baptized with Water*, even in the *literal Senſe*, in order to be made capable of any Favour of this kind; might very well have been ſpared.

As to what you teach in the 42*th and following Sections*, concerning *two diſtinct Souls* in Men; Many antient Writers do indeed ſo expreſs themſelves, as if they ſuppoſed the *ſenſitive Soul* to be one Subſtance, and the *rational Soul* another: But both That Philoſophy it ſelf, and your explication of it particularly, is very unintelligible: And your interpretation of that Text, where the Formation of Man is deſcribed, is really ridiculous; The Words are theſe; *And the Lord God formed Man of the Duſt of the Ground, and breathed into his Noſtrils the Breath of Life, and Man became a living Soul.* Gen. 2, 7. Upon this Text, † *pag.* 216. you † ſay; *Here is a Man ſuppoſed before the Divine Breathing; Certainly not a dead Man, which is indeed no Man, but a Man animated with that lower Soul,*

Soul, which is common to him and Beaſts and therefore cannot be imputed to a Divine Breathing. Can any thing be more abſurd than this Interpretation? or can any thing be more plain, than that the meaning of theſe Words is, that God firſt formed the *Body* of Man out of the Duſt, and then inſpired into it a living *Soul?* But which way ſoever the Philoſophy of this Queſtion be determined, it will ſtill be nothing to your purpoſe: For ſuppoſe, if you pleaſe, that the *Senſitive* and *rational* Soul be really two diſtinct Subſtances; yet how does this tend to prove that the *Rational Soul* is ever the more *naturally Mortal?* Did not thoſe antient Philoſophers, who thought Man compoſed of three diſtinct parts, a *Body*, a *Senſitive Soul*, and a *rational Spirit*; teach that the *rational Spirit* was *naturally Immortal?* as you your ſelf confeſs * concerning *Plato* and *Philo*; and you bring no Authority nor Reaſoning, in theſe Sections, to the contrary.

* page 22 & 23.

In like manner your long Excurſion, in the 55*th Section*, concerning the *Separate State*, does not at all prove, nor indeed ſo much as ſuppoſe, that the Soul is *naturally Mortal:* On the contrary, the Authorities you there cite, do all ſuppoſe it *Immortal.* Wherefore the particular groundleſs, not to ſay abſurd Notions, which you there advance, concerning the *Habitations of ſeparate Souls*, and the *Extent of the Power of Evil Spirits over them* &c. not being of any importance with reſpect to the main Queſtion; need not here be examined.

The Argument you propoſe, (*Sect.* 60.) that *a naturally mortal Soul is more ſuitable and agreeable to be joyned with a naturally mortal Body, as a conſtituent*

ſtituent of Human Nature, than a Soul that is naturally Immortal. This Argument, if it proved any thing, would prove that the Soul ought to be of the ſame Nature and Duration with the Body, and that it ought to die at the ſame time with the Body, that is, that there ought to be no Soul at all. For it is juſt as much diſagreeable and unſuitable to the Body, to have ſuch a Subſtance united to it, as is capable of ſubſiſting at all after the Diſſolution of the Body; as to have ſuch a Subſtance united to it, as is capable of continuing to ſubſiſt for ever. Since therefore you your ſelf acknowledge that the Soul is naturally able to ſubſiſt ſeparate for many ages after the diſſolution of the Body; this Argument, if it had any ſtrength in it, would prove a great deal too much for you; and be of the ſame force againſt *your own* Notion of the Soul, as againſt *ours*; Unleſs you could perſwade the World to believe, that not only the *Immortalizing Spirit*, but even the *rational Soul*, that Soul which you ſuppoſe to be *naturally Mortal*, is it ſelf alſo a *præternatural Principle*, (as you * once or twice very abſurdly aſſert,) and not originally a conſtituent Part of Humane Nature.

* *Præmon.* p. 24. and *Diſcourſe* p. 300.

Neither has the Argument you draw from the Doctrine of *Original Sin*, any greater ſtrength in it. For there is no neceſſity of ſuppoſing, upon any Scheme, that ſuch Perſons as have no actual Sin of their own, ſhall ever be condemned to eternal Torments merely for the Sin of our firſt Parent. 'Tis true we cannot peremptorily affirm in particular, how God will diſpoſe of ſuch Souls, as having no actual Sins of their own to anſwer for, yet have no expreſs Title, by the ordinary Means,

Means, to the Rewards of the Goſpel: But certainly 'tis a very weak and poor Argument, to conclude that numberleſs Souls muſt therefore neceſſarily be annihilated, merely becauſe we do not know in particular, what State and Condition it will pleaſe God to aſſign them.

The ſame may be ſaid of your Argument drawn from the Doctrine of *Reprobation*. You anſwer it your ſelf, by ſuppoſing that the Doctrine of *abſolute Reprobation* is not the Doctrine of Scripture. And as to that *Præterition*, which is barely the not affording all Men the ſame Means of Knowledge; 'tis anſwered in your own Scheme, by what you ſay (*Sect.* 45, 46, and 47) concerning the new Trial ſome Perſons may undergo in another State; and 'tis anſwered better by ſuppoſing that all Men may however be judged in proportion, according to the Equity of the Goſpel, though they never had any explicit Knowledge of it.

Laſtly, As to your Argument drawn from the Difficulty of reconciling eternal Puniſhments with the Goodneſs of God; That Difficulty does not ariſe chiefly from the *difference of the Perſons*, who may be concerned in thoſe Puniſhments proportionably in *different degrees*; but the real difficulty of the Queſtion lies in this, how it is reconcileable with the Goodneſs of God, to put *any Perſons at all* upon a neceſſity of making ſuch an *Option*, wherein if they chooſe amiſs, the Miſery they incurr muſt be irrecoverable. And this difficulty is evidently much better anſwered, by ſuppoſing the Souls of Men to be naturally immortal; ſo that they who render themſelves uncapable of Happineſs, muſt conſequently fall in-

to remedileſs Miſery; than it can be anſwered in *your* Scheme, where none can be liable to endleſs Puniſhment, without being miraculouſly immortalized on purpoſe, by the Arbitrary Will and Power of God, beyond the original Capacity of their Nature.

And now, Sir, I cannot but earneſtly recommend it again to your moſt ſerious conſideration; whether the new and inconſiderate Notions you have advanced, and (the Arguments I will not ſay, becauſe I think you have not offered any that are of any real force, but) the Pretenſes of Reaſon and Authority, which you have put into the hands of ſceptical and profane Men, to confirm them in their prejudices againſt the Belief of the Immortality of the Soul; are not likely to be of great diſſervice to Religion; And whether you ought not (as all good Men are of Opinion you ought) to think of ſome means of making ſatisfaction to the Church, to whom you have given ſo great Offence; and of preventing the effect of that incouragement, which your Notions in this matter (tho' no Body doubts but it is contrary to your intention) have given to Immorality and contempt of Religion.

If zeal for the defenſe of a Doctrine of ſuch importance, has in any part of this Letter cauſed me to drop any Expreſſions, which may be thought too ſharp, and to carry in them too little of that reſpect, which all the World acknowledges to be juſtly due to you upon account of your very great Learning; I know you will pardon it upon ſuch an occaſion as this; and I cannot doubt but upon ſecond Thoughts, you will

will be ſomewhat diſſatisfied with *your ſelf*, for having publiſhed a Book, at which all good Men are ſorry, and all profane Men rejoyce.

ADVERTISEMENT.

WHereas the Author of certain Remarks upon the Sermons preached at Mr *Boyles* Lecture in the Year 1704, has publiſhed a Vindication of thoſe Remarks, with more miſrepreſentation of the Doctrine contained in thoſe Sermons, and in thoſe preached in the Year 1705: The Author of the ſaid Sermons, humbly conceiving that there is no Objection either in the Remarks or in the Vindication of the Remarks, which has not been either prevented in the Sermons themſelves, or fully anſwered in the Preface to the ſecond Volume? and not thinking it fit to trouble the World with any further Reply to mere Calumny and ill Language; deſires to refer this matter wholly to the impartial Reader, who by comparing the Books themſelves, with the Remarks, will judge on which ſide Truth and Reaſon ſtands.

A

DEFENSE

Of an ARGUMENT made uſe of in a *Letter* to Mr *Dodwell*, to prove the *Immateriality* and *Natural Immortality* of the SOUL.

IN a Letter to Mr *Dodwell*, upon occaſion of his late *Diſcourſe* concerning the Nature of the *Soul*, the following Argument was among others particularly made uſe of, to prove the *Immateriality* and *natural Immortality* of the Soul.

'The ſame thing, *viz.* that *the Soul cannot poſſibly be Material*, is moreover demonſtrable 'from the ſingle conſideration even of bare 'Senſe and Conſciouſneſs it ſelf. For, Matter 'being a diviſible Subſtance, conſiſting always 'of ſeparable, nay of actually Separate and Di'ſtinct Parts; 'tis plain, unleſs it were eſſenti'ally conſcious, in which caſe every Particle of 'Matter muſt conſiſt of innumerable ſeparate 'and diſtinct Conſciouſneſſes, no Syſtem of it 'in any poſſible Compoſition or Diviſion can be 'an Individual conſcious Being. For ſuppoſe 'three

Letter to Mr Dodwell. *page* 25.

'three, or three hundred, Particles of Matter, 'at a Mile, or any given diſtance, one from 'another; is it poſſible that all thoſe ſeparate 'Parts ſhould in that State be one Individual 'conſcious Being? Suppoſe then all theſe Par-'ticles brought together into one Syſtem, ſo as 'to touch one another; will they thereby, or 'by any Motion or Compoſition whatſoever, 'become any whit leſs truly diſtinct Beings, 'than they were at the greateſt diſtance? How 'then can their being diſpoſed in any poſſible 'Syſtem, make them one Individual Conſcious 'Being? If you ſuppoſe God by by his Infi-'nite Power ſuperadding Conſciouſneſs to the 'united Particles, yet ſtill thoſe Particles, be-'ing really and neceſſarily as diſtinct Beings as 'ever, cannot be themſelves the Subject in which 'that Individual Conſciouſneſs inheres; but the 'Conſcionſneſs can only be ſuperadded by the ad-'dition of Something, which in all the Particles 'muſt ſtill it ſelf be but one Individual Being. 'The Soul therefore, whoſe Power of Thinking 'is undeniably one Individual Conſciouſneſs, 'cannot poſſibly be a Material Subſtance.

To invalidate the force of this Argument, the following Objections have been offered to the publick.

'I. *That* * an Individual Power *may* reſide in 'a Material Syſtem which conſiſts of actually 'ſeparate and diſtinct parts; *That* an Individual 'Power *can* be lodged by God in, or ſuperadded 'to That which is not an individual Being; *or* 'it *may* follow from the Compoſition or Modi-'fication of a Material Syſtem conſiſting of 'actually ſeparate and diſtinct Particles; *and if* 'ſo,

* *A Letter containing ſome Remarks on a pretended Demonſtration*, &c. pag. 11.

'*ſo, then* the very Soul and Strength of the *foregoing* Demonſtration is gone. *That as to this*, 'Matter of Fact is ſo plain and obvious, that a 'Man can't turn his Eye, but he will meet with 'Material Syſtems, wherein there are Individual 'Powers, which are not in every one nor in any 'one of the Particles that compoſe them, when 'taken apart and conſidered ſingly. *That* a 'Roſe, *for Example*, conſiſts of ſeveral Parti-'cles which ſeparately and ſingly want a Power 'to produce that agreeable Senſation we ex-'perience in them when united; And therefore 'either each of the Particles in that Union con-'tributes to the Individual Power which is the 'external cauſe of our Senſation; or elſe God 'ſuperadds the Power of producing that Senſa-'tion in us, upon the Union of the Particles. '*That* this may be the Caſe of Matters Think-'ing. Thoſe Particles which compoſe the Brain 'may under that Modification, either have the 'Power of Thinking neceſſarily flowing from 'them, or elſe may have the Power of Thinking 'ſuperadded to them by the Power of God, tho' 'ſingly and ſeparately they may not have the 'Power of Thinking. *And That* the Fallacy '*of the fore-mentioned Argument* lies in this, that 'by an Individual Power *is there meant* a Power 'that can only proceed from, or reſide in an 'Individual Being: Which is a plain begging 'of the Queſtion.

II. *That though* a Syſtem *of Matter were allowed not to be capable of Thinking, yet* * 'it is evident, * *page* 8 'that, *according to the foregoing Argument*, the & 9. 'ſeparate and diſtinct Parts of Matter are ca-'pable of having a Power of Thinking, or an 'Individual Conſciouſneſs ſuperadded to each of

'them;

'them; becauſe the want of Individuality or 'Diſtinctneſs, is the ſole Reaſon urged, why a 'Syſtem of Matter cannot have a Power of 'Thinking or an Individual Conſciouſneſs; *and* 'it is only required that a Thing be an Indivi-'dual Being, in order to its being a proper Sub-'ject of a Power of Thinking, or at leaſt *in 'order to its being a Subject to which* it may be 'poſſible for God to ſuperadd a power of Think-'ing.

* page 13. III. '*That though it were allowed*, * that Con-'ſciouſneſs could reſide only in an Individual 'Being; and *alſo* that That Individual Being 'muſt be an Immaterial Being; yet *even* then 'the Soul would not be proved to be naturally 'Immortal; *that is, the* Thinking Immaterial 'Being *would not be proved to be Immortal, but 'only the* bare Immaterial Subject or Subſtance *it 'ſelf*; *Becauſe* Thinking is an Action which may 'commence after the Exiſtence of its Subject, 'and may periſh or ceaſe to exiſt, its Subject 'ſtill remaining.

† page 9. IV. '*That if* † an Individual Being can only 'be the Subject of a Power of Thinking, *then, 'according to the foregoing Argument, either it will 'be proved that Material Subſtance is capable of 'Thinking, or elſe that neither is Immaterial Sub-'ſtance capable of it: Becauſe either* ſeveral Par-'ticles of Matter, when united in one Syſtem, 'may become an Individual Being, and be by 'the Power of God rendred incapable of any 'Diviſion or Separation by Natural Cauſes, and 'conſequently be a Subject capable of Thinking, '*or elſe* Immaterial Subſtance *alſo* may as well 'be conceived capable of Diviſion, upon Sup-

'poſition

' poſition that Extenſion is not excluded out of
' the Idea of Immateriality.

V. ' *That if* * from the Power of Thinking, * *page* 14.
' or Individual Conſciouſneſs, we can prove the
' Immateriality of the Soul, and from its Im-
' materiality prove its natural Immortality;
' *then* the Conſequence will be, that all the nu-
' merous ſenſible Creatures in the Univerſe are
' put in the ſame Condition with Man, and
' made capable of eternal Happineſs as well as
' he; *or elſe* to avoid this Conſequence, *it muſt*
' *be ſuppoſed*, *either* that all thoſe Creatures are
' only mere Machines, *or elſe* that their Souls
' ſhall be annihilated upon the diſſolution of
' their Bodies; *And if ſo*, then the proof of the
' natural Immortality of *Mens* Souls from their
' Immateriality, tends not to prove that their
' Souls ſhall *really be* Immortal.

The Queſtion being of great Importance, and the Objections very ingenious, as containing in brief all that can be ſaid in Favour of *Matter*'s being capable of Thinking; It is preſumed it may be acceptable to the impartial Reader, to ſee a clear Anſwer given to each of them as they are here repreſented in their full Strength, tho' (for Methods ſake) in ſomewhat a different Order than they were at firſt publiſhed.

I. To the Firſt, *viz.* That *an individual Power* may *reſide in a Material Syſtem*; *as Sweetneſs, in a Roſe*; *And that Thinking may be ſuppoſed to do ſo, as well as any other Individual Power*; It is anſwered, that 'tis ſo far from being true, as is alledged, that *Matter of Fact is ſo plain and obvious, that a Man can't turn his Eye, but he will meet with Material*

terial Syſtems, wherein there are Individual Powers, which are not in every one, nor in any one, of the Particles that compoſe them, when taken apart and conſidered ſingly; This, I ſay, is ſo far from being True, that, on the contrary, 'tis both abſolutely falſe in Fact, and impoſſible and a direct Contradiction in the Nature of the Thing it ſelf, that *any Power whatſoever* ſhould *inhere* or *reſide in*, any Syſtem or Compoſition of Matter, different from the Powers reſiding in the ſingle Parts. For the clearer and more diſtinct Explication and Proof of which Doctrine, it is to be obſerved that all *Powers* or *Qualities* may be diſtinguiſhed into three ſorts. *1ſt*, Some Qualities there are, which do *ſtrictly* and *properly* ſpeaking, *inhere* in the Subſtance to which they are aſcribed. And concerning theſe, it is evident at firſt ſight, that every Power or Quality, that is or can be *inherent* in any Syſtem of Matter, is nothing elſe than the Sum or Aggregate of ſo many Powers or Qualities *of the ſame kind*, inherent in all its parts. The *Magnitude* of any Body is nothing but the Sum of the Magnitudes of all its Parts. Its *Motion*, is nothing but the Sum of the Motions of all its Parts. And if *Cogitation* in like manner could poſſibly be a Quality really *inherent* in a Syſtem of Matter, it muſt likewiſe neceſſarily be the Sum and Reſult of the Cogitations of the ſeveral Parts: And ſo there would be as many diſtinct Conſciouſneſſes, as there are Particles of Matter, of which the Syſtem conſiſts; Which I ſuppoſe will be granted to be very abſurd. Compoſitions or Diviſions of *Magnitude*, varied in infinite manners to Eternity, can produce nothing in the whole Syſtem, no Quality or Power whatſoever, but *mere Magnitude*; Compoſitions and

and Variations of *Motion*, nothing but *mere Motion*. And *Sound* may as well be added to a *Colour*, or *Colour* to a *Smell*; or any *Quality* be made to subſiſt, without any *Subject* at all; as that any Power whatſoever ſhould be ſupperadded to, and really made to *reſide* in, any Compoſitum or Syſtem of Matter, without being made to inhere *proportionably* in the Parts of that Whole, taken ſingly as well as together. This, I ſay, is evidently at firſt ſight True, of all real Qualities, which truly and properly *inhere* in the Subject to which they belong; ſuch as are *Magnitude* and *Motion* in Matter. 2*dly*, Other Qualities there are, which are *vulgarly* looked upon as *Individual Powers*, reſulting from and reſiding in the whole Syſtem, without reſiding particularly in each or any of its ſingle and original Parts; ſuch as are the *Sweetneſs* of certain Bodies, their *Colours*, &c. But this is only a *vulgar* and very *groſs* Error. For neither do theſe Qualities reſide in, or at all reſult from, the whole Syſtem, in any *proper Senſe*: Neither in *any Senſe at all*, in which they can be aſcribed to that Body or Syſtem of Matter to which they are vulgarly ſuppoſed to belong, are they truly *Individual Powers*. In the *firſt* place they are not *really Qualities* of the Syſtem, and evidently do not all in any *proper Senſe* belong to it, but are only *Effects* occaſionally produced by it in ſome other Subſtance, and truly Qualities or Modes of that other Subſtance in which they are produced; Thus the *Sweetneſs of a Roſe*, is well known not to be a Quality really inhering in the Roſe; but a *Senſation*, which is merely in him that ſmells it, and a Mode of the *Thinking Subſtance* that is in the Man. In the *next* place, theſe Qualities, in no Senſe where-

in

in they can be aſcribed to the Syſtem of Matter, are *Individual Powers.* They are Individuals, only as they are *Modes* of the Thinking Subſtance that perceives them; but in the Bodies themſelves, they are *only ſpecifically*, not *individually*, ſingle Powers; that is, they are only a number of *ſimilar Motions* of *Figures* of the Parts of the Body. Nay, they are not always ſo much as *ſpecifically* ſingle Powers. Thus Compound Colours, as certain *Greens*, for Example, which are *Individual Modes* in the Thinking Subſtance that perceives them, may in the Objects be nothing but a number of Figures or Motions *even ſpecifically* different, namely ſuch as uſually repreſent both *Blue* and *Yellow.* And the ſame may be ſaid of *Heat*, *Light*, *Taſte*, *Sound*, and all thoſe others which we call *Senſible Qualities.* 3*dly*, Other Powers, ſuch as *Magnetiſm*, and *Electrical Attractions*, are not *real Qualities* at all, reſiding in any Subject, but *merely abſtract Names* to expreſs the *Effects* of ſome determinate Motions of certain Streams of Matter: And *Gravitation* it ſelf, is not a *Quality inhering in* Matter, or that can poſſibly *reſult* from any Texture or Compoſition of it; but only an *Effect* of the continual and regular Operation of ſome other Being upon it; by which the Parts are all made to tend one towards another. Under theſe *three* Heads muſt neceſſarily be contain'd all poſſible Qualities, Modes or Powers whatſoever: They muſt either be *Qualities really inhering in the Subject to which they are uſually aſcribed*; or *Modes produced by it in ſome other Subject*; or elſe *mere abſtract Names ſignifying certain Powers or Effects that do not properly reſide in any Subject at all.* And now the Queſtion is, among which of theſe *Three* ſorts of Powers muſt *Conſciouſneſs* or *Thinking* be reckoned.

cned. I ſuppoſe it will neither be ſaid to be *a mere abſtract Name*, nor yet *an Effect* produced in or upon a Foreign Subſtance, (as the *Sweetneſs* or *Colour* of *a Roſe*, is not any individual Power in the Roſe it ſelf, but merely a *Senſation* excited in him that ſmells or ſees it;) but that it is certainly a *Power* or *Quality* truly and *really inhering* in the Thinking Subſtance it ſelf. And therefore, if that Thinking Subſtance be a *Syſtem of Matter*, the former Reaſoning holds ſtrictly and demonſtratively true, that the Conſciouſneſs, muſt inhere in all and every one of the Particles of that Syſtem, taken ſingly, as well as together. To ſuppoſe any Power or Quality of this kind, ariſing from, or belonging to any *whole* Syſtem of Matter, without belonging to the *ſeveral Parts* of which that Whole conſiſts, is a direct and expreſs Contradiction: Tis ſuppoſing either an *Univerſal* to exiſt, without *Particulars*; or an *Effect* to be produced without a *Cauſe*, or to have more in it than was in the *Cauſe*; or that a *Quality* is by the Power of God made ſo to ariſe out of Nothing, as to be ſuperadded to a *Subject*, and to ſubſiſt without inhering in that Subject, to which it is at the ſame time ſuppoſed to belong. By this I preſume it ſufficiently appears with what poſſibility of Truth it is alleged, that *the Particles of Matter which compoſe the Brain, may under that Modification either have the Power of Thinking neceſſarily flowing from them or elſe may have the Power of Thinking ſuperadded to them by the Power of God, though ſingly and ſeparately they may not have the Power of Thinking*. And it will eaſily be judged, whether it be indeed a *Fallacy* and *a plain begging of the Queſtion*, to affirm that *an Individual Power*, properly

and ſtrictly ſpeaking, ſuch as Conſciouſneſs or Thinking muſt needs be acknowledged to be, *can only proceed from, or reſide in, an Individual Being*; or whether the contrary be not rather demonſtrated to be a plain Contradiction.

II. To the Second, *viz.* That according to the Argument now under Conſideration, it not a *Syſtem of Matter*, yet at leaſt *the ſeparate and diſtinct Parts of Matter, are capable of having a Power of Thinking, or an Individual Conſciouſneſs ſuperadded to each of them*; ſeeing *it is only required that a thing be an Individual Being, in order to its being a proper Subject of a Power of Thinking*: It is anſwered, Firſt, that ſuppoſing any Particle of Matter could be truly an Individual, that is, an Indiviſible or Indiſcerpible Being; yet it would not therefore follow, that it could be capable of thinking, For though Diviſibility or Diſcerpibility in any Subject, is a ſufficient Proof that That Subject is not capable of ſuch an Individual Power of Thinking; yet it does not from thence preſently follow on the contrary, that whatever is Indiſcerpible, is therefore capable of Thinking. Though the preſent Argument proves indeed only, that whatever is Diſcerpible, cannot Think; that is, that Individuality is a *ſine quâ non*, or a neceſſary Qualification without which no Subject can be capable of Thinking; yet it does by no means exclude other Conſiderations, or at all imply that whatever has this Property of Individuality, muſt therefore neceſſarily be capable of Thinking, and cannot by any other Property be rendred, or by any other Argument proved to be, incapable of it. Though *the want of Individuality or Diſtinctneſs, is* indeed *the ſole Reaſon urged* in the preſent Argument,

gument, *why a Syſtem of Matter cannot have a Power of Thinking or an Individual Conſciouſneſs*; yet it ought not therefore to be ſaid, that *it is Only required that a Thing be an Individual Being, in order to its being a proper Subject of a Power of Thinking.* Beſides; Suppoſing any Particle of Matter could be truly an Individual Being, and alſo that upon that account (which yet is by no means neceſſary) it could be capable of Thinking; yet ſtill the principal part of the Queſtion would be certain and unavoidable, that a Thinking Being muſt be, if not immaterial, yet however *naturally Immortal:* For whatever is Indiſcerpible, tho' it were ſuppoſed Material, could not by any Power of Time, or any Force in Nature, receive any ſuch Alteration, but that not only its Subſtance, but even all its Qualities alſo, muſt naturally remain for ever unchanged. But then, Secondly, it is anſwered further, that the Suppoſition it ſelf of this Objection, is utterly impoſſible, *viz.* that any Particle of Matter can be truly an Individual or Indiſcerpible Being. For it is neceſſarily included in the Nature of Solid Subſtance, how *ſmall* ſoever it be conceived to be, to conſiſt ſtill of Parts not eſſentially connected, and not at all depending upon each other for their Exiſtence. So that it is abſolutely impoſſible and contradictory, to ſuppoſe any Particle of Matter ſo truly an Individual, but that by the Power of God (for the *Powers of Nature* here are nothing to the purpoſe) it may be divided into two or more Particles, which ſhall each of them ſeparately be as Perfect and Compleat Matter, and continue to have all the very ſame Properties, as the whole Particle had before it was divided. Suppoſe then the ſmalleſt

imaginable Particle of Matter, indued with Conſciouſneſs or Thought: Yet by the Power of God, this Particle may be divided into two diſtinct Parts; and then what will naturally and conſequently become of its Power of Thinking? *If* That Power will continue in it unchanged; then there muſt either be two diſtinct Conſciouſneſſes, in the two ſeparate Parts; or elſe the Power continuing in the intermediate Space, as well as in the parts themſelves, muſt there ſubſiſt without a Subject; or elſe, not the Material Subſtance, but ſome other Thing, is the Subject of the Conſciouſneſs. *If* the Power of Thinking will remain only in One of the ſeparated Parts; then either That One Part only, had at firſt the Power reſiding in it; and then the ſame Queſtion will return, upon the ſuppoſition of *Its* being likewiſe divided; or elſe it will follow that one and the ſame Individual Quality may be transferred from one Subject to another; which all Philoſophers of all Sects in the World, have always confeſſed to be impoſſible. *If*, in the laſt place, it be ſaid, that upon the Diviſion of the Particle, the Power of Thinking, which was in it, will wholly ceaſe; then it will follow, that That Power was never at all a real Quality inhering or reſiding in the Subſtance, (in which mere ſeparation of Parts, makes no Alteration;) but that it was *merely an external Denomination*, ſuch as is *Roundneſs* in a Globe, which periſhes at its being divided: And this, I ſuppoſe, will be granted to be ſufficiently abſurd. There is no way to evade this Argument, but by affirming either that a Particle of Matter may be ſo ſmall, as that it ſhall not be in the Power of God to divide it; or that if it be divided, it will conſequently

ſequently and neceſſarily be annihilated; (neither of which, I ſuppoſe, will be affirmed;) or elſe that the ſame may be argued concerning Immaterial Subſtance alſo; which is the *Fourth* Objection, and will be conſidered preſently in its proper place.

III. To the Third, *viz.* That though *Conſciouſneſs* were allowed neceſſarily to infer *Indiviſibility*, and *Indiviſibility* to infer *Immateriality*: yet even then not *the Soul*, the *Thinking immaterial Being*, but only the *bare Immaterial Subject or Subſtance* itſelf, *would be proved to be naturally Immortal*; ſince *Thinking is an Action* (a *Power* it ſhould rather have been call'd) *which may commence after the Exiſtence of its Subject, and may ceaſe, its Subject ſtill remaining*: It is anſwered, that the contrary is evidently True; namely, that not only the *bare Immaterial Subject*, but the *Subject* and the *Power* together, the *Thinking Immaterial Being* it ſelf, is hereby proved to be *naturally Immortal*: Becauſe, whatever Subſtance is wholly *indiſcerpible*, is plainly, by Virtue of that Property, not only *it ſelf* incapable of being deſtroyed by any Natural Power, (for ſo alſo is the moſt *diſcerpible* Subſtance likewiſe;) but all its *Qualities* and *Modes* alſo, are utterly incapable of being affected in any meaſure, or changed in any degree, by any Power of Nature; For all real and inherent Qualities of any Subſtance, are either Modifications of the Subſtance it ſelf, or elſe Powers ſuperadded and connected to the Subſtance, by the immediate Power of God; And in either of theſe caſes, 'tis manifeſt no *Quality* can be altered by any natural Power, which is not able to affect and make ſome Alteration (in the

Diſpoſition of the parts at leaſt) of the *Subſtance* it ſelf; which in an *indiſcerpible* Subſtance 'tis evident cannot be done. The *Soul* therefore, the *whole Conſcious Being*; the *Power of Thinking* that reſides in it, as well as the *bare Immaterial Subject or Subſtance* it *ſelf*; (whatever may be ſaid concerning the *Power of God* in this Queſtion;) will clearly, notwithſtanding what any *Finite* Power can do, of neceſſity be *naturally Immortal*. The Truth of this Reaſoning is evident from what we cannot but obſerve even in the *Material World*; namely, that all the Changes which are cauſed therein by any Powers of Nature, are Nothing but Changes of the Order and Diſpoſition of the Parts of compound Bodies. The original and perfectly ſolid Particles of Matter, which are, (not indeed abſolutely in themſelves, but) to any Power of Nature, indiſcerpible; are utterly incapable of having not only their Subſtance, but even any of their Qualities or Properties altered in any meaſure by any Power of Nature: As is evident from the Form or Species of thoſe we vulgarly call ſimple or elementary Bodies, remaining always unalterably the ſame, and indued continually with the ſame Powers and Qualities.

IV. To the Fourth, *viz.* That according to the Argument we are now conſidering, either a *Syſtem of Matter*, being by a ſtrict Union of Parts made an Individual Being, may become *capable of Thinking*: or elſe *Immaterial Subſtance* alſo *may as well be conceived capable of Diviſion*, and conſequently incapable of Thought: *Suppoſing Extenſion not excluded out of the Idea of Immateriality*: It is anſwered, that the Caſe is very different: Be-

Becauſe ſome of the *firſt* and *moſt obvious* Properties which we *certainly know* of *Matter*, as its having *partes extra partes*, ſtrictly and properly ſpeaking, that is, its conſiſting of ſuch Parts as are *actually unconnected* and are *truly diſtinct Beings*, and *can* (as we ſee by Experience) *exiſt ſeparately*, and have *no dependence one upon another*; do neceſſarily and confeſſedly imply *Diſcerpibility*: But in *Immaterial Beings* we do *not know* of any ſuch Properties, as any wiſe imply Diſcerpibility. It cannot be collected from any Property we know of *Them*, but that they *may* be ſuch Beings as can no more be divided than annihilated, that is, whoſe whole Eſſence may be neceſſarily One, and their Subſtance eſſentially indiviſible, upon the ſame Ground as their Exiſtence continues: Nay, the *only* Properties we *certainly and indiſputably* know of them, namely *Conſciouſneſs* and its Modes, do prove (as has been before ſhown) that they *muſt neceſſarily* be ſuch Indiſcerpible Beings. As evidently as the *known Properties* of *Matter* prove it to be certainly a *Diſcerpible Subſtance*, whatever other *unknown Properties* it may be endued with; ſo evidently the *known and confeſſed Properties* of *Immaterial Beings* prove them to be *Indiſcerpible*, whatever other *unknown Properties* They likewiſe may be endued with. How far ſuch *Indiſcerpibility* can be reconciled and be conſiſtent with ſome kind of *Expanſion*; that is, what *unknown Properties* are joyned together with theſe *known ones* of Conſciouſneſs and Indiſcerpibility; is another Queſtion of conſiderable Difficulty, but of no Neceſſity to be reſolved in the preſent Argument. Only This: As the Parts of *Space* or *Expanſion* it ſelf, can demonſtrably be proved to be *abſolutely Indiſcerpible*; ſo

it ought not to be reckoned an insuperable Difficulty, to imagine that all *Immaterial Thinking Substances* (upon Supposition that *Expansion* is not excluded out of their Idea,) may be so likewise.

V. To the Fifth, *viz.* That by the forementioned Argument, *all the sensible Creatures in the Universe are put in the same Condition with Man, and made capable of eternal Happiness as well as he*; or else that, *to avoid this Consequence, all those Creatures must either be supposed to be only mere Machines*, or else *that their Souls shall be annihilated upon the dissolution of their Bodies*; And if so, *then the Proof of the natural Immortality of* Mens *Souls from their Immateriality, tends not to prove that their Souls shall* really be *Immortal:* It is answered, that, though all Sensible Creatures have certainly in them something that is Immaterial, yet it does not at all follow, either that they must needs be annihilated upon the Dissolution of their Bodies, or else that they must be capable of Eternal Happiness as well as Man. This is just such an Argument, as if a Man should conclude, that whatsoever is not exactly like himself, can therefore have no Being at all: Or that all the Stars of Heaven, if they be not exactly like our Globe of Earth, cannot possibly be any Globes at all. Certainly the Omnipotent and infinitely Wise God may, without any very great difficulty, be supposed to have more ways of disposing of his Creatures, than we are at present let into the secret of. He may indeed, if he please, annihilate them at the dissolution of their Bodies; (And so he might, if he thought fit, annihilate the Souls of Men; and yet it would be never the less true, that they

are

are *in their own Nature Immortal*;) or he may, if he pleaſes, without either annihilating them or ſuffering them to fall into a State of entire Inactivity, diſpoſe of them into *numberleſs* States, concerning the particular Nature of which, we are not now able to make the leaſt conjecture. I ſuppoſe, That Man does not do any great Honour either to God, or to the Chriſtian Religion, who will needs contend, that through a boundleſs Eternity there ſhall never exiſt any thing in the immenſe Univerſe, but what muſt needs partake either of the Happineſs or Miſery of *Mankind*.

A Second

DEFENSE

OF AN

ARGUMENT to prove the *Immateriality* of the SOUL, &c.

SIR,

IN abſtract and *Metaphyſical* Speculations, it is hardly poſſible that any thing ſhould ever be ſo clearly expreſſed, or ſo ſtrongly proved; but Thoſe who are not very much verſed in ſuch Enquiries, will perpetually be apt to miſapprehend what is ſaid; and Men of Wit and Parts will always be able to raiſe new Difficulties, and perplex their Readers with intricate and endleſs Diſputations.

Since you have not thought fit in your *Reply*, to offer any new Arguments, but only to urge again the ſame Objections which you had before advanced, againſt what I perſwade my ſelf I have already explained with as much clearneſs as can reaſonably be expected in Queſtions of this Nature; I think I might very well, without entering into any further debate, have now left it wholly to the judicious and impartial Reader, to conſider and determine with himſelf on which ſide the

the greateſt Strength of Reaſon and Argument lies. Nevertheleſs, the Candour and Ingenuity with which you have written, have once more engaged me to indeavour to give you ſatisfaction in this matter; by pointing out to you ſome of the principal Inſtances, wherein you ſeem either to have miſtaken the Queſtion itſelf, or to have miſunderſtood my Argument upon it. But hereafter, unleſs any new Objections ſhall be propoſed, and not merely Repetitions and ingenious Repreſentations of the former Difficulties, you muſt excuſe me if I think not my ſelf obliged to do ſo any more.

In repeating my anſwer to your firſt Objection, you cite my Words thus; * *To ſuppoſe any Power or Quality of this kind, ariſing from, or belonging to the ſeveral Parts of which the Whole conſiſts, is a direct and expreſs Contradiction:* Whereas my Words were; *To ſuppoſe any Power or Quality of this kind ariſing from or belonging to* [*any whole Syſtem of Matter, without belonging to*] *the ſeveral Parts of which that Whole conſiſts, is a direct and expreſs Contradiction* †. I make no queſtion but this is only a Fault of the Preſs in your *Reply*. Yet it was proper to take notice of it, becauſe perhaps every Reader will not be at the Pains to compare the Books; and it happens, as the Paſſage ſtands in your citation to give a very diſadvantageous Repreſentation of my Senſe.

* *Reply*, page 10.

† *Defenſe* page 81.

In your preliminary defining the Signification of the Terms *, I cannot ſee any Reaſon, (unleſs it be to perplex the Reader with a new Queſtion, *Whether the Soul always Actually thinks or not*, which is wholly foreign to the Matter at preſent in Diſpute;) I cannot ſee any Reaſon, I ſay, why you

* *Reply*, page 10.

you ſhould affirm that *Conſciouſneſs cannot be properly imployed to ſignify the ſame thing with a Power of Thinking, unleſs by a Power of Thinking, be underſtood, not a Capacity to Think, but Actual Thinking.* For, the thing to be proved, being This, that a Diviſible Subſtance is not capable of a Power of Thinking; what difference can it make, whether by a *Power of Thinking* you underſtand *actual Thinking*, or a *Capacity to think?* For I preſume you will not deny, but whatever is proved incapable of *actual Thinking*, is alſo proved incapable *(pardon the Expreſſion)* of a *Capacity of Thinking*; and whatſoever is proved incapable of a *Capacity of Thinking*, is alſo proved incapable of *actual Thinking*. Wherefore there was no need of indeavouring at this time to perplex and multiply the Queſtion by any ſuch diſputable Diſtinction; Which kind of Difficulties, foreign to the thing at preſent under Conſideration, they who are deſirous to come at Truth, and to come at it the neareſt way, ought always very carefully to avoid.

Conſciouſneſs, in the moſt ſtrict and exact Senſe of the Word, ſignifies neither a *Capacity of Thinking*, nor yet *Actual Thinking*, but the *Reflex Act by which I know that I think, and that my Thoughts and Actions are my own and not Anothers.* But in the preſent Queſtion, the Reader needs not trouble himſelf with this Nicety of Diſtinction; but may underſtand it indifferently in all or any of theſe Significations; becauſe the Argument proves univerſally, that Matter is neither capable of this *Reflex Act*, nor of the firſt *Direct Act*, nor of the *Capacity of Thinking* at all.

By an *Individual Power* I mean (in the Senſe that Logicians commonly uſe the Word *Individual* when they oppoſe it to *Specifick*,) ſuch a Power as is *really and truly* in the nature of the thing itſelf *One Power*, in oppoſition to its being ſuch merely in our *abſtract Complex Notion*. For Inſtance: When I ſpeak of my own Conſciouſneſs, and call it an *Individual Power*; I mean thereby to expreſs that it is really and truly one undivided Conſciouſneſs, and not a multitude of diſtinct Conſciouſneſſes added together: But when I ſpeak of the Blueneſs (ſuppoſe) or Redneſs, or Sweetneſs of a Body, as of a *ſingle Power* belonging to that Body; 'tis evident I can mean only, that it is ſuch merely in the *abſtract complex Notion* or *Idea* I frame in my Mind; that is, in the ſame Senſe as we ſay an *Army* or a *City* is *One*; But that really and indeed it is a vaſt Multitude of Blueneſſes, Redneſſes, or Sweetneſſes; or rather (to ſpeak ſtrictly and properly) a vaſt Multitude of ſuch Parts as excite in us the Senſations of Blueneſs, Redneſs or Sweetneſs. Now the thing to be proved, was that ſuch an Individual Power as Conſciouſneſs, cannot poſſibly inhere in or reſult from a diviſible Subſtance. And this I did prove; not by *defining* or *ſuppoſing* an *Individual Power* to be *a Power that cannot poſſibly inhere in or reſult from a diviſible Subſtance*; (which would indeed have been a Begging of the Queſtion;) but by *demonſtrating*, that it would neceſſarily imply a plain and direct Contradiction, for any Power which is really *One* and not *Many*, (ſuch as your ſelf acknowledged Conſciouſneſs to be, by confeſſing it does not reſide † in the ſingle and ſeparate Parts of the Brain,) to inhere in or reſult from

† page 15.

from a diviſible Subſtance. Wherefore it is altogether without Reaſon, that you indeavour to perplex your Reader by telling him that * a *Syſtem of Matter being ſuppoſed to be a Power incapable of reſiding in a Being that conſiſts of Parts, the Queſtion of Matter's Thinking will amount to this, Whether that which cannot think, can think*; When you well know that I made uſe of no ſuch Suppoſition, but indeavoured to *prove* (and, I hope, *have proved* with ſome ſtrength and clearneſs) what you ſeem to inſinuate as if I only *ſuppoſed*.

* page 11. to ſpeak of Parts, & Thinking being ſuppoſed to be &c.

I. You reply to my Anſwer to your firſt Objection; that † it is nothing elſe but *Argumentum ad Ignorantiam*: that *in enumerating the ſorts of Powers or Qualities of Matter, I ſuppoſe that a Syſtem of Matter has and can have only Powers of one ſort or kind, ſuch as Magnitude and Motion, which are only the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of the ſame kind; Which, what is it elſe but to argue, that becauſe we know of no other Powers of a different kind in Matter from Magnitude and Motion, therefore it Has and Can have no other Powers?* Now I cannot think, Sir, but a Man of your Underſtanding, if you pleaſe to conſider the Matter a ſecond time, will find it is by no means *Argumentum ad Ignorantiam*. For if a Diſjunction be complete, (as that in which I enumerate the ſeveral ſorts of Powers of which Matter is capable, either is; or elſe you ought to have proved that another Member could be added to it, to ſhow that it was not;) it contains in it all the poſſible particulars, as well the *unknown*, as thoſe that are ever ſo well *known*. For how many particulars ſoever be ſuppoſed to be *unknown*, and how impoſſible ſoever it be ſuppoſed to come at the knowledge of thoſe particulars;

† page 12.

particulars; yet if the Heads or Kinds be rightly diſtributed, they muſt of Neceſſity contain under them all the *unknown* particulars as certainly as thoſe that are the *moſt known*. All the poſſible Qualities, I ſaid, or Powers of Matter, (whether *known* or *unknown*,) muſt of Neceſſity be either *Qualities really inhering in the Subject it ſelf to which they are aſcribed*; or *Modes produced by it in ſome other Subject*; or elſe *mere abſtract Names ſignifying certain Powers or Effects that do not properly reſide in any Subject at all*. Now if this Diſjunction be true; and Thinking be at all a Quality or Power of Matter; and be confeſſed not to belong to either of the two latter ſorts; it muſt of neceſſity, (how *unknown* ſoever the Nature of it be otherwiſe ſuppoſed to be,) be included in the former. And then the Argument holds unanſwerably good; that *Thinking*, (or, if you pleaſe to imagin any other even yet more abſtruſe Qualities or Powers of Matter, even theſe alſo) as well as Magnitude and Motion, which I inſtanced in; and whatever elſe be reducible to this Kind; by truly and really inhering in the Subject itſelf; muſt of neceſſity inhere in all and every one of the particles of the Syſtem, taken ſingly as well as together. Becauſe, as I ſaid before, to ſuppoſe any Power or Quality of this kind, ariſing from, or belonging to any *whole* Syſtem of Matter, without belonging to the *ſeveral Parts*, of which that whole conſiſts, is a direct and expreſs Contradiction: 'Tis ſuppoſing either an *Univerſal* to exiſt, without *Particulars*; or an *Effect* to be produced without a *Cauſe*, or to have more in it than was in the *Cauſe*; or that a *Quality* is by the Power of God made ſo to ariſe out of Nothing, as to be ſuperadded to a *Subject*, and to

ſubſiſt

ſubſiſt without inhering in that Subject to which it is at the ſame time ſuppoſed to belong.

To this you Reply, * that *to ſuppoſe a Power ariſing from Matter, without belonging to the Parts of which the Whole conſiſts; is not to ſuppoſe an* Univerſal *to exiſt without Particulars, but a* Particular *Power exiſting, to which ſeveral Particular Powers contribute; as every* Man *is a* Particular *Man, though various Powers are neceſſary to conſtitute him of that Species.* But, Sir, if the Whole or reſult, which you call a *Particular* Power, be entirely and *Specifically* different from all and every one of the particular Powers contributing to it; as *Thinking* manifeſtly is, from all the Powers of particles not indued with *Thought*; you will find, if you pleaſe to conſider it carefully, that 'tis as certain and evident as any *Arithmetical* Demonſtration, that ſuch a *Particular* Power is a *Whole* bigger than *all its Parts*; a *Whole*, that contains ſomething in it beſides All and every one of its *Parts*; that is, I think, an *Univerſal* without *particulars*. It is exactly as if you ſhould aſſert, that a *Smell* and a *Colour* could be joyned together to make up a *Sound*; or as if *Hardneſs* and *Figure* could be the particulars contributing to conſtitute a *Motion*. A *Man*, if you mean the whole Man, the Thinking Perſon; (as the Reader may be apt to think you do;) and ſuppoſe him to be conſtituted of mere Matter, whoſe ſingle particles are none of them indued with Thought; is ſuch a contradictory Whole: But if you mean, (as you ſeem to do,) the Body only, with its Mechanical Powers; then there is nothing in it, differing from the Powers of the ſingle Parts; except only the bare Name, the Abſtract Notion of its being a *Whole*;

* page 14.

which is a complex Idea in our Mind; but in the Thing it ſelf 'tis nothing at all, but its being the Sum of the Magnitudes, Figures, and Motions of all the ſeveral parts; from which conſtituent parts no Whole can (without an evident Contradiction) differ any otherwiſe, than as in numbers a *Thouſand* differs from *Ten hundred*, or as in Weights a *Pound* differs from *ſixteen Ounces*, or as an *Army* differs from all the *Men* that compoſe it; that is, in nothing but the bare *Name*.

You add: *Neither is it a ſuppoſing an Effect produced without a Cauſe: For the different Powers in the ſingle and ſeparate Parts of a Syſtem of Matter, by uniting in one Operation or Power to operate, are the Cauſe of the Exiſtence of that Power which did not exiſt in the Particles ſingly conſidered. And thus in thoſe Particles which compoſe the Brain*, &c. Now here, Sir, I really cannot but wonder how a Gentleman ſo well skilled in Philoſophy, as you are, can ſuffer himſelf to be impoſed upon by ſo very groſs and palpable a Fallacy. For though the different Powers in the ſingle and ſeparate Parts of a Syſtem of Matter, (as, for inſtance, their Magnitude, Situation, Figure and Motion,) may by uniting in one Operation or Power to operate, be the Cauſe of the Exiſtence of another Power *of the ſame Species*, which did not exiſt in the Particles ſingly conſidered; that is, may conſtitute another Magnitude, another Figure, another Motion, than was in the ſingle Particles; juſt as twenty different Numbers added together, conſtitute a new Number different from any of the Particulars: Yet thoſe Powers cannot, without an evident Contradiction, be the Cauſe of the Exiſtence of any other Power of a *different Species*; (as *Thinking* is confeſſedly of a *different Species* from *Magnitude*,

nitude, *Figure*, *Motion*, or whatever other properties may belong to *Unthinking* Particles of Matter;) for the ſame reaſon as the Addition of different Numbers in Arithmetick, cannot without a manifeſt Contradiction, be the Cauſe of th Exiſtence of a Line or a Figure; or the mixture of Taſts, conſtitute a Colour; Namely, becauſe thus the *Effect* would contain more in it than was in the *Cauſe*; that is, ſomething would without any Efficient, be produced out of Nothing. In like manner; though the different Powers in the ſingle and ſeparate Parts of a Syſtem of Matter, (their Magnitude *ſuppoſe*, Situation, Figure and Motion,) may, by unitiug in one Operation or Power to operate, be the cauſe of the Exiſtence of a Power *to affect ſome foreign Subſtance*, which Power did not exiſt in the Particles ſingly conſidered; that is, certain particles united, may prick the Skin and cauſe Pain, which the ſingle ones could not do; or may ſtrike the Eye ſo as to excite the Senſation of Blew or Red, which the ſingle ones could not do; Juſt as a Wedge may force it ſelf a paſſage, where a Body of ſome other ſhape could not: Yet thoſe Powers cannot, without an evident Contradiction, be the cauſe of the Exiſtence of any new Quality *really inhering in the Subject it ſelf*; (as *Thinking* confeſſedly is a Quality *really inhering in the Thinking Being it ſelf*, and not barely an *abſtract Notion*, or *Power of affecting ſome foreign Subſtance*;) for the ſame Reaſon as the ſharpening of the point of a Needle cannot poſſibly be the Cauſe that the Needle itſelf ſhould feel pain.

From hence it eaſily appears how defective your Similitude is *, when you ſay it is *no Contradiction to ſuppoſe a Power ariſing from Matter, with-*

* *pag.* 14.

without belonging to the Parts of which the Whole conſiſts; *no more than to conceive that a Whole is not the ſame with a peice of a Clock*; Wherein *the Power reſulting from the different contributing Powers in the Syſtem, neither belongs to any Part of the Syſtem when conſidered by itſelf, nor is it of the ſame ſort or kind with any Power in any part of the Syſtem.* For that which you call the *Power* of a Clock, to ſhow the time of the Day, is evidently nothing *in the Clock itſelf*, but the Figure and motion of its Parts; and conſequently not any thing of a different ſort or kind from the Powers inherent in the Parts: Whereas *Thinking*, if it was the reſult of the Powers of the different parts of the Machine of the Body, or of the Brain in particular, would be ſomething really inhering *in the Machine itſelf*, ſpecifically different from all and every one of the Powers of the ſeveral Parts out of which it reſulted: Which is an expreſs Contradiction, a ſuppoſing the *Effect* to have more in it than the *Cauſe*. And therefore, though you are pleaſed to make uſe of it as a *Similitude*; yet in reality this Power of Thinking, which truly and properly inheres in its Subject, has not in any reſpect the leaſt appearance of *likeneſs* to the *Power of a Clock* to ſhow the time of the day, which is merely an *abſtract complex Notion* in the Man that beholds it, and nothing at all really in the Clock itſelf.

† *page* 15.

In like manner, when you ſay † *it may be conceived that there may be a Power in all thoſe Particles which compoſe the Brain, to contribute to the Act of Thinking, before they are united under that Form: though, while they are diſunited, they have no more of Conſciouſneſs, than any Being which produces Sweetneſs in us (that is made up of Parts wherein diſ-*

ferent

ferent Powers inhere) *when under a particular Form, has a Power to produce Sweetneſs in us, when its parts are diſunited and ſeparated* ; you fall again into the ſame Fallacy. For the Power of a Body to excite in us the Idea of Sweetneſs, is nothing elſe but a certain Figure and Motion reſulting from different Figures and Motions, of its original conſtituent parts; juſt as the Power of a Pin to cauſe Pain in us, is nothing but its Motion and the ſharp Figure of its Point, reſulting from different Motions, Figures and Situations of its conſtituent parts. And if the Effect of the Powers, by which the ſeveral particles that compoſe the Brain, contribute (as your Phraſe is) to the Act of Thinking, was likewiſe only the exciting of certain *Thoughts* in ſomething which was before a *Thinking Subſtance*, your Similitude would have ſomething of likeneſs in it. But that Particles which in themſelves have no *Thought*, ſhould ever contribute any thing towards making the Subſtance, which they conſtitute, a *Thinking* Being ; this I am ſure you can no more be able to clear from being an expreſs Contradiction ; (though I doubt not but you can argue upon it as acutely as any One ;) than if you ſhould undertake to prove, that a Solid Maſs of Marble is made up of Particles, which without having any Solidity themſelves, contribute by other unknown Powers to conſtitute a Solid Maſs ; or that a Foot-ſquare of any Matter, is made up of Particles, which without having any Extention themſelves, contribute by other different and unknown Powers, to conſtitute an extended Solid Quantity.

And here I cannot but take notice, that beſides the Contradictions before-mentioned, you have, by chooſing to annex Conſciouſneſs to ſo flux a Subſtance as the Brain or the Spirits in it, fallen into another very great Abſurdity. For if the Brain or Spirits be the Subject of Conſciouſneſs; and the Parts of the Brain or Spirits be (as they certainly are, whatever Queſtion may be made concerning any original *Solid Stamina* of the Body,) in perpetual flux and change; it will follow that That Conſciouſneſs, by which I *not only Remember* that certain Things were done many Years ſince, but alſo *am Conſcious that they were done by Me, by the very ſame Individual Conſcious Being* who now remembers them; it will follow, I ſay, that That Conſciouſneſs is transferred from one Subject to another; that is to ſay, that it is a real Quality which ſubſiſts without inhering in any Subject at all.

But to return to the Argument before us. You ſuppoſe that the Particles which compoſe the Brain, though themſelves *void of Conſciouſneſs* when taken ſingly, may yet by other different Powers contribute towards the making up One *Conſcious Whole*. This I affirm to be, and I think I have proved to be, an expreſs Contradiction; an aſſigning more to the *Effect* than was in the *Cauſe*; a making the *Whole* bigger than all its *Parts* and Specifically different from All and every One of them. The occaſion, the common ground and foundation of Mens Erring in this whole Matter, I have * elſewhere largely diſcovered; and ſhall here repeat what I think may be ſufficient to ſatisfy an inquiſitive and unprejudiced Perſon. "Whatever can ariſe from, or be compounded

* *Demonſtr. of the Being and Attrib. of God. Prop. 8. Sect. 2.*

" pounded of any Things; is ſtill only thoſe
" very Things, of which it was compounded:
" And if infinite Compoſitions or Diviſions be
" made eternally, the Things will ſtill be but
" eternally the ſame: And all their poſſible Ef-
" fects, can never be any thing but Repetitions
" of the ſame. For Inſtance: All poſſible Chan-
" ges of *Figure*, are ſtill nothing but *Figure*: [All poſſible Variations, Compoſitions and Diviſions of *Magnitude*, are ſtill nothing but *Magnitude*]
" All poſſible Compoſitions or Effects of *Mo-*
" *tion*, are ſtill nothing but *mere Motion*: All Compoſitions of *Magnitude*, *Figure* and *Motion* together, are ſtill nothing but *Magnitude*, *Figure* and *Motion*: And how many other Qualities ſoever, *known* or *unknown*, the Particles of Matter be ſuppoſed to be indued with; thoſe Qualities can never in any Compoſition or Diviſion produce any new Power ſpecifically different from themſelves, unleſs a *Cauſe* could give more to the *Effect* than is in it ſelf. And conſequently, if the Matter of the Brain be the Subject in which Conſciouſneſs inheres, That Conſciouſneſs cannot poſſibly be the reſult of any other known or unknown Powers of the ſeveral conſtituent Particles, but what muſt themſelves have been originally of the ſame *Species*, that is to ſay, ſo many ſeveral Conſciouſneſſes. " That which has been
" apt to deceive Men in this Matter, is this;
" that they imagin Compounds to be ſomewhat
" really [ſpecifically] different from the Things
" of which they are compounded. Which is a
" very great miſtake. For all the Things, of
" which Men ſo judge; either, if they be really
" different, are not Compounds nor Effects of what
" Men judge them to be, but are ſomething to-

" tally distinct; as when the Vulgar thinks " Colours and Sounds to be Properties inherent " in Bodies, when indeed they are purely " Thoughts of the Mind: Or else, if they be " really Compounds and Effects, then they are " not different, but exactly the same that ever " they were; As when two Triangles put to- " gether make a Square, that Square is still no- " thing but two Triangles; or when a Square cut " in halves makes two Triangles, those two " Triangles are still only the two halves of a " Square; or when the Mixture of Blew and " Yellow Powder makes a Green, that Green is " still nothing but Blew and Yellow intermixt, " as is plainly visible by the help of Microsco- " copes: And in short, every thing by Composition, " Division or Motion; is nothing else but " the very same it was before, taken either in " whole or by Parts, or in different Place or Order, [so as to excite in our Minds different *complex Notions*, and occasion new *abstract Names* of Things, but by no means to produce any new real Quality in the Things themselves, such as *Consciousness* is agreed to be, inhering truly and properly in the Subject it is ascribed to.]

The true state of this Case, seems in brief to be This. Sometimes we consider one and the same Quality of a thing, in different Circumstances and Respects, and with relation to other different things; which relation may be changed by the alteration or removal of those other things, and a new Effect be produced, without any alteration at all of the Thing it self or any of its Qualities; and yet then we give it a *new Name*, and are apt to think that *new Name* a *new Quality*. Sometimes we consider several distinct Qualities of

different parcels of Matter, together; and, becauſe ſome new Effect is thereby occaſioned in ſome other Being, we give the *imaginary Whole* a *new Name*, and think that *new Denomination* a *new Quality*. But with how little reaſon this is done, will abundantly appear by the following Inſtances. The ſame particle of Matter, which makes a point in the Surface of a *Globe*, may, by other parts being ſhaved off, become the point of the Angle of a *Cube*, without undergoing any alteration it ſelf; and produce an effect, which it could not produce before: But is this truly a new *Quality* or *Power* in the Point it ſelf? *Blue* and *Yellow* Powder mingled together, occaſion a new Effect, and are called by a *new Name*, *Green*: But is this really a new *Quality* or *Power*? is it not plainly the ſame two Qualities, which they had when ſeparate, acting ſtill diſtinctly, as appears in a Microſcope? That *particular and determinate degree of Velocity* in a Wheel, whereby it turns once round preciſely in twelve Hours, is that which you call the *Power of a Clock* to ſhow the time of the Day: and becauſe ſuch a determinate *Velocity of Motion* is made uſe of by Us for the Meaſure of Time, and has an *abſtract Name* given it to expreſs that uſe; is it therefore really a new *Quality* or *Power* diſtinct from the *Motion* it ſelf? And, to mention no more; When a *Weight* in one Scale of a Balance does, by taking out part of the Weight that was in the other Scale, begin to *preponderate*, which it did not before; is this any new *Quality* or *real Power* in the Weight that is not altered, different from what it had before?

I ſhall obſerve but one Thing more upon this Head; and that is, that whereas I affirmed *every Power or Quality that is or can be inherent in any Syſtem of Matter, to be nothing elſe than the Sum or Aggregate of ſo many Powers or Qualities* of the ſame kind *inhering in all the Parts*; meaning that the Powers inhering in the ſeveral Parts, muſt be of the *ſame kind*, or Species *with that Power, which is the reſult of the Whole*; you ſeem all along to underſtand it as if I had aſſerted that the Powers or Qualities inhering in the ſeveral Parts, muſt needs be all of *the ſame kind* or Species *one with another*; Thereby diverting your Reader from the true ſtrength of the Argument, and perplexing him with that which has no relation to the Queſtion: For whether the Powers of the ſeveral Parts be all of the *ſame kind one with another*, or of ever ſo *different kinds one from another*; that which I affirmed, is ſtill equally certain and neceſſary; that the Power of the Whole, being but the Sum or Mixture of the Powers of the Parts, cannot poſſibly be of a *different kind* or Species from all the ſeveral Powers of the Parts, as *Thinking* is of neceſſity ſpecificially different from all and every one of the Powers, known or unknown, of Particles which are confeſſed to be *void of Thought*. Wherefore when you ſay, * *he ought to have demonſtrated, if he would have proved the point he undertook to prove, that there can be no other power in any Syſtem of Matter, but what is the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of* the ſame *kind*; And that † *till it is demonſtrated, that there can be no other Power in any Syſtem of Matter, but what is the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of* the ſame *kind, it may as well be ſuppoſed that there are Powers of* different *kinds in different Particles of Matter*; And that

* Page 12.

† Page 13.

'tis * *ſo far from being the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of the* ſame *kind, that the new Power will be the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of a* different kind; And that † *the Power of every Syſtem will not be the Sum of Powers of the* ſame *kind, but the Sum of Powers of* different *kinds:* All this is entirely beſides the Purpoſe.

* *ibid.*

† *page* 15.

Your Suppoſition, * *that the Matter of which an Egg conſiſts, doth entirely conſtitute the young one; and that the Action of Senſation began under a particular Diſpoſition of the Parts by Motion, without the Addition of an Immaterial and Immortal Soul*; is in every part contrary to all the Diſcoveries in Anatomy, and to all true Philoſophy: For ſo far is it from being true, that the Matter of the Egg, by any particular diſpoſition of its Parts by Motion, is formed into or *entirely conſtitutes* the young one, that it does not *conſtitute it at all*, not ſo much as the *Body* of it; but only ſerves it for *nouriſhment* and *growth:* It being as impoſſible that the Organized Body of a Chicken ſhould by the Power of any Mechanical Motions be formed out of the unorganized matter of an Egg; as that the Sun, Moon and Stars, ſhould by mere Mechaniſm ariſe out of a Chaos. And that *Senſation* ſhould be added to it by ariſing from a *particular Diſpoſition of the Parts by Motion*, is ſtill more impoſſible; becauſe it is ſuppoſing ſomething to come out of that, in which it never was: Than which, nothing in the World can be a more expreſs Contradiction. You think it ridiculous to recur to the *Addition of an Immaterial and Immortal Soul:* Let it be ſo: I can as eaſily ſuppoſe, if you muſt needs have an Hypotheſis, that the immaterial Subſtance was not *Added* afterwards,

* *page* 16.

but

but was in it from the beginning, from the time that the Seminal Principle it ſelf of the Organized Body was framed: And who ſhall tell us when That was? The deeper Diſcoveries every Age makes in Anatomy by Microſcopial Obſervations, the further all theſe things are found to be removed backwards from the ſearch and common Notions even of the moſt inquiſitive Men. Suppoſe therefore we could not frame any probable Hypotheſis at all, *when* and *how* the immaterial principle of Senſation came in; yet why ought this to incline any Man to doubt the Truth of a certain Proof which ſhows him that there is ſuch a principle; any more than the difficulty (which is altogether as great an one) of framing an Hypotheſis *how* and *whence* the Organized Body came, make him disbelieve his Senſes which diſcover it to him?

* *page* 15. You tell me again, * that I have *not right'y enumerated the known Powers of Matter*. To prove which charge, you repeat what you had before ſaid, concerning *Aggregates of Powers of the ſame kind*; wherein I have already ſhown that you lay ſtreſs upon that which is wholly foreign to the Queſtion. And what you add concerning the *particular Texture of a Body*, as being ſomething that is different from the *Magnitude* and *Motion of its Parts*, and on which depend certain Powers, as the Power of the *Eye*, for inſtance, to *be operated upon by external Objects*, and to *contribute to the Act of Viſion*; which Power, becauſe it ceaſes *wholly* upon the leaſt Alteration of the Texture of *any part* of the Eye, 'tis evident does not *inhere* in *the Parts* of the Syſtem, in the ſame Senſe with *Magnitude* and *Motion*: This alſo is altogether foreign to the Queſtion.

Queſtion. For the *Eye's Power of Seeing*, is not, as your Argument ſuppoſes, one of thoſe Powers which I ranked under the *firſt* Head, that is, a Power which really inheres in the Syſtem, and conſequently in all the Parts of it; But it is one of thoſe Powers which I called the *third* ſort, *viz.* which are *mere abſtract Names ſignifying certain Powers or Effects which do not at all reſide in the Subject.* For the *Eye* does not *See*, in the ſame Senſe as the *Thinking* Subſtance *Thinks*; But *Seeing* in the *Eye*, is what *Magnetiſm* is in the *Load-ſtone*; not a real inherent Quality, but merely a Situation of parts and pores, ſo as to be the occaſion of an Effect wholly extrinſical to it ſelf, an effect produced in ſome other Subſtance by Rays tranſmitted through the pores of the Eye, juſt as the Magnetic Effluvia are through a Loadſtone, or Corn through a Sieve. So that you might exactly as well have compared the Power by which the Soul *Thinks*, to the Power by which a *Sieve* tranſmits *Corn*, as to the Power by which the *Eye ſees.*

You obſerve, * that *Saying Conſciouſneſs is an individual Power, is but calling Conſciouſneſs by another Name, and not giving an account of what Conſciouſneſs is, or wherein it conſiſts; which is requiſite to demonſtrate from Conſciouſneſs, that Conſciouſneſs cannot be added to a Being that conſiſts of actually ſeparate and diſtinct Parts.* 'Tis true, my affirming Conſciouſneſs to be an individual Power, is not giving an account of what Conſciouſneſs is; neither was it intended to be ſo. Every Man feels and knows by experience what Conſciouſneſs is, better than any Man can explain it: Which is the Caſe of all ſimple Ideas: And it is not at all neceſſary to define more particularly what *it is*; but abundantly

* page 15.

dantly ſufficient that we know and agree what it *is not*, viz. that it is not a multitude of diſtinct and ſeparate Conſciouſneſſes; in order to prove that it does not and cannot inhere in a Being, that conſiſts of a Multitude of ſeparate and diſtinct Parts. You your ſelf acknowledge that the parts which conſtitute the Brain, are not ſeparately and diſtinctly conſcious; that is, that the Conſciouſneſs of a Man, is not a Multitude of Conſciouſneſſes, but One. This is all that I *ſuppoſe*, when I call Conſciouſneſs an Individual Power; and from hence I think it is *proved* ſtrongly, that Conſciouſneſs cannot reſide in a Being that conſiſts of a multitude of ſeparate and diſtinct parts: Becauſe if it could, it muſt neceſſarily follow, either that it would become a Multitude of diſtinct Conſciouſneſſes, contrary to the Suppoſition which you your ſelf allow; or elſe that an Individual Quality of each ſingle particle, would become the individual Quality of every one of the reſt likewiſe, which is a Contradiction in Terms; or elſe, that the Conſciouſneſs would be one Power reſulting from the contributing Powers of all the ſeveral ſeparate and diſtinct Particles; in which caſe, it would be, as I have before proved in enumerating the ſeveral kinds of Powers, a *mere abſtract Name* or *complex Notion*, and not a real Quality reſiding in any Subject at all. 'Tis therefore wholly without reaſon, that you

† page 20. ſay † *Mr. Clark's calling Conſciouſneſs an Individual Power, in his Senſe of an Individual Power, is* ſuppoſing *that Matter cannot think*: and that you in-

* page 21. ſinuate to your Reader, * *that Conſciouſneſs being an Individual Power, in Mr. Clark's Senſe of thoſe Words, is* ſuppoſing *that it is a Power which can only reſide in an Individual Being*; to prove which *he has not*

not ſaid any thing, but barely by calling Conſciouſneſs an Individual Power. For an *Individual* Power, in my Senſe of the Word, does not *mean in the Definition a Power which can only reſide in an individual Being*; but it ſignifies *One Power*, in oppoſition to *a Multitude*; and I have *proved* that ſuch a Power can only reſide in an Individual Being, (not by Suppoſing it, but) by reducing the contrary Suppoſition to an expreſs Contradiction.

What you ſay again *, concerning Sums and Aggregates of Powers of *the ſame kind*; is repeating the ſame miſtake, which I have before ſhown you to have fallen into, in underſtanding Powers of *the ſame kind* with *one another*, inſtead of Powers of the *ſame kind* [or Species] with the *Whole that reſults from them.* * *page* 22.

You are pleaſed to entertain your ſelf and your Reader, † upon my accuſing you with ſuppoſing *Sweetneſs to be in a Roſe.* But I hope this will appear very pardonable, ſince it ſeemed neceſſary to me to underſtand you as I did, becauſe I could not otherwiſe apprehend what you ſaid concerning it, to be pertinent to your purpoſe. For you compared the Power which reſults from the ſeveral Particles of a *Roſe*, without being in the Particles themſelves ſeparately and ſingly; to the Power which reſults from the ſeveral Particles of the *Brain*, without being in the Particles themſelves ſeparately and ſingly: Now the Power which you ſay reſults from the diſpoſition of the ſeveral Particles of the Brain, is *Conſciouſneſs reſiding in the Brain it ſelf:* Either therefore by the Power reſulting from the diſpoſition of the ſeveral Particles of the *Roſe*, you muſt mean *Something reſiding* likewiſe *in the Roſe it ſelf*; or elſe your Similitude † *page* 23.

militude is not at all parallel. Now that Power which resides in the Rose it self, as Consciousness does in the Brain, and yet belongs not to the several constituent Particles of the Rose, can neither be *Magnitude* nor *Figure*, nor *Motion*, (for these belong to the several parts singly;) nor *Texture*, (for That, so far as it differs from the former, is nothing but a *mere abstract Notion*, and nothing really in the thing it self;) but must be either Sweetness it self, or something else equally unintelligible and inexplicable. If you will say you mean a Power not residing *in* the Rose at all, but resulting *from* it, then, (besides that as I said before, it is not pertinent to your purpose,) what is this, but supposing a Power subsisting without any Subject at all? a *mere name?*

In my Assertion, that the Powers in a Rose are nothing else but a Number of *similar* Motions or Figures, you * tell me *there are two things to be proved.* 1st. *That the mere Figure and Motion of the parts of a Rose, do produce, or are the sole external cause of the Sensation caused by them.* 2dly, *That those Motions and Figures are perfectly similar.* By *Similar*, I meant that they were so far *similar*, as the Smell or Colour of the Rose was similar or homogeneous: But whether they be *similar*, or no, is of no concern at all in the present Question, unless you still continue in your former mistake about Powers of *the same kind* with *one another*, instead of *with the Whole.* And as to the other thing which you say wants proof; I think I may appeal to your self, whether you can find or conceive any thing else in the Rose, which can be the cause of our Sensation,

* page 23.

on, beſides the mere *Magnitude*, *Figure*, *Situation*, and perhaps *Motion* of its parts.

You find fault with me † for aſſerting that Gravitation is the effect of the continued and regular Operation of ſome other Being on Matter; *whereas*, you think, *it does not appear but that Matter gravitates by virtue of* Powers *originally placed in it by God, and is now left to itſelf to act by thoſe Original Powers.* This Opinion of yours, I cannot but think, Sir, to be a great miſtake in your Philoſophy. For when a Stone that was at Reſt, does of it ſelf, upon its Support being removed, begin to fall downward; what is it that cauſes the Stone to begin to move? Is it poſſible to be an Effect produced without a Cauſe? Is it impelled without any Impeller? or can a *Law* or *Power*, that is to ſay, a *mere abſtract Name* or *complex Notion*, and not any *real Being*, impell a Stone and cauſe it to begin to move? In any other Caſe you would not doubt but this implied an abſolute Contradiction.

† page 24.

II. When in my Anſwer to your ſecond Objection, I ſaid that though the want of Individuality is indeed the ſole reaſon urged in the *preſent Argument*, why a Syſtem of Matter cannot think; yet that it ought not therefore to be ſaid that Invidiuality is the *only thing required*, to render a Being a proper Subject of a Power of Thinking; (Becauſe I would not exclude any *other Argument*, by which other inquiſitive Perſons might prove other Conditions alſo, as well as Individuality, to be neceſſary Requiſites in order to a Subject's being capable of Thinking:) You hereupon make the following Remark;

* pag. 26. * *Upon this I obſerve that Mr* Clark *owns the Truth of my reaſoning, upon the Suppoſition, that Individuality is only required by him in a Subject of a Power of Thinking*; (you ſhould have added; and upon Suppoſition alſo, that a Particle of Matter, could be truly an Individual;) *but denies that I have any reaſon to infer that* Individuality *is only required, from the* Want of Individuality's *being the ſole reaſon urged why a Syſtem of Matter cannot have a power of Thinking*; *Which I cannot help thinking to be all one, 'till there is a Difference aſſigned between* only required *in the preſent Argument, and* the ſole reaſon urged *in the preſent Argument.* Now This is a very unfair Obſervation: Becauſe the Difference to be aſſigned, and which I did aſſign expreſly, was between *the ſole reaſon urged* in the *preſent Argument*, and what was *only required* (not in *the preſent* but) in any *new Argument* which Others might make uſe of.

* page 30. III. The Queſtion concerning the * *Alterations of the Modes or Qualities* of Immaterial Beings, ſeems indeed to have ſome Difficulties in it, but not ſuch as any way affect our preſent Argument. The Thing you objected was, that though the Subſtance of the Soul were proved to be both Immaterial and Immortal, yet it would not follow that it muſt be an Immortal *Thinking* Subſtance, becauſe its *Thinking* might periſh, though its *Subſtance* did not. To this I reply'd; that the *Power of Thinking* could no more be deſtroy'd by any Natural Power, than the *Subſtance* it ſelf; becauſe the Qualities or Modes of any Subſtance not being alterable otherwiſe, than by ſome alteration in the Subſtance it ſelf; 'tis manifeſt that an Indiſcerpible Subſtance not being it ſelf alterable by

by any natural Power, it muſt follow that neither can any of its Qualities be altered by any natural Power. When therefore I ſaid that all its Qualities and Modes are utterly incapable of being affected in any meaſure, or *changed* in any degree, by any Power of Nature; you had no reaſon to underſtand this, as if I had aſſerted, that an Indiſcerpible Subſtance could not be *acted upon at all* by any Power of Nature; But my meaning was, that it could not be ſo acted upon, as to *deſtroy*, *change* or *alter* any of its inherent Qualities or Powers; which was all that the thing in Queſtion required me to prove. And that this was my meaning, you might have underſtood from the Compariſon I uſed, of the original and perfectly ſolid Particles of Matter. For as thoſe Particles, being (not abſolutely in themſelves, but) to any Power of Nature, indiſcerpible; are evidently incapable of having any of their Qualities or Properties altered in any meaſure by any Power of Nature; that is, their Figure, their Magnitude, their Hardneſs, and all the reſpective Effects or Powers depending upon theſe, can by no natural means be changed; and yet you could not imagin me to mean, but theſe Particles might be *acted upon*, might be *ſtruck* by each other might be removed this way or that way, upwards or downwards; all which makes no real alteration in them: So an indiſcerpible immaterial thinking Subſtance, though it may be transferred from one part of the Univerſe to another, though it may be *acted upon* by a multitude of things, though it may have different Ideas repreſented to it, though the organs of the Senſes may at times tranſmit different Species or hinder them from

being tranſmitted to it; yet all this makes no real Alteration either in the Subſtance or its inherent Powers; nor can its Power of *Thinking* (which was the Thing in Queſtion) be deſtroyed or altered by theſe or any other natural Powers; any more than the *Mobility* or *Hardneſs* of the original perfectly ſolid Particles of Matter can be deſtroyed by any of their Actings one upon another.

There is ſtill leſs weight in what you add;

* page 30. * *Now till Mr* Clark *has a compleat Idea of both ſorts of Beings,* [Material or Immaterial,] *and of their Powers and Operations one on another; it is impoſſible for him, in Many Reſpects, to tell how far they can affect one another's Operations.* This is true indeed; but what follows from it? Becauſe, in *Many Reſpects*, I cannot tell how far they *can* affect one another's Operations; does it therefore follow, that I cannot in *any reſpect* tell wherein they *can not* affect one another's Operations? All that I pretend to, is to deny the poſſibility of ſuch Effects, as plainly imply a Contradiction; and this, I preſume, I may be allowed to do, though I were in *moſt reſpects* ignorant how far Material and Immaterial Beings *can* affect one another.

As to the *Power of God* to deſtroy any Mode or Quality in an immaterial indiſcerpible Subſtance, I ſaid nothing concerning it, neither is our Queſtion at all concerned in it. But ſince you have thought fit to put the Queſtion whether, according to my Principles, God can deſtroy a Mode or Quality in an Immaterial Being, without making ſome alteration in the Subſtance it ſelf; I cannot but take notice, that all the Anſwers you have made for me to this Queſtion, are ſuch as I cannot approve, and that therefore I am

not

not concerned in any of their Conſequences. The Anſwer I would make for my ſelf, is, that ſuppoſing God to deſtroy any Mode or Quality in an Immaterial Being, it is reaſonable to imagin that he muſt do it by making ſome ſuch *Alterations in that Subſtance*, as may be analogous or equivalent to *altering the Diſpoſition of the Parts in a Material Subſtance*. But you ought not to have jumbled † theſe two things together, (which I carefully diſtinguiſhed) by ſuppoſing me to anſwer, that God muſt do it by making an Alteration in the *Parts* of the *Immaterial Subſtance* (to which it is not *proper* to aſcribe any *Parts*,) and thence concluding that an Immaterial Subſtance is as *diſcerpible* by the Power of God, as a Material Subſtance. † pag. 32.

Laſtly, you tell me * that after all I make the Immaterial Thinking Subſtance to be in no other Senſe *Immortal*, than I make the original ſolid Patricles of Matter to be *indiſcerpible*; that is to ſay, that the one is *immortal* and the other *indiſcerpible*, only with reſpect to the Powers of Nature; but that in reſpect to the Power of God, neither is the one *indiſcerpible*, nor the other *immortal*. Your Expreſſions in this whole Section lie under ſo much Obſcurity, that I can hardly be ſure wheth r I underſtand you right or not. But if this be your Senſe; I confeſs I do indeed make it ſo; and I ſuppoſe no conſiderate Man ever made the Soul *immortal* in any other Senſe. For though I believe it is not *diſcerpible*, even by the Power of God; yet he is undoubtedly able to deſtroy it, either by *annihilating* it, or perhaps by otherwiſe *depriving* it of all its Faculties, in ways which we can know nothing of. * pag. 34.

IV. To the Difficulties ariſing from the *Suppoſition* of Immateriality not excluding Extention; I anſwer,

1. That all theſe Difficulties are wide of the main Queſtion. For if the foregoing Proof, that Matter is incapable of Thinking, cannot be ſhown to be defective; it follows neceſſarily that the Soul muſt be an *Immaterial indiſcerpible Subſtance*. But the Difficulties that ariſe from any following Hypotheſis concerning other Properties of that Immaterial Indiſcerpible Subſtance, as whether it be *Extended* or *Unextended*, whether it ever acts *wholly ſeparate*, or always *in ſome material Vehicle*, finer or groſſer, and the like; the Difficulties, I ſay, that ariſe from any of theſe particular Hypotheſes, affect only the particular Hypotheſis, from which they ariſe, and not at all the foregoing general Proof. I take it to be demonſtrated, that the Soul is an *Immaterial indiſcerpible Subſtance*: He that thinks the Difficulties ariſing from the Suppoſition of that immaterial indiſcerpible Subſtance being *Extended*, to be unſurmountable; may try if he can find fewer Difficulties in ſuppoſing it *Unextended*; And he that thinks the Difficulties that ariſe from ſuppoſing it *Unextended*, are not to be got over; may try to ſolve the Difficulties that ariſe from ſuppoſing it *Extended*: but the main Argument remains firm either way; and no difficulty ariſing from following Hypotheſes can be ſo great, as to leſſen the force of the foregoing poſitive Proof.

2. But conceiving Immaterialty not to exclude Extenſion, and ſuppoſing the Difficulties ariſing from that Hypotheſis to be ſuch as could not be clearly anſwered; yet this would not weaken the

fore-

foregoing Proof, unleſs that Argument could otherwiſe be ſhown to be in it ſelf defective. For there are many Demonſtrations even in abſtract Mathematicks themſelves, which no Man who underſtands them can in the leaſt doubt of the certainty of, which yet are attended with difficult Conſequences that cannot perfectly be cleared. The *infinite Diviſibility of Quantity*, is an inſtance of this kind. Alſo the *Eternity of God*, than which nothing is more ſelf-evident; and yet the Difficulties conſequent upon it, are ſuch as have reduced moſt of the Schoolmen to entertain that unintelligible Notion of a *Nunc Stans*. And his *Immenſity*, attended with much the like Difficulties.

3. But neither is this the true ſtate of the Caſe. For the Difficulties ariſing from the Suppoſition of Immaterial indiſcerpible Extention, are by no means like thoſe before mentioned. Space, (which you *impbiloſophically* call the meer abſence of Bodies, and yet confeſs it to be poſitively infinite,) is without difficulty confeſſed by you to be an Inſtance of ſuch an Extention; An Extenſion whoſe Parts (improperly ſo called) depend on each other for their Exiſtence, not only becauſe of its Infinity, but becauſe of the Contradiction which a Separation of them manifeſtly would imply. And the only Thing required in the preſent caſe, is, to conceive that God can create a finite Subſtance, which ſhall not, like the ſolid, rigid, determined Extenſion of Matter, conſiſt of Parts which are actually ſo many diſtinct Beings independent on each other for their Exiſtence; but be a Subſtance perfectly and eſſentially One, ſo that any Diviſion of it, ſhall neceſſarily infer a Deſtruction of the Eſſence of that

Subſtance. This muſt indeed be confeſſed to be a conſiderable Difficulty: But if the Difficulties ariſing upon any other Hypotheſis, be (as they certainly are) *at leaſt* as great; nothing can thence be inferred to the weakening of the foregoing Proof.

Your applying the Argument, by which I proved that Matter could not Think, in the ſame Words, to prove that neither could Immaterial Subſtance be capable of Thinking; is fallacious in the firſt Sentence. For the Suppoſition of the Subſtance being by *the Power of God divided into two Parts*, which concerning Matter is confeſſed to be always poſſible, may concerning Immaterial Subſtance (even tho' Extenſion be not excluded) be denied to be poſſible, as being a Suppoſition which deſtroys the very *Eſſence* of the ſubſtance itſelf.

V. As to your laſt Difficulty concerning Brutes, I anſwer, that your Disjunction is ſtill imperfect, when you ſay * they muſt either neceſſarily be annihilated ſome time or other, or elſe be capable of Eternal Happineſs *as well as Man*. For tho' they ſhould never be annihilated, yet why muſt they needs be capable of Eternal Happineſs *as well as Man*; any more than their preſent Subſiſting, implies that they muſt needs be capable of the *Expectations* and *Conditions* of eternal Happineſs, *as well as Man*? But what is all this, to our purpoſe? Cannot God, if he pleaſes, cauſe them to periſh at the diſſolution of their Bodies? Or cannot he, if he pleaſes, annihilate them at any other time, when he ſhall ſo think fit? Or cannot he, if he pleaſes, without ever annihilating them at all, diſpoſe of them into States ſuitable

* *pag.* 43. and again *p.* 44.

ſuitable to their particular Natures; which yet may in no propriety of Speech be ſtiled a Capacity of eternal Happineſs, as that of *Man* is?

Having thus at large indeavoured, to give you particular Satisfaction, in every one of the Difficulties you propoſed; I ſhall conclude with briefly repeating the Strength of the Argument, in a few plain and eaſy *Propoſitions*; and ſo leave it to the Judgment of the inquiſitive and impartial Reader.

NOTE; *by* Conſciouſneſs *in the following Propoſitions, the Reader may underſtand indifferently either the* Reflex Act, by which a Man knows his Thoughts to be his own Thoughts; *(which is the ſtrict and propereſt Senſe of the Word;) or* the Direct Act of Thinking; *or* the Power or Capacity of Thinking; *or (which is of the ſame import,)* ſimple Senſation; *or the* Power of Self-Motion, or of beginning Motion by the Will: *The Argument holding equally in all or any of theſe Senſes; as has been before ſaid.*

I.

Every *Syſtem of Matter* conſiſts of a *Multitude of* diſtinct *Parts.*

This, I think, is granted by all.

II.

Every *real Quality* inheres in ſome *Subject.*

This alſo, I think, is granted by All. For whatever is called a *Quality*, and yet inheres not in any *Subject*, muſt either ſubſiſt of it ſelf; and then it is a *Subſtance*, not a *Quality*; or elſe it is nothing but a *mere Name.*

III. No

III.

No *Individual* or *ſingle Quality* of one particle of Matter, can be the *Individual* or *ſingle Quality* of another particle.

The *Heat* of one particle, is not the *Heat* of another. The *Gravity*, the *Colour*, the *Figure*, of one particle, is not the ſame individual *Gravity*, *Colour*, or *Figure* of another particle. The *Conſciouſneſs* or *Senſation* of one particle, (ſuppoſing it to be a Quality of Matter,) is not the *Conſciouſneſs* or *Senſation* of another. If it was; it would follow, that the ſame thing could be *Two*, in the ſame ſenſe, and at the ſame time, that it is but *One*.

Note, From hence may be drawn an evident Confutation of that abſurd Notion which Mr. *Hobbs* ſuggeſts in his Phyſicks, (*chap.* 25. *Sect.* 5.) that *All Matter* is eſſentially *endued with an obſcure actual Senſe and Perception*, but that there is required a Number and apt Compoſition of parts to make up *a clear and diſtinct Senſation or Conſciouſneſs*. For from this Notion it would follow, that the reſulting *Senſation* or *Conſciouſneſs* at laſt, being but One diſtinct *Senſation* or *Conſciouſneſs* (as is that of a Man;) the *Senſation* or *Conſciouſneſs* of every One of the conſtituent particles, would be the individual *Senſation* or *Conſciouſneſs* of All and Each of the reſt.

IV.

Every *real Simple Quality*, that reſides *in* any *whole material Syſtem*, reſides *in* All the *Parts* of that Syſtem.

The *Magnitude* of every *Body*, is the Sum of the *Magnitudes* of its ſeveral *Parts*. The *Mo-*

tion

tion of every *Body*, is the Sum of the *Motions* of its ſeveral *Parts*. The *Weight* of every *Body*, is the Sum of the Weights of its ſeveral *Parts*. The * *Heat* of every *Body*, is the *Heat* of its ſeveral *Parts*. The *Colour* of every *Body* is the *Colour* of its ſeveral *Parts*. And the ſame is univerſally true of *every Simple Quality* reſiding *in* any *Syſtem*. For reſiding in the *Whole*, and not reſiding in the *Parts*, is *reſiding* in a Thing, and not *reſiding* in it, at the ſame time.

* Note, by *Heat* here, is meant that *Motion* which cauſes in Us the Senſation of Heat; By *Colour*, that *Magnitude* and *Figure*, which cauſes particular Rays to be tranſmitted to us; *&c.*

V.

Every *real compound Quality*, that reſides *in* any whole material *Syſtem*, is a number of ſimple Qualities reſiding *in* all the *Parts* of that Syſtem; ſome in one part, ſome in another.

Thus in the Inſtance of *mixt Colours*; When the Simples, *Blue*, ſuppoſe, *and Yellow*, make the *Whole* appear *Green*; In this Caſe, That *Portion* of the Syſtem, in which any one of the particular Simple Qualities reſides, is a *Whole* Syſtem with reſpect to that Quality, and the Quality reſiding in it, reſides in the ſeveral *Particles* of which That *Portion of the Syſtem* is conſtituted: And ſo of the reſt.

VI.

Every *real Quality*, *Simple* or *Compound*, that *reſults from* any whole material *Syſtem*, but does not *reſide in it*, that is, neither in All its diſtinct parts, nor in All the parts of ſome Portion of it, according to the Explication of the two foregoing Propoſitions; is the Mode or Quality of ſome *Other Subſtance*, and not of *That*.

All

All ſenſible ſecondary Qualities, *Heat*, *Colour*, *Smell*, *Taſte*, *Sound*, and the like, are of this kind; being in reallity not *Qualities* of the *Bodies* they are aſcribed to, but *Modes* of the *Mind* that perceives them.

VII.

Every *Power*, *Simple* or *Compound*, that *reſults from* any whole material *Syſtem*, but does not *reſide in it*, that is, in all its parts, in the manner before explained; nor yet reſides in any *Other Subſtance*, as its Subject; is no *real Quality* at all; but muſt either be it ſelf a real Subſtance, (which ſeems unintelligible;) or elſe it is nothing but merely an *abſtract Name* or *Notion*, as all *Univerſals* are.

Thus the Power reſulting from the Texture of a *Roſe*, to excite in us the Senſation of Sweetneſs, is nothing but an *abſtract Name*, ſignifying a particular Motion and Figure of certain parts emitted. The Power of a *Clock* to ſhow the Hour of the Day, is nothing but one *new Complex Name*, to expreſs at once the ſeveral Motions of the parts, and particularly the *determinate Velocity* of the laſt Wheel to turn round once in twelve Hours: Upon the ſtopping which *Motion* by the Touch of a Finger or any other Impediment, without making any alteration at all in the Number, Figure, or Diſpoſition of the Parts of the Clock, the *Power* wholly ceaſes: and upon removing the Impediment, by which nothing is reſtored but *mere Motion*, the *Power* returns again, which is therefore no new real Quality of the *Whole*, but only the *mere Motion* of the *Parts*. The

Power

Power of a *Pin* to prick, is nothing diſtinct from its mere Figure permitting it to enter the Skin. The Power of a *Weight* in one Scale of a Balance, to aſcend or deſcend, upon increaſing or diminiſhing the Counterpoiſe in the other Scale; is not a *new real Quality*, diſtinct from its *abſolute Gravity*, though it occaſions a new *Effect*; there being no Alteration at all made in the *Weight it ſelf*. The *Power of the Eye to ſee*, is not a real Quality of the *Whole Eye*, but merely an *abſtract Name* ſignifying a Tranſmitting and Refracting of the Rays of Light in a certain manner through its ſeveral Parts; Which Effect, by the interpoſition or removal of an Opake Body, is deſtroyed or renewed, without any Alteration at all in the Eye it ſelf. A *Key*, by having many new Locks made fit to it, acquires a *new Power* of producing Effects, which it could not before; and yet no new real Quality is produced, nor any Alteration at all made, in the *Key* it ſelf. And ſo univerſally of all Powers of this kind. If theſe Powers were any thing elſe, but *mere abſtract Names*; they would ſignify Qualities ſubſiſting without any Subject at all; that is, ſuch as muſt themſelves be diſtinct Subſtances. Which is unintelligible.

VIII.

Conſciouſneſs is neither a *mere abſtract Name*, (ſuch as are the *Powers* mentioned in *Prop.* VII; nor *a Power of exciting or occaſioning different Modes in a foreign Subſtance*, (ſuch as are all the *ſenſible Qualities* of Bodies, Prop. VI;) but *a real Quality, truly and properly inherent in the Subject itſelf, the Thinking Subſtance.*

If

If it was a *mere abſtract Name*; it would be nothing at all in the Perſon that Thinks, or in the Thinking Subſtance it ſelf; but only a Notion framed by the imagination of ſome Other Being For all thoſe Powers which are only *abſtract Names*, are not at all in the *Things whoſe Powers they are called*: but are only *Notions* framed in Imagination, by the Mind that obſerves, compares and reaſons about different *Objects without itſelf*

If it was a *Power of exciting or occaſioning different Modes in a foreign Subſtance*; Then the *Power of Thinking* muſt be before in that foreign Subſtance; and that foreign Subſtance alone would in reality be Conſcious, and not *This* which excites the different Modes in *That foreign Subſtance*. For the Power that is in one Subſtance, of exciting different Modes in another Subſtance; preſuppoſes neceſſarily in that other Subſtance the *Foundation* of thoſe Modes. Thus in the Caſe of all the *ſenſible Qualities* of Bodies; the *Power of Thinking* is beforehand in that Being, wherein thoſe Qualities excite or occaſion *different Modes* of Thinking.

It remains therefore that it muſt of neceſſity be a *real Quality, truly and properly inhering in the Subject itſelf, the Thinking Subſtance*; there being no other *Species* of *Powers* or *Qualities* left, to which it can poſſibly be referred. And this indeed is of itſelf as evident by every Man's Experience, as it can be rendred by any Explication or Proof whatſoever.

IX.

No *real Quality* can reſult from the *Compoſition* of *different Qualities*, ſo as to be a new

new Quality in the ſame Subject, of a *different Kind* or *Species* from all and every one of the *Component Qualities*.

If it could, it would be a *Creation of Something out of Nothing*: From compound *Motions*, can ariſe nothing but *Motion*: From *Magnitudes*, nothing but *Magnitude*: From *Figures*, nothing but *Figure*: From compoſitions of *Magnitude*, *Figure* and *Motion* together; nothing but *Magnitude*, *Figure* and *Motion*: From *Mechanical Powers*, nothing but *Mechanical Powers*: From a compoſition of *Colours*, nothing but *Colour*; which it ſelf (as appears by Microſcopes) is ſtill the *ſimple Colours* of which it was compounded. From mixtures of *Chymical Liquors*, nothing but *Ferments*; which are only mere *Motions* of the particles in mixing, ſuch motions as ariſe from the placing of *Iron* and a *Load-Stone* near each other. *Gravity*, is not a Quality of Matter, ariſing from its Texture or any other Powers in it; but merely an *Endeavour* to *Motion*, excited by ſome foreign Force or Power. *Magnetiſm* and *Electricity*, are not new Qualities, reſulting from different and unknown Powers; but merely emiſſions of certain ſtreams of Matter, which produce certain determinate Motions. Compoſitions of *Colours*, can never contribute to produce a *Sound*; nor compoſitions of *Magnitude* and *Figure*, to produce a *Motion*; nor *neceſſary and determined Motions*, to produce a *free and indetermined Power of Self Motion*; nor any *Mechanical Powers* whatſoever, to produce a *Power not Mechanical*. And the ſame muſt of neceſſity hold univerſally true, of all Qualities and Powers whatſoever, whether known or unknown: Becauſe otherwiſe, as

hath

hath been before ſaid, there would in the Compound be ſomething created out of Nothing.

X.

Conſciouſneſs therefore being a real Quality, (*Prop.* VIII.) and of a Kind *ſpecifically different* from all other Qualities whether known or unknown, which are themſelves acknowledged to be *void of Conſciouſneſs*; can never poſſibly reſult from any Compoſition of ſuch Qualities.

This is as evident from the foregoing Propoſitions, as that a *Sound* cannot be the reſult of a Mixture of *Colours* and *Smells*; nor *Extenſion* the reſult of a compoſition of parts *unextended*, nor *Solidity* the reſult of parts *not ſolid*; whatever other different Qualities, known or unknown, thoſe conſtituent parts may be ſuppoſed to be endued with.

XI.

No Individual *Quality* can be *transferred* from one *Subject* to another.

This is granted by All.

XII.

The *Spirits* and *Particles* of the *Brain*, being *looſe* and in perpetual *Flux*, cannot therefore be the ſeat of that *Conſciouſneſs*, by which a Man not only remembers things done many years ſince; but alſo is Conſcious that *He himſelf*, the ſame *Individual Conſcious Being*, was the Doer of them.

This follows evidently from the foregoing.

XIII.

XIII.

The *Conſciouſneſs* that a Man has at one and the ſame time, is *One Conſciouſneſs*; and not a *Multitude of Conſciouſneſſes*; as the *Solidity*, *Motion*, or *Colour* of any piece of Matter is a Multitude of diſtinct *Solidities*, *Motions*, or *Colours*.

This is granted by All, who deny that the particles of the Brain, which they ſuppoſe to conſtitute a Conſcious Subſtance, are themſelves each of them Conſcious.

XIV.

Conſciouſneſs therefore cannot at all reſide in the Subſtance of the *Brain*, or *Spirits*, or in any other *material Syſtem* as its *Subject*; but muſt be a Quality of ſome *Immaterial Subſtance*.

This follows neceſſarily from the foregoing Propoſitions compared together. For ſince every poſſible Power of Matter, whether known or unknown, muſt needs be either, 1ſt, a *real Quality* of the Matter to which it is aſcribed; and then it muſt inhere in the ſeveral diſtinct parts; Or, 2dly a Power of exciting or occaſioning certain *Modes* in ſome *other Subject*; and then it is truly the Quality, not of the *Matter*, but of that *other Subject*: Or, 3dly; a *mere abſtract Name* or *Notion* of what is, properly ſpeaking, no real Quality at all, and inheres in no real Subject at all: And *Conſciouſneſs* is acknowledged to be none of theſe: It follows unavoidably, that it muſt of neceſſity be a Quality of ſome *Immaterial Subſtance*.

XV.

Difficulties that ariſe afterwards, concerning *Other Qualities* of that *Immaterial Subſtance*, as whether it be *Extended* or *Unextended*; do not at all affect the preſent Argument.

For thus even abſtract Mathematical Demonſtrations; as thoſe concerning the *Infinite Diviſibility of Quantity*, the *Eternity of God*, and his *Immenſity*; have almoſt inſuperable Difficulties on the other ſide: And yet no Man, who underſtands thoſe Matters, thinks that thoſe Difficulties do at all weaken the Force, or diminiſh the Certainty of the Demonſtrations.

A Third

DEFENSE

OF AN

ARGUMENT

Made uſe of in a

Letter to Mr *DODWEL*,

to prove the Immateriality and Natural *Immortality* of the SOUL.

In a Letter to the Author of the Reflexions on *Mr* Clarke's *Second Defenſe*, &c.

The Third Edition.

Arguments ſeldom work on Men of Wit and Learning, when they have once engaged themſelves in a contrary Opinion.

Mr. Hobbs.

We have as much Reaſon to be ſatisfied with our Notion of *Immaterial Spirit*, as with our Notion of *Body*; and the Exiſtence of the One, as well as the Other. For it being no more a Contradiction that *Thinking* ſhould exiſt ſeparate and independent from *Solidity*, than it is a Contradiction that *Solidity ſhould exiſt* ſeparate and independent from *Thinking*; they being Both but *Simple Ideas*, independent one from another; And having as clear and diſtinct Ideas in us, of *Thinking*, as of *Solidity*; I know not why we may not as well allow a *Thinking thing without Solidity*, that is, *Immaterial*, to exiſt; as a *Solid thing without thinking*, that, is, *Matter*, to exiſt. Mr *Lock's* Eſſay. Book II. *Ch.* 23. §. 32.

Printed in the Year 1718.

A Third

DEFENSE

OF AN

ARGUMENT, &c.

SIR,

IN my Laſt Reply I perſuaded my ſelf I had ſet the Queſtion between us in ſo clear a Light, that there would have been no need of any new Debate, or of giving our Readers any further trouble in this Matter. But ſeeing you have found out a ſeemingly new *Diſtinction*, by which you ſtill indeavour to evade the Force of the Argument; And, though your Evaſion ſeems to Me indeed extreamly ſlight, yet ſeeing you have thought fit to inſiſt upon it in ſuch a manner, as if you your ſelf really believed there was ſome Strength and Weight in it; I ſhall indeavour to gratify the ſincere Deſire you profeſs to have of diſcovering the Truth, by ſhowing briefly the weakneſs and inconcluſiveneſs of what you have advanced in your *Reflexions*.

In order to prove that *Thinking* cannot poſſibly be a Quality or Power of *Matter*; I ſaid that all the Qualities or Powers, which either Are in Matter,

whether they be known or unknown; or are vulgarly Aſcribed to it; muſt of neceſſity be either,

1*ſt*. Real Qualities, truly and properly inhering in the Subject to which they are aſcribed: Such as are *Magnitude* and *Motion* in Matter. Theſe are always the Sums or Aggregates of Powers or Qualities of *the ſame Kind*, inhering diſtinctly in the ſeveral Parts of the Material Subject. Which not being true of *Thinking*, 'tis manifeſt that *Thinking* cannot be a Power or Quality of *this Sort*, inhering in a Syſtem of Matter.

Or 2*dly*. Qualities, not really inhering in the Subject to which they are uſually aſcribed, but being indeed Modes excited and reſiding in ſome other Subject: Such as are *Colours*, *Sounds*, and all thoſe which are commonly called the Senſible Qualities of Matter. Theſe do not exiſt at all in That Subject to which they are uſually aſcribed; but in ſome Other Subject. And this alſo not being applicable to *Thinking*, 'tis manifeſt therefore that *Thinking* cannot be a Power or Quality of *this Kind*, in a Material Subject.

Or 3*dly*. Qualities, not really inhering in any Subject at all, but being mere Abſtract Names, or external Denominations, to expreſs certain complex Ideas framed in our Imaginations; or certain general extrinſick, and relative Effects, produced upon particular Syſtems of Matter by foreign Agents; or certain Diſpoſitions of the particular Syſtems of Matter, requiſite towards the producing of thoſe Effects. Such as are *Magnetiſm*, *Electricity*, *Attraction*, *Reflexibility*, *Refrangibility*, and the like. Theſe have no real exiſtence by way of *proper inhering*, in any Subject. Which likewiſe ſince it cannot be ſaid of *Thinking*, 'tis manifeſt

nifeſt that *Thinking* cannot be a Power or Quality in a Material Syſtem, of *this Kind* neither.

You grant that *Thinking*, for the Reaſons I urged, cannot be a Power or Quality of any of Theſe Kinds: But you *Diſtinguiſh* upon the Firſt Sort; and allege,

That there are ſome Real Qualities, truly and properly inhering in the Subject to which they are aſcribed; which yet are not, like Magnitude and Motion, Sums or Aggregates of Powers or Qualities of the *ſame Kind*, inhering diſtinctly in the ſeveral Parts of the Subject: And that therefore *Thinking*, though it be not an Aggregate of Powers of the *ſame Kind*, may yet nevertheleſs be a Real Quality inhering in Matter

That Numerical Powers, or *particular and Individual Modes*, are ſuch real inherent Qualities, reſiding in a Syſtem of Matter, without inhering diſtinctly in its ſeveral Parts: in contradiſtinction to *generical Powers*, ſuch as *Magnitude and Motion*, which you acknowledge to be the Sums of the Magnitudes and Motions of the ſeveral Parts. *Reflex.* p. 18 & 20.

That, for Inſtance, the *Power of the Eye, to contribute to the act of Seeing*; the Power of a *Clock*, to ſhow the hour of the Day; the Power of a *Muſical Inſtrument*, to produce in us harmonious Sounds; the particular *Figures* in Bodies, ſuch as *Roundneſs* or *Squareneſs*; and particular or individual *Modes of Motion*, are ſuch *Numerical Powers*, not at all reſulting from any Powers of the *ſame Kind* inhering in the Parts of the Syſtem: And that *Thinking* therefore in like manner, not being an Aggregate of Powers of the *ſame Kind*, may yet inhere in a Syſtem of Matter, as one of theſe *Numerical* or *Individual Modes* of ſome *Generical Power*. pag. 14. pag. 15. pag. 15. pag. 17, & 20. pag. 21.

That, upon this Supposition, of *Thinking* being a *Numerical Mode* of some *Generical Power* of Matter;

pag. 19. it may be conceived, that *as the Roundess of a Body, is not the Sum of the Roundnesses of the Parts*; nor the *Squareness* of a Body, the Sum of the *Squarenes-*

pag. 19. *ses* of the Parts; nor *the Power of a Musical Instrument to cause an harmonious Sound, the Sum of Powers of the same Kind in the Parts singly considered*; nor any particular *Mode of Motion*, the Sum of the same

pag. 20. *Modes of Motion* in all the several Parts; So the *Consciousness* that *inheres in a System of Matter*, may yet *not be the Sum of the Consciousnesses of the Parts.*

That the Argument therefore drawn from *Con-*

pag 25. *sciousness* not being made up of *several Consciousnesses*, concludes no more against the possibility of its residing in a System of Matter; than the like Argument would *conclude against the possibility of the*

pag 25. *Existence of* Roundness, *or any other* Numerical Mode, *in a Body.*

Pag. 25. For *Roundness no more consists of several Roundnesses, than Thinking or Consciousness does of several Consciousnesses.*

pag. 25. And *Roundness is as specifically different from other Figures* of which it may be composed, *as Consciousness is from a Circular Motion.*

page 32. So that *Sensation* may be conceived to be *in the Parts of an Animal's* Body, just *as Roundness is in the Parts that compose a Round Body: Each Part has as much of Sensation, singly considered; as each Part of a Round Body, has of Roundness: And when the Parts are duly disposed, whole Thinking is performed, as whole Roundness exists by the Conjunction of Parts.*

page 55. For *Consciousness*, being *supposed to be a real Numerical Power, such as Roundness is; may result from the Composition of different Qualities, as Roundness does from different Species of Figure: And is consequently*

quently a new Quality in the ſame Subject, of a different Kind or Species from all the component Qualities conſidered together.

Wherefore, *though Conſciouſneſs be a real Quality, and different from all other Qualities, whether known or unknown, which are themſelves acknowledged to be void of Conſciouſneſs; yet it may reſult from ſuch Qualities as ſingly conſidered are void of Conſciouſneſs;* In like manner as *Roundneſs is a real Quality ſpecifically different from other Qualities void of Roundneſs, and yet may be the reſult or Compoſition of ſuch Qualities.* pag. 56.

That Conſciouſneſs may be conſider'd particularly, as an individual *Mode* or *Species of Motion.* pag. 19. 22 & 26.

For, as nothing more *goes to the Compoſition of Roundneſs, than the Conjunction of ſeveral Particles not ſingly endued with Roundneſs*; ſo upon *This Suppoſition*, nothing more needs *go to the Power of Thinking, than the Conjunction of ſeveral Particles not each endued with That Species of Motion called Thinking.* pag. 26.

This, if I underſtand you aright, is the Sum and full Strength of what you have urg'd in your *Reflexions.*

And to This, I anſwer as follows.

It is abſolutely impoſſible and an evident Contradiction, that any Real Quality ſhould truly and properly inhere in a Syſtem of Matter, without being the Sum or Aggregate of a Number of Powers or Qualities, reſiding diſtinctly in the ſeveral Parts of the Syſtem, and being always of the *ſame Kind* with the Whole that reſults from them. For, as the *Subſtance it ſelf* of a Syſtem of Matter, is nothing but the Sum of its Parts, exiſting

ſting diſtinctly and independently from each other; and the Whole cannot but be of the *ſame Kind* with the Parts that conſtitute it: So no *Power* or *Quality of the Subſtance* can be any thing elſe, but the Sum or Aggregate of the Powers of the ſeveral Parts; and That Sum or Aggregate, without a Creation of ſomething out of Nothing, cannot but be of the *ſame Kind* with the Powers that conſtitute it. If the Parts of the Subſtance be *ſimilar*, then the Syſtem it ſelf is an *uniform* or *homogeneous* Subſtance: If the Parts be *diſſimilar*, then the Subſtance is *difform* or *Heterogeneous*: But ſtill always of the *ſame Kind* or *Kinds* with the Parts that compoſe it. In like manner, if the Powers of the ſeveral Parts of the Syſtem be *ſimilar*, the Power of the Whole will be a *ſimple* and *uniform* Power: If the Powers of the ſeveral Parts be *diſſimilar*, the Power of the Whole will be a *compound difform* Power: But ſtill always neceſſarily of the *ſame Kind* or *Kinds* with the Powers of which it is compounded. Since therefore you acknowledge *Thinking* to be a Power not compoſed of a Multitude of *Thinkings*; and 'tis evident (as ſhall in the ſequel be made fully appear) that no Powers void of Thinking, can be of the *ſame Kind* with the Power of Thinking, ſo as to be Parts of it, and that from a Compoſition of Them the Power of Thinking may ariſe; it follows that *Thinking* is not a Power made up at all of Parts, and conſequently that it cannot reſide in a Subſtance that conſiſts of diſtinct and independent Parts, ſuch as all Matter is confeſſed to be.

For the clear explication of which whole Argument, and to vindicate the Notion from all the Ob-

Objections and pretended Inſtances you have brought to the contrary; it is to be obſerved, that the Terms, *Kind*, and *Species*, and *of the ſame Kind* or *Species*, are very ambiguous Terms, and uſed in great Variety of Significations: Though among Men who ſeek Truth, and indeavour to expreſs themſelves with the greateſt clearneſs they can, and are willing to underſtand each others meaning; they do not often cauſe any conſiderable Miſtakes.

For Example: Tis an evident Truth, that *All Circles of four foot Diameter*, are of *one and the ſame Kind* or *Species*; and this is what the Logicians call *Species ſpecialiſſima*. 'Tis true in another Senſe, that *All Circles Whatever*, are of the *ſame Species*: In another Senſe, that *All curvilinear Figures*, are of the *ſame Species*: In another, that *All plain Figures both ſtreight-lined and curvilinear*, as oppoſed to ſolids, are of the *ſame Species*: And in another, that *All Figures whatſoever, whether plain or ſolid*, are of the *ſame Kind* or *Species*; as contradiſtinguiſhed from Motion or Thinking, or from any thing elſe of a totally different Kind. This is what they call the *Genus generalius*. And beyond This, it is neither *True* nor *good Senſe*, nor can it in any manner be ſaid, that *Figure* and *Motion*, or *Figure* and *Colour*, or *Figure* and *Thought*, are of the *ſame Kind*; Becauſe there is nothing Common in their Idea's, by which they can be ranked or compared together: ſave only as they are all comprehended perhaps under the mere Abſtract Name of *Quality* in general.

In like manner; *All Squares of two foot diameter* are *ſpecifically* different from *All Squares of one foot diameter*; but not in the ſame Senſe, nor ſo much, as Both are from *Parallelograms*: And *All Parallelograms* differ *ſpecifically* from *All Squares*; but not

ſo,

ſo, as Both do from *Triangles:* And *All Triangles* differ *ſpecifically* from *All quadrilateral Figures*; but not ſo, as Both do from *Spheres* or *Cylinders*: And *Spheres* or *Cylinders* differ *ſpecifically* from all Streight-lined Figures; but not ſo, as They and All Other Figures differ from *Motion*, or from a *Taſt* or a *Sound*; or as *Figure* or *Motion* does from a *Thought*. Which makes it appear by the by, with what Truth and Senſe
page 25. you affirm, that *Roundneſs is as ſpecifically different from all other Figures as Conſciouſneſs is from a Circular Motion*; That is, that a *Circle* differs from an *Elipſis* (ſuppoſe) or from a *Parabola*, not only as much as it differs from a *Cube*, but even as much as it differs from the *Reaſon of a Man:* Or, as Logicians would expreſs it, that the *Species ſpecialior* differs as much from the *Species* next and immediately ſuperiour to it, as it does from the *Genus generaliſſimum*; and not only ſo, but as it does alſo from any thing that is not ſo much as included even in *That Genus*.

Again: *All light Blue Colours* differ *ſpecifically* from *All Dark Blues*; but not ſo as Both do from *Yellow* or *Scarlet:* And *Scarlet* differs *ſpecifically* from *Blue*; but not ſo, as Both do from the *Sound of a Trumpet*.

Now to apply This to our preſent Queſtion. When I affirm that every real Power or Quality inhering in a Syſtem of Matter, muſt of neceſſity be the Sum or Aggregate of Powers *of the ſame Kind* reſiding diſtinctly in the ſeveral Parts of that Syſtem; 'tis manifeſt that by this Term, *of the ſame Kind*, is not to be underſtood the *Species ſpecialiſſima*, but ſome of the *Species generaliores*. For Example: When I ſay the *Magnitude* of a *Cubic Foot* of Gold, is the Sum or Aggregate of the *Magnitudes* of its parts; I do not mean to ſay, that 'tis an Aggregate of *Cubic feet*, but of other

ther *Magnitudes* which conſtitute a Cubic foot, and which are of *the ſame Kind* with it, in the Senſe that *All Magnitudes* are of *the ſame Kind*, and may be parts one of another: But *Magnitude* and *Motion*, or *Magnitude* and *Figure*, are not in any Senſe *of the ſame Kind*, and cannot be parts one of another; Neither can *Figure* or *Motion* be a *Piece* of a *Thought*.

In like manner: When I ſay the Number *Twenty* is made up of Parts *of the ſame Kind* with the Whole: 'tis evident I do not mean that it is made up of *Twenties*, but of Other *Numbers*, which are *of the ſame Kind* with it, in the Senſe that *All Numbers*, are of *the ſame Kind*, and may be parts one of another: But *Number* and *Sound*, or *Number* and *Colour*, are not in any Senſe *of the ſame Kind*, and cannot be Parts one of another; Neither can *Number* or *Figure*, *Motion* or *Magnitude*, be a *Piece* of a *Thought*.

Again; When I ſay *Roundneſs* or *Globoſity* or any other Figure of a Body, muſt needs be the Sum of Qualities *of the ſame Kind* inhering in the ſeveral Parts; 'tis plain I do not mean to affirm, that *Globoſity* is made up of *Globoſities*, any more than the Number *Twenty* is made up of *Twenties*, or the *Motion of a Cubic foot* of Matter made up of the *Motions* of *Cubic feet*; but that a *whole Round Figure* muſt neceſſarily be made up of *Pieces of Roundneſs*, which are all of the *ſame Kind* with it; juſt as the *Numbers*, which are Parts of *Twenty*, are of the *ſame Kind* with the Whole, and the *Motions* of the Particles of a Cubic foot of Matter, which are Parts of the Motion of the Whole, are of the *ſame Kind* with the Whole Motion. But *Figure*, and whatever is not *Figure*, are not in any Senſe *of the ſame Kind*; Neither can any thing that is *void of Figure*, be part of any *Figure* whatſoever; nor

any

any thing that is *void* of *Curvity* in particular, be part of a *round circumference*; nor any thing that is void of that *particular degree of Curvity* which makes a Circle of a certain determinate Diameter, be part of the *circumference of That Circle*; nor any thing that is *void of Thinking*; be a Part or Conſtituent of a *Thought*.

From hence it clearly appears, that your Diſtinction of *Generical* and *Numerical* Powers, is of no Service to your Cauſe. For thoſe Powers which you call *Numerical*, muſt as neceſſarily be Aggregates of Powers of *the ſame Kind*, as thoſe which you call *Generical*. It is as evident, that the *Round Figure* of a *Globe*, [its *Superficial Figure*,] is the Sum of the *Convex Surfaces* of its outward Parts: and its *Solid Figure*, the Sum of all its *Solid Parts taken together*, conſider'd like ſo many *concentrick Shells* or any other Figures which can be conſtituent Parts of the Solid Content of a Globe; as it is that the *Motion* of a Globe, is the Sum of the *Motions* of its Parts. And the *convex outſides* of its outward parts, and the *concentrick Roundneſſes* of its inward parts, are as much *of the ſame Kind* with the *Whole Roundneſs* or the *Whole Globoſity*, of which they are pieces; as the ſeveral diſtinct *Motions* or *Magnitudes* of its Parts, are of the *ſame Kind* with the *Whole Motion* or *Magnitude* which they conſtitute. For why is not a *Semicircle* or the *Arch of a Quadrant*, of the *ſame kind* with the Circumference of a *Circle*; and *concentrick round Figures*, or any other *Figures* which can be *conſtituent* Parts of the Solid Content of a Globe, of *the ſame Kind* with the Figure of the *Globe*; as much as the *Motion* or *Magnitude* of *half a foot cube* of Matter, is of the *ſame Kind* with the *Motion* or *Magnitude* of the *Whole foot cube*?

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In reality, no other Powers but *Numerical* Powers, can properly in the preſent Queſtion come under Conſideration at all. For *Generical* Powers, conſidered as ſuch, are nothing but Univerſals, having no being but in the Imagination conſidering and comparing ſeveral Particulars. In the Individuals themſelves, wherein alone Powers really exiſt, they are not *General*; They are only made *General* by the conſidering and comparing together of Particulars; Which compariſon has no Exiſtence but in the Idea; And conſequently *General* or *Generical Powers*, having no real Exiſtence in things without us, have really neither Parts nor Whole, nor can properly come at all under Conſideration in the preſent Queſtion. 'Tis not *Motion* or *Figure* in *general*, that is made up of Motions and Figures; but 'tis the *individual Numerical Motion* or *Figure* of a Body, that is made up of the Motions or Figures of its Parts. The *Numerical Mode of Motion* of the Whole; is always the Sum of the *Numerical Modes of Motion* of the Parts: The *Numerical Mode of Superficial Figure* of the Whole; is the Sum of the *Numerical Modes of Figure* of the *Outſides* of its *Superficial* Parts: And the *Numerical Modes of Solid Figure* of the Whole; is the Sum of the *Numerical Modes of Solid Figure* of all the Parts taken together. In like manner, if *Thinking* could inhere in a Syſtem of Matter, it would not be *Thinking* in *general*, but always ſome particular *Numerical Thought*, that would be the reſult of the *Thinkings of the ſeveral Parts.*

If you will reply, that by *Generical* Powers, you do not mean *General* Powers, or *Univerſals*, which have no real Exiſtence; (though when you reckon *Figure* among your *Generical* Powers, in oppoſi-

oppoſition to any *particular Figure*, as *Roundneſs*; your words cannot eaſily bear any other than this abſurd Senſe;) If, I ſay, you will reply, that by *Generical* Powers you do not mean *General* Powers, but only ſuch *Sorts* of *particular* Powers, as *Are* Sums or Aggregates of Powers of the *ſame Kind*, in oppoſition to ſuch other *particular* Powers or Qualities, as *Are not* Sums or Aggregates of Powers of the *ſame Kiud*: I anſwer, that there is no ſuch Diſtinction in Nature; But all Powers or Qualities whatever that inhere in Syſtems of Matter, whether they be ſuch as you inſtance in for *Generical*, or ſuch as you inſtance in for *Numerical* Powers; are equally and alike Sums or Aggregates of Powers *of the ſame Kind*. For if by this Term, *of the ſame Kind* or *Species*, you underſtand the *Species ſpecialiſſima*; in that Senſe neither the One Sort of Qualities, nor the Other, nor any Wholes in the World, are Aggregates of Parts *of the ſame Kind*; It being no more true, that the *Magnitude or Motion* (which you call the *Generical* Qualities) of a *foot cube* of Matter, are made up of *cubic feet Magnitudes* or *cubic feet Motions*; than it is true that the *Roundneſs* (which you call the *Numerical* Quality) of a *Globe*, is made up of the *Like Roundneſſes*. But if by the Term, *of the ſame Kind*, be underſtood (as common Senſe requires, and as I before explain'd,) the *Species generalior*; then both the One Sort of Qualities and the Other, and All Wholes in the World, are Aggregates of Parts *of the ſame Kind*: It being equally true and evident, that the *Round Figure* of a Globe, (the *Numerical* Quality,) is, as to its *Surface*, made up of *Pieces of Surfaces ſpherically and concentrically convex*; and, as to its *Solid Content*, made up of *concentrick round Figures* or of *Shells ſpherically and concentrically convex*; which, being Pieces of the whole

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Spherical Surface, or of the whole Spherical ſolid Content, are reſpectively *of the ſame Kind* with it: as that the *Magnitude* of a *foot cube* of Matter, (the *Generical* Quality,) is made up of *Inches cube*, or of any *other Magnitudes*, which, being Pieces of a foot cube, are *of the ſame Kind* with it.

When therefore you ſay; *If Powers of the ſame Kind be underſtood* Generically, *then* you *Do agree that the known Powers of Matter are nothing elſe but the Sums of Powers of the ſame Kind; that is, the Figure and Motion of a Body,* [the *Magnitude* and *Motion* you ſhould more properly have inſtanced in,] *conſiſt of the Figures and Motions* [the *Magnitudes* and *Motions*] *of the Parts: But if the Terms, Powers of the ſame kind, be taken* Numerically, *(that is, as Powers really exiſt,) then there are Powers inhering in Syſtems of Matter, that are not the Sums of Powers of the ſame Kind; As, the Roundneſs of a Body, is not the Sum of the Roundneſſes of the Parts:* Your Diſtinction is evidently very groundleſs. Becauſe in the ſame Senſe that *the Roundneſs of a Body is not the Sum of the* Like *Roundneſſes of the Parts,* (for of *Other* Roundneſſes, as of innumerable *concentrick Roundneſſes*, and of the *convex out-ſides* of its minute external particles, it may be and always is the Sum:) In the ſame Senſe (I ſay,) that *the Roundneſs of a Body* is not *the Sum of the* [Like] *Roundneſs of the Parts*; in that ſame Senſe it is true alſo, that *neither* does *the Magnitude nor Motion of a Body conſiſt of the* [Like] *Magnitudes nor Motions of the Parts.* And on the contrary: In the ſame Senſe that it is true, that the *Magnitude and Motion of a Body* does *conſiſt of* [not the *ſame*, but the *Different*] *Magnitudes and Motions of the Parts*; in that ſame Senſe it is true likewiſe, that the *Numerical Round Figure of a Body*, that is, the *Round Figure of its Surface*, is the Sum

pag. 19.

of the *Roundneſſes*, that is, of the *round* or *convex outſides*, of its *ſuperficial* parts; and its *Solid Figure*, is the Sum of all its Solid Parts taken together, which (as I before ſaid) may be conſidered as ſo many *concentrick Shells* or any other Figures that can be *conſtituent* parts of the Solid Content of a Globe.

pag. 20. And when you ſay; It is *a Contradiction to make Conſciouſneſs the Sum of the Conſciouſneſſes of the Parts, as it is a Contradiction to make Roundneſs to conſiſt in the Roundneſſes of the Parts*; *Though* you *would readily grant, that was Conſciouſneſs a generical Power like Figure and Motion, it would be likewiſe the Sum and Reſult of the Conſciouſneſſes of the ſeveral Parts*; *and ſo there would be as many diſtinct Conſciouſneſſes, as there are Particles of Matter, of which the Syſtem conſiſts*; *which* you *do allow to be very abſurd*: And again;

pag. 21. *If humane Conſciouſneſs be a* Mode *of ſome generical Power in Matter, it muſt not be the Sum of the Conſci-*

pag. 56. *ouſneſſes of the Parts*: And; *Did Conſciouſneſs anſwer to Figure and Motion*, [the generical Powers;] *That would likewiſe conſiſt of the Conſciouſneſſes of the*

pag. 56. *Parts*: And again; *Conſciouſneſs may reſult from ſuch Qualities, as ſingly conſidered are void of Conſciouſneſs*; In like manner as *Roundneſs is a Real Quality ſpecifically different from other Qualities void of Roundneſs, and yet may be the Reſult or Compoſition of ſuch*

pag. 59. *Qualities*: And; *Nor is Conſciouſneſs a Power which anſwers to Figure and Motion* [the generical Powers,] *which* you *agree conſiſt only in the Figures and Motions of the Parts*: *but it agrees or anſwers to* [Numerical] *Modes of Figure and Motion*: All this, is only amuſing your Reader with inſignificant Words. For 1ſt. *Conſciouſneſs*, (as I ſhall hereafter have occaſion more particularly to obſerve) is truly a *more generical* Power, than either *Figure* or *Motion*. For

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Figure contains under it, nothing but the Modes of *Figure*; and *Motion*, nothing but the Modes of *Motion*: But *Conſciouſneſs* comprehending under it all the Modes of *Thinking*, contains in it ſelf the Ideas of all the Modes of *Figure*, and the Ideas of all the Modes of *Motion*, and infinite *Other Ideas* beſides. *Conſciouſneſs* therefore being a *generical Power*, not *like*, but infinitely *more* ſo, than *Figure and Motion*; muſt be (according to your own Confeſſion) *the Sum and Reſult of the Conſciouſneſſes of the ſeveral Parts; and ſo there would be as many diſtinct Conſciouſneſſes, as there are Particles of Matter, of which the Syſtem conſiſts*; *which* you *do allow to be very abſurd.* But 2dly, Let us endeavour to imagine *Conſciouſneſs* to be, not a *Generical*, but a *Numerical* Power or Quality, ſuch as *Roundneſs* is; and ſee what will follow from thence. It cannot be conceived that *Conſciouſneſs in general* is a *Numerical* Power, any more than *Figure in general*, or *Roundneſs in general.* But, as the *individual Roundneſs* of a *Globe*, is a *Numerical* Quality of that *individual Globe*; ſo you can only ſay that the *individual Conſciouſneſs*, which I find in my ſelf at any particular moment of Time, is a *Numerical* Mode of ſome Power inhering in that Syſtem of Matter which conſtitutes my Brain. Now as the *individual Roundneſs* of a *Globe*, is not indeed made up of a Number of the *Like whole Roundneſſes*; (even as the Number *a Hundred*, is not made up of *Hundreds*, nor the *Magnitude of a foot Cube*, made up of *feet Cube*; nor any *Whole* whatever, made up of a Number of the *like Wholes*;) but yet muſt needs be made up of *ſuch Figures*, as are *Parts of Roundneſs*, nay Parts endued with that *particular numerical degree of Curvity or Roundneſs*; page 20.

and cannot be made up of *ſtraight Lines*, nor of any *Figures* which are *not Pieces* of *Roundneſs*, or *not Pieces* endued with that *particular determinate degree of Curvity or Roundneſs*: So the *individual Conſciouſneſs* that I find in my ſelf at any particular moment of Time, (ſuppoſing it to be a Quality inhering in a Syſtem of Matter,) muſt be made up, though not indeed of a Number of the *very ſame Conſciouſneſſes*, yet of ſuch Powers as are as much *of the ſame Kind* with that *Numerical Conſciouſneſs*, as *Arches of Circles* are of *the ſame kind* with the whole *circular Circumference*; or *pieces of Surfaces ſpherically and concentrically convex*, are of the *ſame kind* with the whole *Spherical Surface* compoſed of them all: That is, it muſt be made up of *Different* Conſciouſneſſes indeed, but ſtill *Conſciouſneſſes* only, and not *Motions* or *Figures* or any thing elſe; any more than the *Roundneſs of a Circle* can be made up of *ſtraight Lines*, or of *Colours*, or *Sounds*, or any thing elſe beſides *Pieces of circular Roundneſs*; or than the *Surface of a Sphere*, can be made up of any thing elſe than *little Surfaces having every one of them the very ſame ſpherical and concentrick convexity*; or than an *Extended* or *Solid* Subſtance, can be made up of any other Ingredients, than ſuch as are Themſelves *Pieces* of *Extended* or *Solid Subſtance*. 'Tis by no means true, which you affirm, that *Roundneſs* is *a new Quality, of a different* Kind *or* Species *from all the component Qualities conſidered together*; or that *it may be the Reſult or Compoſition of Qualities void of Roundneſs*; Since it cannot be affirmed of any part of the *Arch of a Circle*, that it is wholly *void of Circularity*; as a *ſtraight Line* is: And in like manner, 'tis by no means poſſible, that *Conſciouſneſs may reſult from ſuch Qualities*,

lities, as ſingly conſidered are void of [all kind of] *Conſciouſneſs*; as *Motion* or *Figure* is. Nay further: *Every Part* of the Circumference of *a* Circle, is not only *not wholly void of Roundneſs*, but has really *as much Roundneſs* or *Curvity* (as much in *Degree*, though not ſo much of it in *Quantity*,) as the *whole* Circle it ſelf has; For the ſame Reaſon as *one Circle* has *as much Roundneſs*, as *twenty*; or *one inch cube* of boiling Water, *as much Heat* [in Degree] as *twenty*; or *one foot ſquare* of a white Surface, *as much Whiteneſs* as *twenty*: And therefore *Conſciouſneſs* in like manner, if it was a Quality anſwering to, or that could be compared with, the Roundneſs of a Circle; muſt conſiſt of Parts, every one of which would have *as much Conſciouſneſs* [in Degree] as the Whole.

From the ſame Principles may eaſily be ſhown the Abſurdity of all the reſt that you have advanced, upon your favourite Inſtance of *ROUNDNESS*.

You ſay that the Argument drawn from Conſciouſneſs's not being made up of ſeveral Conſciouſneſſes, concludes no more againſt the poſſibility of Its reſiding in a Syſtem of Matter; than the like Argument would *conclude againſt the poſſibility of the Exiſtence of Roundneſs in Body*; *which no more conſiſts of ſeveral Roundneſſes, than Thinking or Conſciouſneſs does of ſeveral Conſciouſneſſes*; *and is as ſpecifically different from other Figures, as Conſciouſneſs is from a circular Motion.* But I think I have ſhown, that the Inſtances are not alike; and that *Roundneſs* does not conſiſt of Qualities *ſo* different from *Roundneſs*, as you ſuppoſe *Conſciouſneſs* to be made up of Qualities different from *Conſciouſneſs*; that is, that the *Roundneſs of the* page 25.

whole Circumference of a Circle, is not *ſo* ſpecifically different from the *Convexity of the little Arches*, of which it conſiſts; or the *Roundneſs of a whole Globe*, from the *little ſpherically and concentrically convex pieces of Surfaces*, of which it is compoſed; as *Conſciouſneſs* is from a *circular Motion*, or from *Motion in a Square* or *any Motion at all* or *any other thing whatever that is wholly void of Conſciouſneſs*. For *Roundneſs* can conſiſt of nothing but *Pieces of Roundneſs*, that differ from it *ſpecifically* only in the very loweſt Senſe of the word *ſpecifically*; or rather they do not differ from it at all *ſpecifically*, but *in Magnitude* only, as the *Part* from the *Whole*; it being hardly good Senſe, to ſay that the *Number Twenty* differs *ſpecifically* from the *Number Ten*; or that 360 degrees, or 60 degrees, differ *ſpecifically* from 20 degrees or from 20 ſeconds, or from any other part of *One and the Same Arch*; Every *part* of which, has neceſſarily (as I before ſaid) juſt as much Roundneſs or Curvity [in Degree,] as the *whole* Arch or *whole* Circle it ſelf has: But *Thinking*, if it be made up of Qualities *utterly void of Thought*, as *Motions*, *Figures*, and the like; muſt conſiſt of Qualities *generically* different from it ſelf, in the higheſt Senſe of the word *generically*; they being under no common *genus*, and having no ſimilitude, nothing common one with another in their Ideas; and conſequently cannot with any Senſe be compared at all one with another, or be compounded one of another; any more than *Circles and ſtreight Lines*, or *Colours* and *Sounds*, *Numbers* and *Taſts*, *Figures* and *Motions*, or any things whoſe Ideas have nothing common or alike betwixt them.

page 26. Again: You allege *in behalf of Roundneſs as well as Thinking, that 'tis ſo far from being as certain as*

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an Arithmetical Demonſtration, that ſuch a particular Power is a Whole bigger than all its Parts; that 'tis an Arithmetical Demonſtration, that ſuch a particular Power as Roundneſs is, is but juſt equal to all the Parts of which that Roundneſs conſiſts. For what more goes to the Compoſition of Roundneſs, than the Conjunction of ſeveral Particles not ſingly endued with Roundneſs? And —— what more goes to the Power of Thinking, than the Conjunction of ſeveral Particles not each endued with —— Thinking? But here alſo your Compariſon is nothing to the Purpoſe. For, when you ask, *what more goes to the Compoſition of Roundneſs, than the Conjunction of ſeveral Particles not ſingly endued with Roundneſs?* if by *not ſingly endued with Roundneſs*, you mean *not ſingly endued with* [the ſame whole] *Roundneſs*; then your Aſſertion is no more than this, that the *Parts* of *Roundneſs* are not a Number of the ſame *Wholes*; or that the ſeveral *Pieces* of the *Circumference of a Circle*, are not ſo many *Whole* [Same] *Circumferences:* And then I anſwer, neither would the *Parts* of *Thinking* (if it inhered in a Syſtem of Matter) be ſo many *Whole* [the Same] *Thoughts*. But if you mean, that a Round Figure is a Compoſition of particles *not ſingly endued with* [any Part of] *Roundneſs* any [Curvity] *at all*; then your aſſertion is directly falſe: And ſuch a *Roundneſs*, would be a *Whole* bigger than *all its Parts*; juſt as I ſaid *Conſciouſneſs* would be, if it was made up of Motions or any other Qualities *void of Conſciouſneſs*. If you imagined *Thinking* to be made up of innumerable different *Conſciouſneſſes*, as the *Roundneſs of the Circumference of a Circle* is made up of innumerable *convex Arches*, which are *Pieces of Roundneſs*; then indeed, and then only, your Compariſon would be good: But to

ſuppoſe *Thinking* made up of Powers *utterly void of Conſciouſneſs*, is like ſuppoſing the *Circumference of a Circle* to be made up of *ſtraight lines utterly void of convexity*; (or rather like ſuppoſing it to be made up of *Sounds* or *Colours*, or whatever elſe can be imagined even ſtill more remote from the Idea of *Roundneſs*:) And This is evidently making a *Whole* bigger than *All its Parts*, that is, containing ſomething different from, ſomething over and above, ſomething more than All its Parts taken together; nay, ſuch a Whole, the Sum of whoſe parts neither make up the Whole it ſelf, nor any Part of it: Which is a plain Contradiction. It is evident, that no *Whole* can poſſibly differ from *All its Parts* in any thing elſe, but only in the Abſtract Name, the mere external Denomination of its being a *Whole*; which is nothing at all in the Thing it ſelf, but merely a manner of Conception, a Conjunction of Ideas in the Imagination of the Perſon that beholds or thinks upon it. *Thinking*, if it was the Quality of a Syſtem of Matter, that is, the *Sum* or *Whole* of the Powers of its Parts; muſt differ from the diſtinct Powers of thoſe Parts, no otherwiſe than as the Idea of the Roundneſs of a *Circle* differs from the Idea of the Roundneſs of *two Semicircles* (or of *four Quadrants*) *joined together*; or as the Idea of *Twice Six*, differs from the Idea of the Number *Twelve*. If therefore *Thinking* was, as you ſuppoſe, a Compoſition or Reſult of ſeveral Powers; and thoſe Powers ſuch, as were Themſelves *utterly void of Conſciouſneſs*; *Thinking* would be either a *mere outward Denomination*, and nothing at all really in the Thinking Subſtance it ſelf; juſt as *a Dozen* is only a mere Name, and nothing at all differing really in the thing

thing it ſelf from *Twelve Units*; Which is what you will not affirm: Or elſe it muſt unavoidably be a *Whole* bigger than *All its Parts*; that is, containing *All its Parts*, and *Thinking* beſides: Juſt as the *Curve Circumference of a Circle* would contain *more* of curvity in it than *All its Parts taken together*, if it could be compoſed of Lines that had none of them ſingly any *Curvity at all*; or a *Cube* would be *bigger* than *All its Parts*, if it were made up of Parts that had none of them ſingly any *Magnitude at all.*

[If upon this you will forſake your firſt Inſtance, and, ſeeking ſtill for new Similitudes, allege that a *Square* Figure (ſuppoſe) may conſiſt of Parts, that are none of them ſingly endued with any thing like Squareneſs: I anſwer, that the *Squareneſs* of the Figure of a Body, is a mere *external Denomination*, *a mere relative comparing together* in the Imagination the *Bounds of a Surface*, *the Situation of four ſtraight lines with reſpect one to another*; and has not properly any real Exiſtence in Things themſelves, ſo as *Conſciouſneſs* is acknowledged to have in the Thinking Subſtance. The like may be ſaid concerning all other Qualities, whoſe Eſſence conſiſts merely in the *relative comparing the ſituation* or other *Reſpects of the Parts of a Body one towards another*: Such kind of Qualities having really no *proper Numerical* Exiſtence, ſave only in the Idea. And Roundneſs it ſelf, being conſidered in the ſame manner, might *this way likewiſe* afford a juſt Anſwer to your Argument drawn from thence.]

Laſtly, You affirm that *Senſation is in the Parts* Page 32. *of an Animal, as Roundneſs is in the Parts which compoſe a Round Body: Each Part has as much of Senſation, ſingly conſidered, as each part of a Round*

Body

Body has of Roundneſs; *And when the Parts are duly diſpoſed, whole Thinking is performed, as whole Roundneſs exiſts, by the Conjunction of Parts.* But from what has been already ſaid, I preſume it is evident enough, that *Senſeleſs Figure* or *Motion* cannot be *ſo* a *Part of Senſation* or a *Piece of a Thought*, as a *Semicircle* or *Quadrant* is a *Piece of a Circle*. To affirm that it can; *viz.* that Figure or Motion *wholly void of Senſe*, can be *ſo* a *Part of Senſation*; is plainly (as I have before ſhown) the very ſame Thing, as if you ſhould affirm that a Line *wholly void of Curvity*, could be *ſo* a *piece of the Circumference of a Circle*, as the *Arch of a Quadrant* is; or that ſomething that has *no Solidity* and *no Extenſion*, might yet be a Conſtituent Part of an *Extended* and of a *Solid* Subſtance.

I have ſhown that no part of the Circumference of a Circle, is wholly void of Roundneſs. If therefore *Senſation is* (according to your Aſſertion) *in the Parts of an Animal, as Roundneſs is in the Parts that compoſe a Round Body*; and *each part has as much of Senſation, ſingly conſidered, as each part of a Round Body has of Roundneſs*; It will follow, not (as you intended) that *Senſation* can ariſe from a Conjunction of Particles *utterly void of Senſe*; (for the *circumference of a Circle* cannot be made by a Conjunction of *Lines*, or the *Superficies of a Sphere* by a Conjunction of *Surfaces, utterly void of Curvity:*) but, on the contrary, it will follow that *ſome degree of Senſation* is really in *every part* of the Animal, ſingly conſidered; as *ſome degree of Curvity* is neceſſarily in *every part* of the *circumference of a Circle*, or of the *Surface of a Sphere*. And ſo you run unavoidably into that confeſſedly *abſurd* Notion, that there are *as many diſtinct Conſciouſneſſes, as there are Particles*

page 20.

ticles of Matter, of which the Thinking *Syſtem conſiſts.*

I am afraid our Readers are ſufficiently tired with *ROUNDNESS.* The other Inſtances you allege, to prove that a Quality or Power inhering in a Syſtem of Matter, needs not be the Reſult of Powers or Qualities *of the ſame Kind*, reſiding in the Parts of the Syſtem; are ſtill leſs to your purpoſe. For it is very evident concerning Thoſe and All other poſſible Inſtances, that they never are nor can be any thing elſe, but the Sums of Powers or Qualities *of the ſame particular uniform Kind* with the Whole, when that Whole is *Simple and Homogeneous*; or *of the ſame General Kind* with it, when it is *Complex and Heterogeneous.* Which ſince you acknowledge cannot be the Caſe of *Thinking*, it will follow that *Thinking* cannot be a Power or Quality reſiding in a Syſtem of Matter.

The *Power of a Clock* to ſhow the Hour of the Day, is not indeed a Reſult from the *like individual Powers* reſiding in the ſeveral Parts; any more than the Number *a Thouſand*, is the Reſult of a Compoſition of *Thouſands*; or *Any Whole*, a Compoſition of a Multitude of *the ſame Wholes*: But, as the Number *a Thouſand* is the Sum of a great many *Numbers*, but cannot with any Senſe be imagined to be a Compoſition of *Sounds* or *Colours*; ſo the *Numerical Power of a Clock*, being it ſelf nothing but *Motion* and *Figure*, cannot be the Reſult of any other Powers in the Parts, but ſuch as are themſelves ſingly *of the ſame Kind*, in the manner before explained; namely, *Motions* and *Figures.* And in like manner *my preſent Numerical Conſciouſneſs*, if it were at all a Quality inhering

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in a Syſtem of Matter; though it need not indeed be the Sum of a Multitude of the *like individual Thoughts*, inhering in the ſeveral diſtinct Parts of the Syſtem; yet it muſt be the Sum of *Such* Powers in the Parts, as would themſelves ſingly be of *the ſame Kind*, namely *Conſciouſneſſes* or *Thoughts:* It being equally, and for the very ſame reaſon, impoſſible that my *Conſciouſneſs* ſhould be the Reſult of ſuch Powers in the Parts of my Brain, as are *toto genere* different from *Thinking*, and have nothing in their Ideas common with it or alike to it; (ſuch as are *Figure* and *Motion*, and all other Powers which are *void of* Conſciouſneſs;) as that the fore-mentioned Number *a Thouſand*, ſhould be a Compoſition of *Sounds* or *Colours*, or of any thing elſe but *Numbers*.

page 15. The *Power of a Muſical Inſtrument to produce Harmonious Sounds*, is not indeed a Reſult from the *like individual Powers* reſiding in the ſeveral Parts of the Inſtrument; any more than the *Circumference of a Circle* is made up of a Number of the *like whole Circumferences:* But, as the *Circumference of a Circle* is the Sum of a Multitude of *convex Arches of like Curvity*, but cannot be an Aggregate of *Straight Lines* or of *Cubic Bodies* or of *Arches of unlike Curvity*; So the *Harmony* produced by a Muſical Inſtrument, being it ſelf, in the Mind that perceives it, nothing but *Sound*; and, in the Inſtrument, and in the Air, and in the Organs of Senſation, nothing but a *Motion of Parts*; cannot be the Reſult or Compoſition of any other Powers, but what are themſelves ſingly *of the ſame kind* in the ſeveral Subjects reſpectively; namely, in the Mind that perceives them, *Sounds* likewiſe; and, in the Inſtrument it ſelf, and in the

the Air, and in the Organs of Senſation, *Motion of the Parts*. And in like manner *Conſciouſneſs*, if it were a Power inhering in a Syſtem of Matter, could not be the Reſult of any other Powers in the Parts, but *ſome ſorts of Conſciouſneſs*; for the very ſame reaſon as the *Circumference of a Circle* cannot (as was before ſaid) be an Aggregate of *ſtraight Lines*, or of *Cubic Bodies*; nor an *Harmonious Sound* a Compoſition of *Colours*, or of any thing elſe beſide *Sounds*.

The *Power of the Eye* to See, is nothing elſe but ſuch a Power, as is in the *Object Glaſſes* of Teleſcopes, of *Traſmitting* and *Refracting* Rays of Light, ſo as to paint the Image of the Object in the bottom of the Eye. And This is evidently nothing but the Sum of Powers *of the ſame Kind*, namely Powers of *Tranſmitting* and *Refracting* of Rays, reſiding diſtinctly in the ſeveral Parts of the *Eye* or of the *Glaſs*. Every Part of the Eye, *Tranſmits* and *Refracts* Rays; and thoſe Rays paint ſeveral Parts of the Image: And the *Whole Image*, differs no otherwiſe from *all its Parts*; nor That which you call the *Numerical Power of the Whole Eye*, from the *ſingle Powers of all its Parts*; than the Idea of *a Dozen* differs from the Idea of *Twelve Units*: Which, if it be as great a Difference, as is between the Idea of *Conſciouſneſs* and the Idea of a *Circular* or *any other Motion*, I will confeſs I have loſt my Underſtanding. pag. 14. 16 & 17. pag. 25.

But there is ſtill a further peculiar unhappineſs in your chooſing to inſtance in the *Power of the Eye to contribute to the Act of ſeeing*, as a *Numerical Power* of a *Syſtem of Matter*, that does *not inhere in the Parts* of that Syſtem; and in your affirming, that upon *dividing or varying the leaſt part of the Eye, the Power of contributing towards the Act of Vi-* pag. 14.

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ſion is entirely at an End. For ſo far is this from being true, (excepting only *accidentally* upon account of the Softneſs and Fluidity of the Matter of the Eye,) that on the contrary, not only *every Part* of the Eye (as I now ſaid) *Tranſmits* and *Refracts* Rays, in order to paint at the bottom the ſeveral Parts of the Image of the Object; (and the Power of the *Whole Eye*, is nothing more than the *Sum* of thoſe *Tranſmiſſions* and *Refractions*:) but moreover even *every Part* of the Eye has the ſame Power as the *Whole*, (differing only in *Degree*,) of painting at the bottom the *Whole Image* of the Object. For, as each Half of a broken Object Glaſs of a Teleſcope, or any Piece of it that retains the poliſh on both Surfaces, will repreſent diſtinctly the Whole Object, only with leſs Brightneſs and Luminouſneſs than the whole Glaſs would do; So each part of the Eye, paints every part of the whole Object: And, if half of the Eye, or almoſt the Whole Eye be covered, ſo that you look only through a Pinhole placed on the right ſide or on the left ſide or upon the middle of the Pupil; ſtill the whole Object is ſeen diſtinctly, even by that very ſmall part of the Eye; And conſequently the Power of the Eye is the ſame both in the *Whole*, and in *every Part*.

And the ſame that has been ſaid concerning theſe ſeveral Inſtances you choſe to inſiſt upon, may with very little variation be ſaid likewiſe concerning all other Powers whatſoever that do or can reſide in any Syſtem of Matter; The right explication of the nature of which Powers, ſhows even your own Inſtances to be ſo many unanſwerable Arguments againſt the Aſſertion you brought them to ſupport.

This,

This, I preſume, may be ſufficient to prove againſt you in the *general*, that Every Power or Quality reſiding in any Syſtem of Matter, muſt of Neceſſity be the Sum or Aggregate of Powers *of the ſame Kind*, reſiding diſtinctly in the ſeveral Parts of the Syſtem: And conſequently, that Whatever Power is not an Aggregate of ſuch Powers; as you confeſs *Conſciouſneſs* or *Thinking* is not; cannot be at all a Power or Quality of Matter.

Not without ſome unwillingneſs you ſeem at laſt to determin in *particular* what Sort of Generical Power in Matter, you imagine *Thinking* to be a Numerical Mode of. You *ſuppoſe Conſciouſneſs to be a Mode of Motion*: You ſpeak of *Thought* as *a Species of Motion*: And you conceive it a proper Expreſſion, to mention a certain *Species of Motion, called Thinking*. pag. 19. pag. 22. pag. 26.

You deſire indeed it may not be *imputed to you as your Opinion*, ſince you *only take the Liberty to Suppoſe it*. But This will not ſerve you for an Evaſion, when the Abſurdity of the Notion is proved upon you. For you declare it as your poſitive *Opinion, that Human Conſciouſneſs or Thinking is a Mode of* Some *Generical Power in Matter*. What that Generical Power is, you will not poſitively determine; But you *Suppoſe* it to be *Motion*. Now I preſume you *Suppoſe* That which you judge the moſt probable, and which you think will beſt ſerve your purpoſe in explaining the Nature of *Thinking*. I ſhall prove preſently, that Nothing can be more abſurd, than to Suppoſe *Thinking* to be a *Mode of Motion*. The ſame Arguments will prove no leſs ſtrongly, that it is not poſſible for *Thinking* to be a pag. 19. pag. 22.

Mode

Mode of *Figure*, or of any other *known* Property of Matter; And alſo that it is not poſſible for it to be a *Mode* of any *unknown* Power of Matter, which in the general is *void of Thinking*; Becauſe every *unknown* Power which is *void of Thinking*, is as different from *Thinking*, as *Motion* it ſelf is, or *Figure*, or any other *known* Power; for the ſame reaſon that a *Smell* or a *Taſte*, or any other *known* or *unknown* Quality which is *not a Colour*, muſt of Neceſſity be as different from *Blue* or *Scarlet*, as *the Sound of a Trumpet* is. When therefore I have ſhown the
pag. 19. Abſurdity of your *Suppoſition*, that *Thinking* is a *Mode of Motion*; I ſhall likewiſe have ſhown the
pag. 22. Abſurdity of your *declared Opinion*, that *Human Conſciouſneſs or Thinking is a Mode of* Some *Generical Power in Matter*.

Now to prove the Abſurdity of Suppoſing *Conſciouſneſs* to be a *Mode of Motion*, I offer the following Arguments.

1. Every *Mode* of any *Power* or *Quality*, is nothing elſe but *That Power* or *Quality* of which it is a *Mode*, underſtood with ſome particular Limitation; that is to ſay, 'tis nothing but a *particular Inſtance* of that *general Power* or *Quality*; nothing but the *general Power* or *Quality*, conſidered under this or that *particular Modification*. *Blue* and *Red*, and all other *Modes* of *Colour*, are nothing but ſeveral particular *Colours*; and can contain nothing in their Idea, beyond the *Genus* of *Colour*. *Acute* and *Grave*, and all other *Modes* of *Sound*, are nothing but ſeveral particular *Sounds*; and can contain nothing in their Idea, beyond the *Genus* of *Sound*. *Circular* and *Triangular*, and all other *Modes* of *Figure*, are nothing but ſeveral particular *Figures*; and can contain nothing in their Idea, beyond the *Genus* of *Figure*. In like manner All *Modes* of *Motion*, are nothing elſe but *merely* particular

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Motions; and cannot contain any thing in their Idea, beyond the *Genus* of *Motion*. Now if *Simple Ideas* be the Foundation of all our Knowledge; and *clear and diſtinct Perception* of the *Agreement or Diſagreement* of thoſe Ideas, be the beſt and greateſt *Criterion* of Truth, that our Faculties inable us to attain to; then it is as evident as any Truth in the World, that *Conſciouſneſs* cannot poſſibly be a *Mode of Motion*. For I have as *clear and diſtinct a Perception*, that the Idea of *Conſciouſneſs* contains ſomething in it beſides and beyond the *Genus* of *Motion*, as I have that it contains ſomething in it beyond the *Genus* of *Figure*. The Idea of *Conſciouſneſs* is as totally and *generically* different from the Idea of a *Circular Motion* or an *Elliptical Motion* or any other *Mode of Motion* whatſoever, as it is from the Idea of a *Circle* or a *Cube* or any other *Mode of Figure* whatſoever. I have therefore exactly the ſame *intuitive certainty*, that *Conſciouſneſe* cannot be a *Mode of Motion*, as I have that a *Circle* or a *Cube* is not a *Thought*, or that an *Acute Sound* is not a *Purple Colour*, or that any one thing in the World is not another, whoſe Idea is the remoteſt and moſt different from it, that can be imagined. To ſuppoſe *Conſciouſneſs* to be a *Mode of Motion*, is really a greater Abſurdity, (if poſſible) than it would be to ſuppoſe *Roundneſs* to be a Property of a *Square*; Becauſe the Idea of *Local Motion* and the Idea of *Thinking*, having *no common Genus*, nothing wherein they agree or can be compared together; are evidently *more different* one from another, than the Ideas of *any two plain Figures* can be, which have *a common Genus*. And your Queſtion, *What more goes to the Power of* Thinking, *than the Conjunction of ſeveral Particles not each endued with That Species of* pag. 26.

Motion *called* Thinking? Is truly more ridiculous, than if a Man ſhould aſk, *What more goes to the making up of a* Scarlet Colour, *than the Conjunction of ſeveral particles not each endued with That Species of* Sound, *called* Scarlet? Becauſe no two Senſible Qualities are in their Ideas ſo different one from another, as the Idea, of *Conſciouſneſs* is from the Idea of *Local Motion.*

Local Motion can have no other effect upon any Syſtem of Matter, than only producing in it a different *juxta poſition* of Parts. To which to aſcribe Thinking, Mr *Lock* himſelf, who had no prejudice againſt the Poſſibility of Matter's Thinking, acknowledges it is very Abſurd. *To ſuppoſe*, ſaith he, *the Eternal thinking Being* [or any finite thinking Being] *to be nothing elſe but a Compoſition of Particles of Matter, each whereof is incogitative; is to aſcribe all the Wiſdom and Knowledge of that Eternal Being* [or the Wiſdom and Knowledge and all the Powers of the Finite thinking Being] *only to the juxta poſition of Parts. Than which nothing can be more abſurd. For unthinking Particles of Matter, however put together, can have nothing thereby added to them, but a new relation of Poſition, which 'tis impoſſible ſhould give Thought and Knowledge to them.*

Book IV. ch. 10. §. 16.

2. If *Thinking* was any *Mode or Species of Motion*, it would follow that *All Motion* would be ſome *degree* or *kind* of *Thinking*. For *Motion*, in the thing Moved, excepting only the difference of *degrees* of its Swiftneſs or Slowneſs, is a *Similar Quality*, and has no variety in it: All its different *Determinations*, or thoſe which you call its *Modes* and *Species*, being *nothing really* in the *Body it ſelf* that is moved; but *mere Abſtract Notions* or *external Denominations*, conceived *only in our Imagination.* For, moving with one Determination, or with

with another; from North to South, or from South to North; is *merely* relative, and not really a different thing in the Body moved; that one of those Motions should be *Consciousness*, the other not. In like manner *Circular Motion*, or *Motion in any other Figure*, is not any thing really and truly inhering in the Body it self, different from Motion in a *straight Line*. For the Determination of any Body that *moves in a Circle*, is nothing else, at any given Point of Time, but a Determination to *move in a certain straight Line*; and, at another given Point of Time, to *move in another straight Line*; and so on: so that there is no such thing as a *circular Motion* of any particle of Matter, coexistent at once; but all Motion is, strictly and properly speaking, a similar and uniform Quality, *viz.* a Body's *Going on* according to its Determination; Which Determination is always in a straight Line; and causes the Body to go on actually in a straight Line, where it meets with no Resistance; and where it meets with Resistance by Intervals, there to go on into new straight Lines successively, into which it is diverted by such Resistance; and, where it meets with continual Resistance, there to go on in a Curve Line, into which it is continually diverted: And every such *curvilinear Motion*, whether *circular* or of *any other Species whatsoever*, is but the Idea of a Number of Successive Motions of a Body, never existent together: a pure *Ens Rationis*, or Operation of the Mind; which considering Past Motion and Future, and recollecting *the Whole* by the Memory and Fancy, calls * *That Whole* sometimes by one Denomination and sometimes by another. How then can any of those *Modes of Motion* be the *Efficient* of *Thought*, or (according to yours

* See Bishop Norwich's Sermon on Immortality of the Soul, pag. 9. And Dr Bentley's Sermon II at Boyle's Lecture, pag. 55.

your Suppoſition) be themſelves *Thought*; when they are evidently nothing but the *Effect and Product* of it, *viz.* Ideas framed merely by the Imagination and Memory?

And the ſame that has been ſaid concerning the *Modes of Motion* of a *ſingle Body*, may eaſily be applied to the *Modes of Motion* of *any Number of Bodies*, in any *Syſtem* or *Compoſition* whatſoever. It being very evident, that if the *Progreſſion* of *One Particle* of Matter *directly in a Straight Line*, be not *Conſciouſneſs* or *Thought*; the *like Progreſſion* of *Twenty Particles* at the ſame time *in Straight Lines*, cannot be *Conſciouſneſs* neither: The Poſition of thoſe Lines with reſpect one to another, which determines the particular *Mode of Motion* of the whole Syſtem, being merely *imaginary*, *relative*, and *comparative*; a figment only in the Mind or Imagination, and not any thing really exiſting in the Bodies themſelves, at any one and the ſame Moment of Time.

In like manner the *Impulſe* alſo, or *Beating of one particle of Matter againſt another*, is a thing ſimilar and in all Caſes alike; differing in nothing, but in the *Degrees* or Quantity of the Force: And therefore muſt always and in all Caſes, if ever in Any Caſe at all, be ſome *Degree* of *Thought*. From whence it would follow, that there muſt be as many ſeveral incoherent *Conſciouſneſſes*, as there are Particles of the Brain or Spirits or of any other Matter in any Syſtem, that ever daſh one againſt another: Which is what you are not willing to affirm.

2. If *Conſciouſneſs* were a *Mode* or *Species of Motion*; then *Motion* would be the *more generical* Power; containing *Thinking* under it, as (in the Language of Logicians) the *Genus* does the *Species*. But on the contrary 'tis evident (as I before ob-

obſerved) that *Thinking* (though ſimple and not compounded of Parts,) is, in the Senſe we are now ſpeaking of, a Power infinitely *more generical* than either *Motion* or *Figure* or any other *Power of Matter*; and conſequently cannot be a *Mode* or *Species* of any of them. There are as many *Ideas of Figure*, as there are *Figures*; and as many *Ideas of Motion*, as there are *Modes of Motion*; and as many *Ideas of other things*, as there are *other things* in the World, that *can be thought upon*: And all theſe *Ideas*, are Modes and Sorts or Kinds of *Thinking*. Now if *Thinking* is a Power more various, more extenſive, more *generical*, than *Motion*; 'tis manifeſt it cannot be a *Mode* or *Species* of *Motion*, as *Roundneſs* is a *Mode* or *Species* of *Figure*. If *Thinking* is a Power *more generical*, than *Figure* or *Motion* or any other *Power of Matter*; if it is a Power as univerſal, as all things taken together, that can be thought upon; 'tis certainly a *generical* Power in the *higheſt degree*; And conſequently, (if it be at all a *Power of Matter*,) it will oblige you to run into the *Abſurdity* you declare you would avoid. For, by your own Confeſſion, you *would grant readily, that, was Conſciouſneſs a* generical *Power like Figure and Motion (like* Figure and Motion it is not, but infinitely *more generical* than either of them,) *it would be likewiſe the Sum and Reſult of the Conſciouſneſſes of the ſeveral Parts; and ſo there would be as many diſtinct Conſciouſneſſes, as there are Particles of Matter, of which the Syſtem conſiſts; Which* you *do allow to be very Abſurd.* pag. 20.

As *Figure* is the *Genus* of *all the Species of Figure*, ſo the *Idea of Figure* is the *Genus* of *all the Ideas of all the Species of Figures*: And ſo the *Idea of Motion*, is the *Genus* of *all the Ideas of all the Species of*

Motions; and the *Idea of Colour*, is the *Genus* of *the Ideas of all the Species of Colours*; and the *Idea of Sound*, is the *Genus* of *the Ideas of all the Species of Sounds*; and the *Idea of an Animal*, is the *Genus* of *the Ideas of all the Species of Animals*. The General Ideas of *Figure*, *Motion*, *Colour*, *Sound*, *Animal*, *&c.* are *generical* Powers of the Mind; And *Thinking* is the *Genus generalius* of all thoſe Powers. With what Senſe then can it be ſaid to be one of the *lower Species*, or a *Numerical Mode* of One of thoſe Powers?

4. *If it was the Motion* of the parts of a Corporeal Syſtem, *on which its Thinking depends: all the Thoughts There, muſt be unavoidably accidental and limited*; becauſe each one of *the Particles, that by Motion cauſe Thought, being in it ſelf without any Thought, cannot regulate its own Motions; much leſs be regulated by the Thought of the Whole; ſince that Thought* of the Whole, *is not the Cauſe of Motion, (for then it muſt be antecedent to it, and ſo without it,) but the Conſequence of it: Whereby Freedom, Power, Choice, and all rational and wiſe thinking or acting, will be quite taken away: So that ſuch a thinking Being, would be no better nor wiſer, than pure blind Matter; ſince to reſolve all into the accidental unguided Motions of blind Matter, or into Thought depending on unguided Motions of blind Matter, is the ſame thing: Not to mention the narrowneſs of ſuch Thoughts and Knowledge, that muſt depend on the Motion of ſuch parts. But there needs no enumeration of any more Abſurdities and Impoſſibilities in this Hypotheſis, (however full of them it be,) than That before-mentioned; ſince, let this thinking Syſtem be All or a Part of the Matter of the Univerſe, it is impoſſible that any one Particle ſhould either know its own, or the Motion of any other Particle; or the*

Whole

Whole know the Motion of every particular; and ſo regulate its own Thoughts or Motions, or indeed have any Thought reſulting from ſuch Motion. This Argument, is Mr *Locks* owns Words, (Book IV. ch. 10. *Sect.* 17.) to which I cannot but ſuppoſe you will give ſome Deference.

5. If *Thinking* was a *Mode* or *Species* of *Motion*; then in like manner as it is a proper Expreſſion to ſay, that *Circularity* is one *Species* of *Figure*, and *Squareneſs* a ſecond, and *Cubicalneſs* a third, and *Ellipticalneſs* a fourth; ſo it would be proper alſo to ſay, that *Circular Motion* is one *Species* of *Motion*, and *Motion in a Square* a ſecond, and *Motion in an Ellipſis* a third, and *Thinking* or *Conſciouſneſs* a fourth; and, I appeal to the common Senſe of all Mankind, whether I may not add with exactly the ſame reaſon, that a *Tree* is a fifth, and a *Syllogiſm* a ſixth, and *Perſonality* a ſeventh, *&c.*

[If to this you will reply, that you do not mean as you ſay, that any *particular Motion* is it ſelf *Thought*, but that *Thought* may be the *Reſult* of ſome *particular Motion*; I anſwer in the words of Mr *Hobbs*, that * no *Reſult* of Motion can ever be any thing elſe but *mere Motion* ſtill: (With a different Juxta-poſition of Parts perhaps; of which before, *pag.* 29.) And conſequently all the fore-going Arguments hold equally good, againſt one Notion as againſt the other.]

* *Motus nihil generat præter Motum.* Leviat. c. 1.

Some of theſe Abſurdities are ſo very groſs, and yet ſuch obvious Conſequences of your Notion, that it can hardly be imagined you ſhould have over-looked them. And indeed you do at laſt indeavour to obviate them in a *very effectual manner*; In ſuch a manner, by which you may,

whenever you please, answer all the Arguments upon any Question in the World; and remove out of your way, not only any *Demonstration*, but even *Intuitive Knowledge* it self. You tell me,

page 59. that I imagine *Consciousness to be Something else than what* you *contend it is*; That *the Term of*

pag. 60. *Consciousness stands with* You, *in* another *Sense* than

pag. 59. with Me: That with You, it signifies *a Numerical Power, answering to Roundness in a Body, or to a Motion peculiar to a System of Matter*; but that

page 60. with Me, *it relates to a Chimera or Idea of* my *own framing.*

Now to This I reply in the Words of Mr *Lock*; (Book 4. ch. 1. *Sect.* 4.) *A Man infallibly knows, assoon as ever he has them in his Mind, that the Ideas he calls* White *and* Round, *are the very Ideas they are; and that they are not other Ideas, which he calls* Red *or* Square.

I think I know infallibly, assoon as ever I have it in my Mind, that the Idea I call *Consciousness, Perception* or *Thinking*, is the very Idea it is; and that it is not another Idea, which I call *circular Motion*, or *Elliptical Motion*, or *Motion in a Square*, or the *Motion of a Watch or of any other Machine*. And I appeal to what every Man finds in his own Mind; whether my Account of *Consciousness*, or yours which makes it to be merely a *Mode of Motion*, be the more *Chimerical* Idea.

Simple Ideas cannot be defined nor described. When any Dispute is carried so far, as to terminate in questioning the *Idea it self*; there is nothing then left but to appeal to the Idea which every Man has in his own Mind. If I affirm that this Paper is *White*, and you will contend that it is *Red*; we cannot confute one another by Arguments, but must appeal to the Judgment of

the

the World. If a Man will tell me, that by *Scarlet-Colour* he does not mean That Chimerical Idea which I frame in my own Mind and call by that Name; but that He means thereby, only a certain *Numerical Mode* of *Sound*, I know not how he can be confuted, but by appealing to every Man's own Ideas. The *Idea of Conſciouſneſs* which I have in my Mind, appears to Me an Idea, which I think I clearly and diſtinctly perceive to be altogether as different from the *Idea of any poſſible Numerical Mode of Figure or Motion*, as my Idea of *Scarlet-Colour* is different from my Idea of *the Sound of a Trumpet*. If any other Perſon thinks his Idea of *Conſciouſneſs*, to be the ſame with his Idea of a *circular Motion* or of any *other numerical Mode of Motion*; I conceive there is nothing more to be done, but to permit him to have the pleaſure of continuing to think ſo, as long as he pleaſes.

The Sum is This. I affirm that *Thinking*, cannot poſſibly be a mere *Mode of Motion*; becauſe the Idea of *Thinking* and the Idea of *Motion or any of its Modes*, have not the leaſt likeneſs or affinity between them. This, you ſay, proves nothing; becauſe My Idea of *Thinking*, is a mere Chimera; but Your Idea of it, is the ſame as your Idea of ſome *Numerical Mode of Motion*. I reply; If this proves nothing, then neither can any Argument in the World ever prove any thing. For, Suppoſe the thing in diſpute be, whether *a Square is a Circle*, or whether *Blueneſs* is *a Taſte*: I contend this cannot poſſibly be, becauſe my Idea of *a Square* includes in it nothing of that *Roundneſs* which is my Idea of *a Circle*; and my Idea of *Blueneſs* includes in it nothing like *That Senſation*, which is my Idea of *a Taſte*.

May

May not another Perſon anſwer, that This proves nothing? becauſe my Idea of *a Square*, or of *Blueneſs*, is a mere Chimera; but His Idea of *a Square*, is the ſame as his Idea of a *round Figure*; and his Idea of *Blueneſs*, the ſame as his Idea of ſome certain *Taſte*.

To conclude. In reviewing this whole Matter, I can hardly perſwade my ſelf, but that you have miſtaken your own Argument. Some ingenious Perſons in the preſent Age have indeed undertaken to maintain, that God, by the immediate exerciſe of his Omnipotence, may make Matter Think; notwithſtanding it be impoſſible that *Thinking* ſhould reſult naturally, from any Compoſition or Diviſion of the original Properties of Matter. I ſuppoſe they meant, that to Matter diſpoſed in a certain Manner, and put into ſome particular Modes of Motion, Omnipotence could *Superadd* the Power of *Thinking*. I think the Argument drawn from the Diviſibility of Matter, proves that Matter is not a Subject capable of ſuch a *Superaddition*: And if it be not; then recurring to the Divine Omnipotence for the making out an Impoſſibility, is not *magnifying* but *deſtroying* the Power of God; as indeed all contradictory Apprehenſions concerning any of his Perfections, are really and in event deſtructive of our whole Notion of God; and have no other Effect, than to give profane Men an occaſion of ſcoffing at Religion. However, that aſſertion had the appearance (tho' a very falſe one) of being founded in a certain modeſt apprehenſion concerning the Inconceivable Extent of the Divine Power. But that any *Mode of Motion* ſhould be (not a previous diſpoſition or qualification, towards capacitating Matter for the Addition of ſuch a Power; but that

that it ſhould be) *Thinking it ſelf*; when all the Matter ſuppoſed to be in that Motion, is acknowledged otherwiſe to be *void of Thought:* This is ſuch an Extravagant Abſurdity, as may juſtly cauſe wonder how it ſhould ever enter into the Heart of any rational Man; eſpecially in an Age, wherein Philoſophical Knowledge has received ſo conſiderable Improvements.

Having thus particularly anſwered the Argument wherein you placed your main Strength; It remains that I take notice of ſome Incidents in your *Reflexions*, wherein I think you have either greatly miſrepreſented Me, or given very diſadvantageous Repreſentations of your own Philoſophy.

In the Queſtion, *Whether a Syſtem of Matter can have a* Power of Thinking *or an* Individual Conſciouſneſs *ſuperadded to it, or flowing from any Modification of that Syſtem*; you ſaid, you underſtood by a *Power of Thinking*, only *Actual Thinking*, and not a *Capacity of Thinking*.

I replied, there was no need of making any ſuch Diſtinction; becauſe my Argument was of equal force, in whatever Senſe the Term *Conſciouſneſs* was underſtood; whether to ſignify the *Capacity of Thinking*, or *Actual Thinking*, or the Reflex Act of being *Conſcious that I Think*.

Upon this, you make a long Expoſtulation, *what occaſion* I had *for contending with* you *about the Senſe* you *fixed to the Terms*. I did not *contend* much about it: But the *Occaſion* of ſaying what I did, was, becauſe in all Queſtions, the greater Latitude of ſignification the Terms may be allowed to be underſtood in, without making any Alteration

pag. 5.

Alteration in the Strength of the Proof, the clearer and ſtronger ſuch Proof always is; and the leſs perplexity, or room for quibbling, remains in the Queſtion it ſelf.

pag. 5. You ask; *Have* you *not underſtood* me *in a Senſe that anſwered all the Ends and Purpoſes of* my *Argument?* My Argument was indeed concluſive in the Senſe you underſtood me in: But I had no reaſon to approve of your confining me to that Senſe only, when the Argument was equally concluſive in any other Senſe the Reader might happen to underſtand the Terms in.

pag. 6. You ſay, you *have taken but the ſame Liberty* I *allow to every other Reader*. But, if I miſtake not, there is ſome Difference between allowing the Reader to take the Term *Conſciouſneſs* in which of the Three fore-mentioned Senſes he pleaſes; and allowing You to confine it to One of thoſe Senſes, excluſive of the others.

I affirmed that *the Reader needs not trouble himſelf with the Nicety of Diſtinction between a Capacity of Thinking, actual Thinking, and the Reflex Act of Thinking; but may underſtand Conſciouſneſs indifferently in all or any of theſe Significations.*

pag. 6. This Sentence, you think, *contains one of the niceſt diſtinctions that ever* you *met with*; being *as much as to ſay, that the Reader* need not *underſtand Conſciouſneſs indifferently in any of the before-mentioned Significations, and yet* may *underſtand it indifferently in any of theſe Significations.* But Where is the *Niceneſs* (the *Ridiculouſneſs* I ſuppoſe you mean) of ſaying that the Reader *may* take a Word in a Senſe, which yet he is not under a *neceſſity* of taking it in, but *may* likewiſe take it in ſome Other Senſe if he pleaſes?

You

You add: *For* you *cannot See, but that whoever* page 6.
underſtands Conſciouſneſs in any one of thoſe Significations, muſt uſe *that nicety of Diſtinction* I *complain of, whether he will or no; For by* Reſtraining *Conſciouſneſs to any* One *of thoſe Significations, he neceſſarily diſtinguiſhes That* One *from the other two: And* that *therefore* you *muſt needs own* you *cannot See the leaſt reaſon* I *had to blame* you *for a needleſs Diſtinction, when* I *allow* you *to underſtand Conſciouſneſs indifferently in three Significations, one of which* you did *aſſign as* your *meaning or Idea of that word.* But, if you pleaſe to look once again, I ſuppoſe you will *be able to See,* that there is no abſolute Neceſſity for *him that underſtands Conſciouſneſs in any* One *of thoſe fore-mentioned Significations, to* Reſtrain *it to That One Signification*; as you deſired to do.

Laſtly, You allege that *the whole Diſpute turns* pag. 8 & 9.
upon the preſent *Diſtinction* of the Significations of the word *Conſciouſneſs*; And to prove that it does ſo, you cite a Sentence out of my Letter to Mr *Dodwell*, wherein the word *Conſcious* cannot be underſtood in any other Senſe, than to ſignify *actual Thinking*. 'Tis true; in that Sentence the word was ſo uſed; And in the very ſame Sentence it was alſo uſed Otherwiſe. Now, becauſe in that paſſage which you made *the Occaſion* of our preſent Debate, I once uſed the word in ſuch a manner, as that the Nature of the Thing accidentally confined it to that Signification; though in the more emphatical part of the very ſame Sentence, it was uſed in a larger Senſe; Does this prove that *the whole Diſpute* now *turns upon* any Diſtinction of the Signification of that Word? You might as well have ſaid, it proves the remoteſt thing in the World from our preſent Queſtion. The Sentence

tence it self was This: *'Tis plain, unleſs Matter were eſſentially Conſcious,— no Syſtem of it in any poſſible Compoſition or Diviſion can be an Individual Conſcious Being.* My meaning was, that unleſs Matter were eſſentially *Conſcious*, that is, unleſs it were eſſentially indued with *actual Thinking*; it might be proved from its Diviſibility, that no Syſtem of it in any poſſible Compoſition or Diviſion, could ever be an individual *Conſcious* Being, that is, could ever either *actually Think* or attain a *Capacity of Thinking*. How does it follow now from hence, that becauſe in the former part of this Sentence, the word *Conſcious* happens to ſignify only *actual Thinking*; therefore in the Queſtion, [Whether *Conſciouſneſs can inhere in a Syſtem of Matter*,] the word *Conſciouſneſs* may not be underſtood at large, to ſignify either *actual Thinking* or a *Capacity of Thinking*? Between which, after all, there is no great Difference at the bottom.

Upon the whole; why you ſhould be diſpleaſed with me for allowing the Terms of the Queſtion to be underſtood in the greateſt Latitude, and for endeavouring to prove more than you expected, *viz.* that no Syſtem of Matter could either have *actual Thinking*, or ſo much as any *Capacity of Thinking*; I could not imagine. And why you made ſuch a Stir about a Diſtinction, which did and ſtill does appear to me to be very needleſs; I could conceive no other Cauſe, but only that you might *perplex* the Queſtion.

pag. 8. Thus I have given you the *Reaſon*, you *Demanded, of my Conduct* in this Matter: I do not *Demand* of *You*, but leave it to your Diſcretion, to chooſe whether you will give any *Reaſon* of *yours*, or no: For, (if you will give me leave to uſe your own Expreſſion) *I cannot aſſign a good one for you.* *pag.* 8.

You

You aſk; *If the Soul or Principle of Thinking be Undivided, how can it think ſucceſſively, divide, abſtract, combine or ampliate, retain or revive Impreſſions in the Memory? and how can it be capable, partly or wholly to forget any thing?* And the *Corporeity* of the Soul, you think, is further proved experimentally, from our being *tired with contemplating*, as much as with *ſinging and dancing*; from the *Reaction of our Thoughts* or of our Ideas *and Words*, mutually exciting each other; and from the *Forgetfulneſs* of *Children and Old People*, upon any *cauſe that diſcompoſes the Organ.* pag. 23.

To this I anſwer. The Reaſon why the Soul or Principle of Thinking, though it ſelf *Undivided*, yet thinks ſucceſſively, divides, abſtracts, combines or ampliates, retains or revives Impreſſions in the Memory, or partly or wholly forgets Things; is becauſe *The Whole Soul* thinks ſucceſſively, divides, abſtracts, combines or ampliates, retains or revives Impreſſions in the Memory, or partly or wholly forgets things: And none of theſe Phænomena can be explained by the various Acts of the *various Parts of a Bodily Organ* alone.

Our being *tired with Contemplation*; the mutual *Reaction of our Ideas and Words*; our *Forgetfulneſs* that follows upon certain *Defects* or *Diſcompoſures* of the Brain, *&c*; do not prove that the *Soul it ſelf* is a *Bodily Organ*; but only that it *Acts upon*, and *is Acted upon by*, Bodily Organs; and is aſſiſted by them, as Inſtruments in its Operations. Experience ſhows us, that the *Sight* is bettered by good Teleſcopes, and the *Hearing* by Inſtruments of conveying Sounds; but not that thoſe Inſtruments therefore *Hear* or *See*: That all *Senſati-*

on

on is bettered by good Organs of Senſe; but not that the Organs themſelves are *Senſible*: That *Imagination* and *Memory* depend on the Brain; But not that the Brain *imagines* or *remembers*. The Organs of the Senſes are entirely diſtinct from one another; But the Thing which perceives by thoſe different Organs, is One and the Same Thing; one Thinking Being, which every Man calls *Himſelf*. And this One Thinking Being, has not ſome Powers in ſome Parts, and other Powers in other Parts; ſome Actions in ſome Parts, and other Actions in other Parts; But all its Powers, are the Powers of the Whole; and All its Actions, are the Actions of the Whole. The Whole Thinking Subſtance, Sees both the Whole Object, and every Part of it; The ſame Whole Subſtance Hears every Sound, Smells every Odour, Taſts every Sapour, and Feels every thing that Touches any Part of the Body. Every Imagination, every Volition, and every Thought is the Imagination, Will, and Thought, of that Whole Thinking Subſtance, which I call I *myſelf*. And if this One Subſtance (which we uſually ſtile the *Soul* or *Mind*) has no Parts, that can *Act* ſeparately; it may as well be conceived to have none, that can *Exiſt* ſeparately; and ſo, to be abſolutely *Indiviſible*.

I alledged that it is *Abſurd to annex Conſciouſneſs to ſo flux a Subſtance as the Brain or Spirits; becauſe if ſuch a Subſtance could be the Seat of that Conſciouſneſs, by which a Man not only remembers things done many Years ſince, but alſo is Conſcious that He himſelf, the ſame individual Being, was the Doer of them; it would follow that Conſciouſneſs could be transferred from one Subject to another; that is, that a Quality could ſubſiſt without inhering in any Subject at all; which all rational*

Men

Men allow to be impossible. To this you reply; that *in order to retain the Consciousness of an Action, it is necessary to revive the Idea of it, before any considerable Flux of Particles; and by reviving the Idea of that Action, I imprint afresh the Consciousness of having done that Action, by which the Brain has as lively an Impression of Consciousness, (though it be not entirely composed of the same Particles,) as it had the day after it did the Action, or as it has of a Triangle or any other new Idea not before imprinted on it. Consciousness of having done that Action, is an Idea imprinted on the Brain, by recollecting or bringing into View our Ideas, before they are quite worn out; which Idea continues in me not only the memory of the Action it self, but that I did it. And if there is every now and then, a recollection of a past Action;* it may hereby be *conceived, that a Man may be conscious of things done by him, though he has not one particle of Matter the same that he had at the doing of those things; without Consciousnesses being transferr'd from one Subject to another, in any absurd Sense of those Words* And again: *If* Matter *can know at this Instant, that it Thinks;* you *can see no reason why it may not remember to morrow what it thinks of to day, though some Particles will be then wanting which it has at present: And if it can remember at all; then the Memory of things may be continued even after we have lost all the particles of Matter that we had at the doing them, by continual intermediate repeating or imprinting afresh our Ideas before they are quite lost or worn out.* But the Fallacy of this Reply, is very evident. For to affirm that *new Matter* perpetually added to a fleeting Syſtem, may by repeated impreſſions and recollections of Ideas, participate and have communicated to it a *Memory* of what was formerly done by the *Whole Syſtem*; is not explaining or proving, but begging

pag. 28 & 29.

pag. 58.

the Queſtion, by aſſuming an *impoſſible* Hypotheſis. But ſuppoſing it were *poſſible*, that the *Memory* in general of ſuch or ſuch an Action's having been done, might be preſerved in the Manner you ſuppoſe; yet it is a manifeſt Contradiction, that the *Conſciouſneſs* of its being done by *Me*, by *my own Individual Self* in particular, ſhould continue in me after my whole Subſtance is changed; unleſs *Conſciouſneſs* could be be transferred from one Subject to another, in the abſurdeſt Senſe of thoſe Words. For to ſuppoſe that One Subſtance ſhould be *Conſcious* of an Action's having been done by it ſelf, which really was not done by It, but by Another Subſtance; is as plainly ſuppoſing an Individual Quality to be transferred from One Subject to another, in the moſt abſurd Senſe; as 'tis plain that *Conſciouſneſs* is a *real individual Quality*, and different from bare *general Memory*.

If therefore you will anſwer, (which is the only poſſible ſeeming Evaſion in this Caſe,) that That which we call *Conſciouſneſs*, is not a *fixt individual numerical Quality*, like the numerical Figure or Motion of a ſolid Body; but a *fleeting tranſferrible Mode or Power*, like the Roundneſs or the Mode of Motion of Circles upon the Face of a running Stream; And that the *Perſon* may ſtill be the ſame, by a continued Superaddition of the *like Conſciouſneſs*; notwithſtanding the Whole *Subſtance* be changed: Then I ſay, you make *Individual Perſonality* to be a mere *external imaginary Denomination*, and nothing at all in reality: Juſt as a *Ship* is called the *ſame Ship*, after the Whole Subſtance is changed by frequent Repairs; or a *River* is called the *ſame River*, though the Water of it be every day new. The *Name* of the Ship, is the ſame;

ſame; but the *Ship it ſelf*, is not at all the ſame; And the continued *Name* of the River ſignifies Water running in the ſame Channel, but not at all the *ſame Water*. So if a Man at forty Years of Age, has nothing of the ſame Subſtance in him, neither material nor immaterial, that he had at twenty; he may be called the *ſame Perſon*, by a mere *external imaginary denomination*; in ſuch a Senſe as a *Statue* may be called the *ſame Statue*, after its whole Subſtance has been changed by piecemeal: But he cannot be *really and truly* the *ſame Perſon*, unleſs the *ſame individual numerical Conſciouſneſs* can be transferred from one Subject to another. For, the continued Addition or exciting of a *like Conſciouſneſs* in the new acquired parts, after the manner you ſuppoſe; is nothing but a Deception and Deluſion, under the Form of Memory; a making the Man to ſeem to himſelf to be Conſcious of having done That, which really was not done by Him, but by Another. And ſuch a Conſciouſneſs in a Man, whoſe Subſtance is wholly changed, can no more make it Juſt and Equitable for ſuch a Man to be puniſhed for an Action done by another Subſtance: than the Addition of the like Conſciouſneſs (by the Power of God) to two or more new Created Men; or to any Number of Men now living, by giving a like Modification to the Motion of the Spirits in the Brain of each of them reſpectively; could make them All to be One and the ſame individual Perſon, at the ſame time that they remain ſeveral and diſtinct Perſons; or make it juſt and reaſonable for all and every one of them to be puniſhed for one and the ſame individual Action, done by One only, or perhaps by None of them at all.

Mr Lock himſelf, in the very place where he contends that *Conſciouſneſs* makes the *ſame individual Perſon*, notwithſtanding that the *Whole Subſtance* be ſuppoſed to be changed; acknowledges expreſſly, (*Book II. ch.* 27. *Sect.* 13.) that ſuch a continuation of the *ſame Conſciouſneſs* in a fleeting Subſtance, would be *a repreſenting That to the Mind to have been, which really never was*; a *repreſenting to One intellectual Subſtance as done by it ſelf, what it never did, and was perhaps done by ſome other Agent*; a *repreſentation without reality of Matter of Fact, as ſeveral repreſentations in Dreams are*; a *Transferring by a fatal Error from One to Another, That Conſciouſneſs which draws Reward or Puniſhment with it*; a *making Two* [or Two Hundred] *Thinking Subſtances, to be but One* [Individual] *Perſon*: And *leaves it to be conſidered, how far this may be an Argument againſt thoſe who would place Thinking in a Syſtem of fleeting Animal Spirits.*

To ſay here, that Gods *Juſtice and Goodneſs* will not permit him to put any ſuch inevitable Deceit upon Men; is nothing to the Purpoſe. For if it be but *naturally poſſible* for him to do That, which, upon Suppoſition of the Truth of your Notion, will be a *plain Contradiction*; this is a certain Demonſtration that your Notion is Falſe. And I think it is a *Contradiction plain enough*, to ſay that Gods impreſſing permanently upon 1000 Mens Minds, after the manner of the repreſentation of a Dream, the like Conſciouſneſs with that which I find in my own Mind; would make every One of them, to be, not Perſons *like* me, but the *ſame Individual Perſon* with my ſelf. According to ſuch Reaſoning as this, Accidents need not have any neceſſary Dependence on their Subſtance: And the ſame individual Subſtance may as well be conceived

wed to exiſt in a thouſand places at once, under like Accidents; as the ſame *Individuating* Accidents or Qualities can inhere in a Thouſand different Subſtances at once. By which ſame Subtilty, (as Believing *too much* and *too little*, have commonly the Luck to meet together, like things moving two contrary ways in the ſame Circle,) all the Abſurdities in the Doctrine of *Tranſubſtantiation* may eaſily be reconciled.

You *deny that we have any Conſciouſneſs at all, that we continue the ſame Individual Being at different times.* If ſo; it can be to no great purpoſe for us to diſpute about Any Thing: For, before you receive my Reply, you may happen poſſibly to be entirely changed into another Subſtance; and, the next time you write, may deny that you have any Conſciouſneſs at all, that you continue the ſame Individual Being who wrote this Remarkable Sentence. But to the Aſſertion, I anſwer: Either Conſciouſneſs proves a Man to be the ſame Individual Being at different times; Or elſe it is a mere Deceit and Deluſion; and by being added in like manner to other Subſtances, might (as I ſaid) make an Hundred other Men with equal juſtice liable to the ſame puniſhment with himſelf for any One Individual Action done by Him. But of this more, when I come to ſpeak of the uſefulneſs and importance of the preſent Argument to the Ends and Purpoſes of Religion. pag. 57.

You affirmed, that *The Matter, of which an Egg conſiſts, doth entirely conſtitute the young One; and that the Action of Senſation began under a particular diſpoſition of the Parts by Motion:* To this I anſwered; that *ſo far is it from being true, that the Matter of the Egg, by any particular Diſpoſition of its Parts by* pag. 10.

Motion, is formed into or entirely conſtitutes the young One; that (accordin to the beſt Diſcoveries by Microſcopes and in Anatomy) it does not conſtitute it at all, not ſo much as the Body of it; but only ſerves it for
pag. 31. *Nouriſhment and Growth.* You reply: *If by* our Eyes *we can perceive the organized Body of the Animal to be* Part of the Matter *of the Egg; no Microſcopical Obſervation can deſtroy ſuch Matter of Fact, and —— make us See Nothing, where we do See Something.* Now I am very ſorry, Sir, to find you in a ſerious and important Queſtion deſcend to ſo extremely mean and trifling a Quibble. For, This is exactly the ſame thing, as if you ſhould ſay, that *by your Eyes* you can perceive an incloſed Worm to be *Part of the Matter* of the Nut it feeds on; or that *by your Eyes* you can perceive a Man to be *Part of the Matter* of the Houſe he dwells in.

I called *Gravitation* the *Effect of the continued and regular Operation of ſome Other Being on Matter.* You
pag. 34. replied; that *it does not appear, but that Matter gravitates by virtue of Powers originally plac'd in it by God, and is now left to it ſelf to act by theſe original Powers.* To this I anſwered: that *a Law or Power, that is to ſay, a mere abſtract Name, or complex Notion, which is no real Being; cannot impel a Stone, and cauſe it to begin to Move.* You reply again; that
pag. 35. you *deny not the neceſſity of a Being impelling another, in order to cauſe that Mode of Motion called Gravitation:* That you ſuppoſe it to be cauſed by the *Im-*
pag. 36. *pulſe of Other Bodies:* And, *to ſpeak your own Opinion, it ſeems Matter of Fact to* You, *that the external Figure and internal configuration of the Parts of Matter, are theſe Powers in Matter, by which it receives that peculiar Mode of Motion called Gravitation, from the circumambient impelling Bodies.* I did imagine, Sir, when I expreſſed my ſelf with ſuch brevity in

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my firſt Anſwer, you had been ſo well acquainted with Natural Philoſophy, as not to be ignorant that it has been demonſtrated even Mathematically, that Gravitation cannot ariſe from the *configuration and texture of the parts of Matter*, and from the *circumambient impeling Bodies*; becauſe, if it did, it would not be proportionable to the Quantity of Matter or the Solid Content of all Bodies, without any regard to their Superficial Proportion; as we find by Experience it is; ſeeing all Bodies, of all Textures, and all configurations of Parts, and all varieties of ſuperficial Proportion; [a Bullet, or a Feather, or a piece of Leaf-Gold, or a Sheet of Paper;] deſcend in *Vacuo* with equal Swiftneſs. And if *Material Impulſe*, be not the Cauſe of Gravity; then ſome Being that is *not Material*, (for *Laws* or *Powers* are nothing but mere empty Words,) muſt of neceſſity be allowed to be the Cauſe of it. But it ſeems you are, notwithſtanding the Force even of Demonſtration it ſelf, ſtill of Opinion that Gravitation is *purely owing* to the outward Figure and inward Configuration of the parts of Matter, and the impulſe of circumambient Bodies. For, *drop a pound of Lead, in the Form of a Bullet, from the top of a Tower: and it deſcends in a very quick ſpace to the ground: Vary the external Figure of the Bullet, by beating it broad with a Hammer: and its Tendency downward decreaſes: Vary the configuration of its Parts by Fire; and it will aſcend, inſtead of deſcending.* Certainly the Reader cannot but be greatly ſurprized, to meet with ſuch Philoſophy as This, in *our preſent Age*. For, what has All This to do with *Gravitation?* or with the Cauſe of Bodies *Tending downward?* Has a *Pound* of Lead in the Form of a Bullet, a greater *Tendency downward*, than under any other Form; becauſe the Air

See the incomparable Sir *Iſaac Newton's Principia* throughout; and the *Queries* at the end of the Latin Edition of his *Opticks*.

pag. 57.

pag. 36.

making leſs Reſiſtance to it when in that Form, ſuffers it to fall more ſwiftly? Or when it is beaten out into a *thin Plate*, which is ſtill of a *Pound-weight*; does its *Tendency downward decreaſe*, becauſe the Air making greater Reſiſtance to it when under that new Form its Superficies is inlarged, ſuffers it now to fall but ſlowly? You might by the ſame Philoſophy, and exactly with the ſame Truth, affirm that a *Hundred-pound-weight*, ſo long as you ſupport it with your Hands, has loſt its *Tendency downward*, becauſe it does not deſcend; But, I preſume, Experience will eaſily convince you of the contrary. In like manner; when *Lead* being evaporated by Fire, *aſcends* in the Air *inſtead of deſcending*, becauſe it is carried upward by the Motion of the Air, which aſcends being rarefied with Heat; is therefore its *Tendency downwards decreaſed?* You might exactly with the ſame reaſon have affirmed that a *Pound of Lead* in one *Scale of a Balance*, loſes its *Tendency downwards*; whenever a greater Weight in the oppoſite Scale, forces it to *aſcend in ſtead of deſcending*. The Truth, is plainly This: As a Pound of *Wood*, during the time of its aſcending from the Bottom of a Pail of Water towards the Top, is as much a Pound-weight added to the weight of the Whole Water, as a Pound of *Lead* is, that lies ſtill at the Bottom; and conſequently the *Tendency* of the Wood *downwards*, is always the very ſame, whether it be *aſcending* in Water, or *deſcending* in the Air; So your *Bullet*, whether it falls ſwiftly in the form of a *Bullet*, or ſlowly in the form of a *thin Plate*, or falls not at all while it is *ſupported in your Hand*, or on the contrary aſcends in the form of *Fume*, (in which caſe, *It* is in the Air, exactly what *Wood* is in the Water;) ſtill its *Tendency downward*, that is, its

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Gravitation, continues always the ſame, without any the leaſt *decreaſe* or *increaſe:* Which is the direct Contradictory to your Aſſertion. As *in Vacuo* all Bodies, of all Figures, and all Textures whatſoever, actually deſcend with equal Swiftneſs; ſo in the open Air, and every where elſe, their *Tendency downwards*, that is, their Gravitation, whether they aſcend or deſcend, whether they fall ſwiftly or ſlowly, or not at all, continues always invariably the ſame; and cannot be *increaſed* or *decreaſed* by any change whatſoever, of their *external Figure*, or of the *internal configuration of their Parts*, or of the *circumambient impelling Bodies.* Gravitation therefore cannot poſſibly ariſe from the *external Figure*, nor *internal configuration of the Parts of Matter*, nor from the *circumambient impelling Bodies*; ſince by no alteration of Any or All of theſe things, can the Gravitation of any Body be in the leaſt *increaſed* or *diminiſhed*; And conſequently Gravitation is quite another thing, than you ſeem to have at all thought of, when you *ſpoke your Opinion* about what *ſeemed Matter of Fact to you*, and talked of the *Decreaſe* of a Bullets *Tendency downward*, upon the variation of its Figure. pag. 36.

[Whoever will explain *Gravity*, which by Experience is always proportionable to the *Solid Content* of Bodies; muſt aſſign ſuch a Cauſe, as can act upon Bodies in proportion to their *Solid Content*, without any regard to their *Superficial* Proportion; that is to ſay, ſuch a Cauſe, as can reach and penetrate to the very Center of every ſolid particle of Matter: Which I ſuppoſe you will hardly affirm your *circumambient Bodies*, how ſubtle ſoever, are capable of doing.]

And not content to have erred so very grossly, in the first Foundation of all Natural Philosophy; you could not forbear professing further, that you
pag. 37. *have often Admired that Gravitation should be esteemed a matter of such Difficulty among Philosophers*; and that you think it to be so evident and necessary an Effect of *Matter in constant Motion perpetually striking one part against another*, that you wonder every Body should not see it. I suppose the rest of the World will no less *Admire* at *You*, for imagining that by so slight an *Admiration* you could at once set aside all the Propositions in that most excellent Book before-mentioned; wherein it is made appear by strictly Mathematical Demonstrations, drawn from the Laws of Motion now agreed on by Mathematicians and established by Experiments, and from the Phænomena of the Heavenly Bodies; that the present Operations of Nature, depending upon Gravitation, cannot possibly be Mechanical Effects of *Matter in constant Motion perpetually striking one part against another*.

Principia Philosophiæ Mathematica

Not much unlike to This, was *Mr Hobbs's* fancying that he had confuted all the Propositions in *Euclid*, by *Admiring* at *Euclid's* Definitions of Lines and Surfaces: And all Men ever since, that understand the first Elements of Geometry, have *Admired* at *Him* for fancying so.

But that which follows, is still the most wonpage 38 & 39. derful of all. You say: *Whether* you *take Mr* Clarke *right or no, the incomparable Sir Isaac Newton* (in the Preface to his *Principia*,) *is of Opinion, that* "*several Phænomena of Nature may depend on cer-*
"*tain* Forces *or* Powers, *whereby from Causes yet*
"*Undiscovered, the Particles of Bodies are mutually*
"*impelled against each other,* —— *or recede and are*
"*driven from one another: Which* Forces *or* Powers
"*being*

" *being yet unknown, the Philoſophers hitherto have* " *attempted Nature in vain.* Now to inſinuate to your Reader by ſuch a Citation, that This Great Man is of your Opinion in the preſent Queſtion; when on the contrary, the very Sentence you cite, was ſpoken by him (as appears from the words immediately preceding thoſe you have cited,) not concerning *Gravitation*, but concerning *Other* more particular Phænomena of Nature, in *expreſs Contradiſtinction* to thoſe of *Gravitation*; and when in that whole Book, from one End to the other, he is profeſſedly confuting and ſhowing the abſolute Impoſſibility of your Notion of Gravitation; and when he has * elſewhere in expreſs words declared, that by the Terms, *Forces* and *Powers*, he does not mean (as You did by *Powers originally placed in Matter by God*) to ſignify the *Efficient Cauſe* of certain determinate Motions of Matter, but only to expreſs the *Action* it ſelf by which the Effect is regularly produced, without determining the immediate *Agent* or *Cauſe* of that Action: After all this, I ſay, to inſinuate to your Reader by the citation of a piece of a ſingle Sentence, that That Great Man is of your Opinion; is (to uſe your own Expreſſions once more,) ſuch a *Conduct*, as the World may juſtly *demand a Reaſon of* from your ſelf; for *I cannot aſſign a good one for you.*

* *Optic.* pag. 322.

pag. 3.

Laſtly: As you declare it to be your Opinion, that Gravitation is cauſed by *Material Impulſe*; ſo you think it impoſſible, that it ſhould be owing to any *Immaterial Cauſe*: And you believe it to be *as intelligible, that Matter might act without Impulſe, by* Powers *placed in it by God*; *as that an* Immaterial Being *ſhould move Matter without being able to impell it by Contact.*

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This Belief of yours is founded wholly upon the Suppoſition, that there is nothing in the World but *Tangible* Subſtance; Which Opinion you give no Reaſon for; and therefore it is a *mere Prejudice*. But further: I preſume you will hardly deny, but *God* himſelf is an *Immaterial Being*; and that *He* can move Matter, though he does not *impell it by Contact*. Other *Immaterial Beings* therefore, though they do not *impell Matter by Contact*, yet it does not from thence follow that they cannot move it at all; Becauſe from *God's* moving it, it is manifeſt that there are other ways of moving it, beſides that of *impelling by Contact*. But *Powers* or *Laws*, are not real Beings; They are nothing but mere Words, or Notions; and can neither act in any Senſe, nor move Matter either with Contact or without it. I conceive an ordinary Reader may be able to diſcern the Difference, between affirming that an *Immaterial Subſtance*, a real Being, though not hard and ſolid, may move Matter; and affirming that a *Law* or *Power*, a mere Word or Term of Art, which is really No Thing, and has not truly any Being or Exiſtence, ſave only in the Imagination, can cauſe Matter to move.

Upon the Whole; All that you have advanced in theſe Sections about *Gravitation*, is ſuch marvellous Reaſoning, to be made uſe of in the preſent Age, after ſo many great Diſcoveries, founded upon Experience, and even Mathematical Demonſtration; that though I have no cauſe at all to be diſpleaſed with you, for arguing in ſuch a manner; yet I believe your Readers cannot but think you might very well have forborn going out of your Way; to give ſo very diſadvantageous a Repreſentation of your own Philoſophy.

I

I have been the longer upon this Head, because the true Theory of *Gravitation*, as it has been made out by that excellent Person whom you just now so unfortunately cited, does in its obvious and necessary Consequences, more entirely subvert the very Foundations of all possible Hypotheses, wherewith *Materialists* would undertake to explain the Phænomena of Nature *Mechanically* by the mere Powers of Matter and Motion; than any Discovery in natural and experimental Philosophy, that has ever yet been made in Any Age: Showing the *Matter* of the Universe to take up almost an infinitely small and inconsiderable part of that Space, which you suppose to be filled with it; bearing in truth far less Proportion to it, than a Tennis Ball does to the Body of the Earth: And consequently, that the great Phænomena of Nature cannot possibly depend upon any *Mechanical* Powers of Matter and Motion, but must be produced by the Force and Action of some higher Principle: And so leading us even with Mathematical Certainty, to *Immaterial Powers*; and finally to the Author of all Power, the *Great Creator and Governour of the World.* See Sir *Isaac Newtons Optics.* page 314 & 346. *Lat. Edit.*

I affirmed, that *there are many Demonstrations, even in abstract Mathematicks themselves, which no Man who understands them, can in the least doubt of the Certainty of; which yet are attended with difficult Consequences, that cannot be perfectly cleared:* As, for instance, those concerning *the infinite Divisibility of Quantity, and the Eternity and Immensity of God.* In Answer to this, you say that *if* there are any such Demonstrations, from whence any *Contradictions or Absurdities* follow in our way of conceiving things, *&c.* And again: *Absurdities and* page 42. page 42.

Con-

Page 43. *Contradictions, &c.* And again: *Abſurdity, Contradiction, or Diſagreement of Ideas; &c.* And again: You *require* me *to prove* that any *Abſurdity or Contradiction* follows either from the infinite Diviſibility of Matter, or from the Eternity or Immenſity of God, in our way of conceiving; and if I cannot, I have no ground, *you ſay*, from thoſe Inſtances, to put Human Nature in ſuch a State of *Scepticiſm and Abſurdity.* Now, *by all the Rules of Anſwering*, (to uſe your own Expreſſion;) you ought not to have changed my Words, *Difficult Conſequences that cannot be perfectly cleared*; into *Abſurdities, Contradictions, and Diſagreements of Ideas*; Becauſe *Abſurdities, Contradictions, and Diſagreements of Ideas*, are things juſt as different from *Dificult Conſequences* of Demonſtrated Truths, *which cannot be perfectly cleared*; as *Light* is from *Darkneſs. Abſurdities, Contradictions, and Diſagreements of Ideas*, are things *already perfectly cleared*; that is, things proved with *perfect clearneſs*, to be Falſe and Impoſſible: But *Difficulties* that *cannot be perfectly cleared*, may attend things either *poſſibly* or *certainly* True. *Abſurdities, Contradictions, and Diſagreements of Ideas*, do with as *perfect clearneſs* prove a thing to be *Falſe*; as a *poſitive Demonſtration* proves a thing to be *True*: And therefore it is abſolutely impoſſible, that they can Both be applied to the ſame thing; even juſt as impoſſible, as that the ſame thing ſhould at the ſame time be both *true* and *falſe*. But *Difficult Conſequences that cannot perfectly be cleared*, may be, and very often are, found to attend Things which are Demonſtrated to be True. The Reaſon is; becauſe *Difficulties that cannot perfectly be cleared*, do not (like *Abſurdities and Contradictions*) ariſe from a *Perception of the Diſagreement of Ideas*, but barely from

Page 43. Page 48.

from the *Defect* or *Imperfectneſs of the Ideas themſelves*. Our *Reaſon* is able to *apprehend* clearly the Demonſtration of the Certainty of the Exiſtence of ſome Things, where the *Imagination* is not able to *comprehend* the Ideas of the Things themſelves. This is plainly the Caſe of the *infinite Diviſibility of Quantity*, of *Infinity and Eternity* in general, of the *Actions of Immaterial Subſtances upon Matter*, and of many other Things. Here therefore I have juſt Cauſe (if I may uſe your own Expreſſion once again) to *demand a Reaſon of your Conduct*; and to *page 8.* complain that you have greatly departed from that Fairneſs, for which your former Papers were juſtly commended.

And you can ſtill the more hardly be excuſed in this Matter; becauſe you knew I had before expreſſed my ſelf very particularly and fully concerning the ſame Thing, in a Book which you your ſelf cite upon another occaſion in the very next Page to That wherein you accuſe me ſo wrongfully. My Words were Theſe: (*Demonſtrat. of the Being and Attrib. of God, p.* 11.) "Since "in all Queſtions concerning the Nature and Per- "fections of God, or concerning any Thing to "which the Idea of Eternity or Infinity is joined; "though we can indeed demonſtrate certain Pro- "poſitions to be true; yet it is impoſſible for us "to comprehend or frame any adæquate or com- "plete Ideas of the Manner How the things ſo "demonſtrated, can Be: Therefore when once "any Propoſition is clearly demonſtrated to be "True; it ought not to diſturb us, that there "be perhaps perplexing Objections on the other "ſide, which for want of adæquate Ideas of the "Manner of the Exiſtence of the Things demon- "ſtrated, are not eaſie to be anſwered. Indeed,

"were

" were it poſſible there ſhould be any Propoſition,
" which could equally be *Demonſtrated* on both
" ſides of the Queſtion, or which could on both
" ſides be *reduced to imply a Contradiction*, [*as Some*
" *have too inconſiderately* aſſerted;] This it muſt
" be confeſſed, would alter the Caſe; Upon this
" abſurd Suppoſition, all Difference of True and
" Falſe, all Thinking and Reaſoning, and the
" Uſe of all our Faculties, would be entirely at
" an End. But when to Demonſtration on the
" one ſide, there are oppoſed on the other, only
" Objections raiſed from our Want of having
" adæquate Ideas of the Things themſelves; this
" ought not to be eſteemed a Real Difficulty. 'Tis
" poſitively and clearly Demonſtrable, that Some-
" thing has been *from Eternity:* All the Objecti-
" ons therefore raiſed againſt the *Eternity* of any
" thing, grounded merely on our Want of having
" an adæquate Idea of *Eternity*; ought to be lookt
" upon as of no real Solidity. Thus in other the
" like Inſtances: 'Tis Demonſtrable, for Ex-
" ample, that Something muſt be actually *In-*
" *finite:* All the Metaphyſical Difficulties there-
" fore, which ariſe uſually from applying the
" Meaſures and Relations of Things Finite to
" what is Infinite; and from ſuppoſing *Finites*
" to be [Aliquot] Parts of *Infinite*, when indeed
" they are not properly ſo, but only as Mathe-
" matical Points to Quantity, which have no
" Proportion at all; [and from imagining all *In-*
finites to be *Equal*, when in things deſparate they
manifeſtly are not ſo; an *infinite Line*, being not
only *not equal to*, but *infinitely leſs* than an *infinite*
Surface; and an *infinite Surface*, than *Space infinite*
in all Dimenſions;] " ought to be eſteemed vain
" and of no Force. Again; 'Tis in like manner

" Demon-

" Demonſtrable, that Quantity, is infinitely Di-
" viſible: All the Objections therefore raiſed [by ſuppoſing the *Sums Total of all Infinites* to be *equal*, when in deſparate Parts they manifeſtly are not ſo; and] " by comparing the imaginary *Equality* " *or Inequality of the Number* of the Parts of Un-
" equal Quantities, whoſe Parts have really *no* " *Number at all*, they all having Parts *without* " *Number*; ought to be look'd upon as weak and " altogether Inconcluſive: *&c.*

Concerning the *Queſtions*, Whether Immaterial Subſtances be extended or not; *and* Whether, upon Suppoſition of their being extended, they may not nevertheleſs be of ſuch a Nature, as not to conſiſt of Parts which (like the Parts of Matter) are themſelves every one of them complete diſtinct Beings, ſeparable, and wholly independent of each other: *Alſo*, Whether from the Immateriality of the Souls of Brutes, it follows that they muſt of neceſſity be put into an eternal State of Rewards and Puniſhments: Concerning theſe Queſtions, I ſay, I have nothing further to add; but only that I think All you have advanced upon theſe Heads in your *Reflexions*, hath been already clearly obviated in my former Papers; To which therefore I refer the Reader, who, I fear, is already too much tired with Repetitions.

In the laſt place, you challenge me to ſhow that my Argument is *of any Uſe to the Ends and Purpoſes of Religion.* That it is of the *Greateſt Uſe*, will I ſuppoſe eaſily be granted; if it be evident that the Notion I am arguing againſt, is utterly deſtructive of Religion. And in what reſpects it pag. 46 & 61.

is ſo, I ſhall give you an Inſtance or two to conſider of; and ſo conclude.

1*ſt* then; If the *Mind* of Man, were nothing but a certain *Syſtem of Matter*; and *Thinking*, nothing but a certain *Mode of Motion* in that Syſtem: It would follow, that, ſince every *Determination* of Motion depends *neceſſarily* upon the *Impulſe* that cauſes it, therefore every *Thought* in a Man's Mind muſt likewiſe be † *neceſſary*, and depending wholly upon external Cauſes; And there could be no ſuch thing in Us, as *Liberty*, or a Power of *Self-determination*. Now what *Ends and Purpoſes of Religion*, mere Clocks and Watches are capable of ſerving, needs no long and nice Conſideration.

† See above; *pag.* 33. & 34.

2*dly*. If *Thinking*, in a *Man*, be nothing but a *Mode of Motion* or *of any other Quality of Matter*; it will be but too natural a Conſequence, to conceive that it may be only the ſame thing in all *Other Rational Beings* likewiſe; and even in *God* himſelf. And what a Notion of *God* This would give us, is not difficult to imagine. A Friend of yours has given us a very broad hint, whither This tends; when he tells us that * *the greateſt Freedom or Liberty we can conceive to belong to* ANY BEING, is ſuch as he there largely explains to be No Liberty at all, but abſolute Neceſſity, ſuch as the Motion of a Watch or Clock is determined by.

* *Eſſay concerning the Uſe of Reaſon in Propoſitions, the evidence whereof depends upon Human Teſtimony. pag.* 47.

3*dly*. If the *Soul*, be nothing but a *Syſtem of Matter*; and *Thinking*, nothing but a *Mode of Motion* or *of ſome other Power of Matter*; the Doctrine of the *Reſurrection*, (as I before obſerved, *pag.* 66, *&c.*) will be inconceivable and incredible; and the Juſtice of future Rewards and Puniſhments, impoſſible to be made out. The Notion of the Soul's *Immateriality*, evidently facilitates

cilitates the Belief of a *Reſurrection* and of a future Retribution, by ſecuring a Principle of *Perſonal Individuality*, upon which the Juſtice of all Reward or Puniſhment is entirely grounded: But if *Thinking* be in reality nothing but a *Power* or *Mode*, which inhering in a looſe and fleeting Syſtem of Matter, periſhes utterly at the Diſſolution of the Body; then the reſtoring the Power of *Thinking* to the ſame Body *at the Reſurrection*, will not be a Raiſing again of the *ſame Individual Perſon*; but it will be as truly a *Creation* of a *new Perſon*, as the Addition of the like Power of *Thinking* to a new Body *Now*, would be the *Creation* of a *new Man*. For, as God's ſuperadding *Now* to a new parcel of Matter, the like *Conſciouſneſs* with what I at this time find in my ſelf, would not make that new parcel of Matter to be the *ſame individual Perſon with me*, but only *another Perſon Like me*; ſo his ſuperadding That *Conſciouſneſs* at the *Reſurrection*, to the ſame particles of Duſt, of which my Body was formerly compoſed; will not be a *Reſtoration* of the *ſame Perſon*, but a Creation of a *new one* like me. For, the ſameneſs of the ſenſeleſs Particles of Duſt, 'tis evident from the flux nature of the Subſtance of our Bodies, is not that which *Now* makes me to be the ſame Perſon; and therefore cannot be that, which will *Then* make me to be ſo. If my preſent *Conſciouſneſs*, be nothing but a *Mode of Motion* in the fleeting particles of my Brain or Spirits; this *Conſciouſneſs* will be as utterly deſtroyed at the Diſſolution of my Body, as if the very Subſtance of my Body was annihilated: And it would be juſt as poſſible for the *ſame Individual Perſon* to be *created again*, after an *abſolute Annihilation*;

nihilation; as to be *reſtored again*, after ſuch a *Diſſolution*. But now, if the *ſame Perſon*, after *Annihilation*, could, by reſtoring of the ſame *Conſciouſneſs*, be created again; he might as poſſibly be created again, by addition of the ſame *Conſciouſneſs* to new Matter, even before annihilation of the firſt: From whence it would follow, that Two, or two Hundred, ſeveral Perſons, might All, by a Superaddition of the like *Conſciouſneſs*, be *one and the ſame individual Perſon*, at the ſame time that they remain *ſeveral and diſtinct Perſons*: It being as eaſy for God to add *my Conſciouſneſs* to the new formed Matter of One or of one Hundred Bodies at this *preſent Time*, as to the Duſt of my preſent Body at the *Time of the* Reſurrection. And no Reaſon can be given, why it would not be as juſt at any time, to puniſh for my Faults a new created Man, to whom *my Conſciouſneſs* is by the Power of God ſuperadded; as to puniſh That Perſon, who at the *Reſurrection* ſhall by the ſame Power be new made out of the Duſt of my Body, with the ſame *Conſciouſneſs* ſuperadded: It being allowed that *Then*, as well as *Now*, 'tis not the Sameneſs of the particles of Duſt, that makes the *ſame Perſon*. But if it was; yet That would make no difference in this Matter: For, the Particles of Duſt, which in the courſe of twenty Years have ſucceſſively been part of the Subſtance of my Body, are enough in Quantity to form ſeveral Bodies: And if the Addition of a like Conſciouſneſs with what I now find in my ſelf, to One of thoſe Bodies at the Reſurrection, will make *It* to be the ſame *Individual Perſon* with *Me*; the Addition of the like Conſciouſneſs to Twenty of them, would conſequently make every one of them to be (not Perſons *like* Me, but) the ſame *Individual Perſon* with *Me*, and with

each

each other likewiſe. Which is the greateſt Abſurdity in the World: An Abſurdity equal (as I before ſaid) to that of *Tranſubſtantiation*. This inexplicable Confuſion, wherewith your Doctrine perplexes the Notion of *Perſonal Identity*, upon which Identity the Juſtice of all Reward or Puniſhment manifeſtly depends; makes the *Reſurrection*, in Your way of arguing, to be inconceivable and impoſſible: And conſequently your Doctrine, (which ſuppoſes the Body to be the Whole Man,) is deſtructive of Religion; leaving no room for Reward or Puniſhment but in the preſent Life only; and conſequently giving Men liberty to do every thing for their preſent Pleaſure or Advantage, that can be done with a good Colour, and without being obnoxious to human Laws: Which is the greateſt Miſchief that can poſſibly befal Mankind. But if the Soul be, as We believe, a *permanent indiviſible Immaterial Subſtance*, then all theſe Difficulties vaniſh of Themſelves.

It is here to be obſerved, that all the Abſurd Conſequences which I have now (in conſidering of what Uſe my Argument is to *Religion*) ſhown to follow from your Doctrine, with reſpect to the *Reſurrection*; do equally follow from it (as has been before proved) even *without reſpect to the Reſurrection*. For as it is Abſurd to ſuppoſe, (which you muſt do in your Scheme,) that at *the Reſurrection* the *ſame individual Perſon* can be reſtored; merely by the Addition of a *like* Conſciouſneſs with that which utterly periſhed at the Diſſolution of the Body, to the Duſt of the ſame Body when recollected again: As this, I ſay, is plainly Abſurd, becauſe in the ſame manner twenty other Men formed out of the ſame Duſt, (of which there is quantity enough belonging to every Perſon that

has lived any Number of Years,) may alſo by an Addition of the like Conſciouſneſs become every one of them *That One Same Individual Perſon*, at the ſame Time that they remain ſo many ſeveral and diſtinct Perſons: So, without regard to any future Reſurrection, there is the very ſame Abſurdity in ſuppoſing (as you do,) that a Man *at this preſent Time*, though he has none of the ſame Subſtance belonging to him, may yet, merely by a like Modification of the Motion of his Spirits, continue to be *the ſame Individual Perſon* he was twenty Years ſince; There is, I ſay, the very ſame Abſurdity in this Suppoſition, as in the former; becauſe there is no difference between ſuppoſing that any Number of new Bodies at the Reſurrection *co-exiſtently*, or any Number of different Men now living *contemporarily*, or any Number of different Bodies *ſucceeding* one another in one continued Form by a perpetual uninterrupted Flux of Particles, (which is the thing you contend for;) can be *One and the ſame Individual Perſon*, merely by a *like* Modification of the Figures and Motions of their Parts reſpectively, without having any thing at all *the ſame* in them.

To the *Propoſitions* I laid down at the Concluſion of my former Reply, you have objected nothing, but what (I think) is already clearly anſwered in the foregoing Pages.

A Fourth

DEFENSE

OF AN

ARGUMENT

Made uſe of in a

Letter to Mr *DODWELL*,

To prove the Immateriality and Natural *Immortality* of the SOUL.

In a Letter to the Author of the Anſwer *to Mr* Clark's *Third Defenſe*, &c.

With a POSTSCRIPT, relating to a *Book*, entitled, *A Vindication of Mr* Dodwell's *Epiſtolary Diſcourſe*, &c.

The Third Edition.

If we look into the World, is there not evident proof, that Men profeſſing Learning, are capable of believing and defending any Abſurdity in Nature? Anſwer to Mr *Clark* s Third Defenſe, *pag.* 49.

Printed in the Year 1718.

A Fourth

DEFENSE

OF AN

ARGUMENT to prove the *Immateriality* of the SOUL, *&c.*

SIR,

OF repeating the ſame Things over and over again, there is no End. The Thing I propoſed to prove, is, I think, ſo fully made out in my foregoing *Defenſes*; that I might ſafely leave the whole Matter to the intelligent and impartial Reader, without any further Inlargement. Your laſt Anſwer is little more, than a renewing of your former Aſſertions, ſometimes in the ſame, and ſometimes in different Words; as if you thought all that I had advanced to the contrary, was entirely wide of the Queſtion. Whether that be really the caſe or no, I am very willing the World ſhould judge: And therefore, in reply to your perpetual Repetitions, I ſhall not tranſcribe my former Papers; but only refer to them, as occaſion ſhall offer; and deſire they may fairly be compared together: And, as I go along, ſhall endeavour to point out to you ſome of the chief Miſrepreſentations and Fallacies you appear to be guilty of: And where you offer at any Argument that ſeems new in any part of it, ſhall conſider it in its place.

You

Anſw. pag. 3. You begin with charging me, that *out of Four Objections inſiſted on in* your *Reflexions, I have dropt the conſideration of Three.*

Whether this be true, or no; they who pleaſe to compare the Papers, may find. I am not ſenſible, that I have paſſed over any of your Objections, or any part of any of them, unanſwered: Only, where you have repeated the ſame Things again, (as, for Inſtance, in that poor Objection drawn from our *Ignorance of the manner how God will diſpoſe of the Souls of Brutes*;) inſtead of repeating my Anſwers, I have only referred to them as they ſtood in my former Defenſes; which is ultimately appealing to the Judgment of the intelligent Reader: And for this Complaint, I ſhall give you more frequent Occaſions hereafter.

pag. 3. & 4. *And in anſwer to* your *Fourth Objection*, you ſay I *am ſo far from ſhowing* (as I ought to have done,) *that if* Conſciouſneſs did inhere in a Syſtem of Matter, it muſt conſiſt of the *Conſciouſneſſes* of the Parts; *that on the contrary* I *have only endeavoured to prove, that, as Roundneſs muſt conſiſt of ſeveral* Pieces *of Roundneſs, or* Tendencies *towards Roundneſs*; *ſo*, if Conſciouſneſs did, in like manner with Roundneſs, inhere in a Syſtem of Matter, It muſt conſiſt of ſeveral *Tendencies* towards Conſciouſneſs. And this you call an *apparent Deſertion of* my *Argument.*

Now to this, I reply; that, *conſiſting of the Conſciouſneſs of the Parts*, and *conſiſting of ſeveral* Tendencies *towards Conſciouſneſs*, is the very ſame thing. For, as nothing that is not *Curve*, can have any *Tendency* towards *Curvity*; as nothing that is not *Colour*, can have any *Tendency* towards *Colour*; as nothing that is not *Sound*, can have any *Tendency* towards

towards *Sound:* So nothing that is not *Conſciouſneſs*, can have any *Tendency* towards *Conſciouſneſs*. Differences indeed and Degrees there may be, of the diſtinctneſs of *Conſciouſneſs* and vigor of *Thinking*; as there are different degrees of the *Curvity of a Line*, different degrees of the *Brightneſs of a Colour*, and different degrees of the *Clearneſs of a Sound*: But as it is plainly impoſſible that any *Colour* ſhould have any *Tendency* towards being any *Sound*, or that any *Figure* ſhould have any *Tendency* towards being any *Motion*; ſo it is likewiſe ridiculous to imagine that any *Motion*, or any other Quality of Matter void of Conſciouſneſs, ſhould have any *Tendency* towards being *Conſciouſneſs*.

Beſides: The Curvities of the ſeveral little Arches that conſtitute the Circumference of a Circle, are not properly *Tendencies* towards *Roundneſs*; (for a *Part* has no more *Tendency* to the *Whole* by *Compoſition*, than the *Whole* has a *Tendency* to its *Part* by *Diviſion*;) but they are themſelves, being taken together, the whole Circle, or the *Roundneſs* it ſelf: So that *Roundneſs* is not a new real Quality, reſulting from the Curvities of the ſeveral parts; but only a *Name* of the *Whole*, a *mere external Denomination:* Even in the ſame manner as the Twelve Units that conſtitute the Number a *Dozen*, are not properly ſo many *Tendencies* towards a *Dozen*, (as towards any *real* new Thing or Quality;) but are Themſelves, being taken together, the Number *a Dozen*; which Name is nothing but a *mere Term*, an *external Denomination of the Whole*, and nothing at all really in the Things numbered. *Conſciouſneſs* therefore in like manner, if it was nothing but the *Sum* of thoſe Motions or Modes of Motion, which you call *Tendencies* towards Conſciouſneſs; would not be a diſtinct Quality really inhering

See *Third Defenſe*, pag. 152. 153. 3d Edit.

in

in the Thinking Substance, (as every Man feels by Experience, and you your self grant that it is;) but it would be a mere *Word* or *Term of Art*, nothing but a *Name* or *external Denomination*, such as are those Qualities which I ranked under the Third Sort.

Third Defence, pag. 134.

Answ. to Third Defense, pag. 20.

Wherefore when you confess, that *the Parts*, (of Roundness, suppose,) *must be so far of the same Kind, as to have a* Tendency *to that Individual Figure of which they are a Part: And* that *in that Sense* you *have always allowed Consciousness to consist of Powers of the same Kind; because if Consciousness inheres in a System of Matter, it must necessarily be allowed that the distinct Beings in that System contribute towards Thinking, as the Pieces of a Circle do towards a Circle, or as all the Parts of a System of Matter contribute towards the System*: And again; that What is

pag. 22.

said in the *Third Defense*, *may, for ought* you *know, be a Vindication of the Conclusion before-cited, (viz.*

pag. 4.

that if Consciousness did inhere in a System of Matter, it must consist of several Tendencies *towards Consciousness:)*

pag. 23 & 24.

And again; You *do, in that Sense, allow Consciousness to consist of Powers of the same Kind; For, according to* You, *it consists of Parts which have a* Tendency *to Thinking or Consciousness, as Roundness does of Parts that have a* Tendency *to Roundness*: In all these Passages you directly give up the Question. For, those Modes of Motion (or of any other Quality of Matter) which you call *Tendencies to Consciousness*, either are themselves *Consciousnesses and Thoughts*, or not. If they *be*; then, as the whole Curvity of a Circle is made up of the Curvities of the several little Parts or Arches of which it is composed, so *whole Consciousness or Thinking* will likewise be made up of several *partial Consciousnesses or Thoughts*; which is giving up the Question with one

one Hand: Or if they *be not*; then, as the Roundneſs of a Circle, ſo far as it differs from the Curvities of the little Arches of which it is compoſed, is nothing but a *bare Name* of a *Whole*, a *mere external Denomination*; ſo *Conſciouſneſs*, as far as it differs from thoſe conſtituent Modes that are *no Conſciouſneſſes*, will be only a *Name of a Whole*, a *mere External Denomination*, and nothing at all really in the Thinking Subſtance it ſelf; Which is giving up the Queſtion with the other Hand.

You repreſent me all along ſpeaking, as if my whole Argument was founded upon the Suppoſition, that *in the Idea of an Immaterial Being Extenſion is contained.* That *Extended Being of* Mr Clark's. You *think him miſtaken in making the Soul an Extended Being. In making an Extended Being, as ſuch, &c.* An *Immaterial Subſtance and a Clock agree, according to* Mr Clark, *in being Extended:* And, *to make Immaterial Being Extended, as* Mr Clark *does.*

pag. 5. pag. 44. pag. 48. pag. 50. pag. 55. pag. 83.

This is neither doing Me nor your Readers Juſtice. For my Argument is not at all founded upon any Suppoſition either of Immaterial Subſtance being Extended or Unextended. That which I undertook to prove, was, that Matter, (all whoſe ſolid Parts are ſo many diſtinct, ſeparable, independent, unconnected Beings;) could not be a Subject capable of Individual Conſciouſneſs; And that therefore Conſciouſneſs muſt have ſome other Subject to reſide in. Whether That other Subject be Extended or Unextended, (whatever you may ſuppoſe my Opinion to be, upon other Grounds,) the preſent Argument determines not; but leaves every Reader at Liberty to judge as he ſhall find Reaſon. Only I affirmed *by the by*, for Argument's ſake,

ſake, that I thought the Difficulties ariſing from the Suppoſition of Immaterial Subſtance being Extended, were not greater, but rather leſs, than thoſe which ariſe from the Suppoſition of its being Unextended. See *Second Defenſe*, pag. 118, 119, 120.

Anſw. to 3d Def. pag. 5. It is here alſo further to be obſerved incidentally; that, when you aſk, *What other Argument can be made uſe of to prove all Matter diviſible by the Power of God, but what is drawn from the conſideration of its Extenſion?* and affirm, that *if Matter, as an extended Being, is diviſible; all extended Beings muſt be diviſible:* and, that I have *no other Reaſon to make all Matter diviſible, but becauſe it is Extended:* and, when you mention the *Diviſibility*, add by way of Explication, *or (which is all one) the Extenſion, of Matter*: You ſeem to forget, that you your ſelf expreſly allowed *Space*, though extended, to be abſolutely Indiſcerpible; And, therefore you your ſelf make Matter diviſible, not barely *as an Extended Being*, but as *finitely* Extended; And, that I gave ſtill another Reaſon for ſtiling Matter diviſible; *viz.* God's having by his own Will and good Pleaſure created it ſuch a Subſtance, all whoſe ſolid Parts we find by Experience to be ſo many diſtinct Beings, looſe, independent one from another, and unconnected; that is, having no eſſential connexion one with another, nor any dependence one upon another for their Exiſtence: as the Parts of *Space* evidently have, even ſeparate from the Conſideration of its being abſolutely Infinite; and as the Parts of *Time* have, (foraſmuch as every *Moment*, co-exiſting with all the Parts of Space, is yet both *indiviſible* in it ſelf, and *inſeparable* from the other Parts of *Duration*;) and as the Parts, improperly ſo called, of Immaterial Subſtances may

pag. 83.

pag. 16. Reply to firſt Def. pag. 39. and Reflect. on 2d Def. pag. 43. 11th Def. pag. 24. and 2d Def. pag. 39.

have,

have, for any thing that can ever be proved to the contrary, on Suppoſition of their being Extended. But all this is beſide the main Argument, which (as I have ſaid) does not neceſſarily imply any ſuch Suppoſition.

In like manner; when you make a long and pompous Diſcourſe about *Adequate and Inadequate Ideas*, and about *Difficulties that cannot be perfectly cleared*; (that is, which cannot be cleared *wholly*, but yet may *in great part*, and enough to ſatisfy any reaſonable perſon; though, it ſeems, you *know no* ſuch *Difference*:) When, I ſay, you talk about theſe things as of great neceſſity to be premiſed, and as if you would have the Reader think the Whole Argument depended upon the right ſtating of them; whereas in reality they have no relation at all to the Argument, but were ſtarted only upon occaſion of that foreign and incidental Queſtion concerning the *Extenſion of Immaterial Subſtance*; In all this Matter, you have by no means made a right Repreſentation of things. *Anſw. to 3d Def. pag. 6 — 16.* *pag. 6.*

However, as to the Diſtinction it ſelf, between *Abſurdities or Contradictions*, and *Difficulties that cannot be perfectly cleared*; I deſire only, that what *I* have ſaid upon this Head, (*3d Defenſe, pag.* 189, 190.) may be compared with what *you* have ſaid upon it, (*Anſw. pag.* 6 — 16:) And whether then I had not reaſon, (notwithſtanding the Amuſement of Ten Pages about *Difficulties ariſing from the Perception of the Diſagreement of perfect or adequate Ideas, and Difficulties ariſing from the Perception of the Diſagreement of imperfect or inadequate Ideas*; when on the contrary I had expreſsly ſaid, that the Difficulties I meant, did *not* ariſe from the Perception of *any Diſagreement of Ideas at all*, but merely from *Anſw. pag.* 6, &c.

our

our having in our *Imagination* either *no Ideas*, or ſuch very imperfect ones as cannot well be compared together, of Things whoſe Exiſtence or Certainty we can nevertheleſs demonſtrably prove by *Reaſon*, and apprehend many of their Properties by the *Underſtanding*; Which every one, that underſtands the firſt Elements of Mathematicks, knows to be the Caſe of *All Sorts of Infinites* and of *Some Finites*: Whether I ſay, I had not good reaſon) for the Diſtinction I made, I am willing any one, who pleaſes to compare the Books, ſhould judge.

Pag. 6. You aſk, *What is a Difficulty which cannot be perfectly cleared by reaſon of defective Ideas, but a Difficulty which ariſes from the Perception of the Diſagreement of thoſe Ideas?* I anſwer; 'Tis a Difficulty ariſing, not from the Perception of any *Diſagreement* of Ideas, but from the *want or Defectiveneſs* of Ideas in the *Imagination*; which therefore we cannot compare ſo as to *Imagin* diſtinctly *how* they *agree*, though we can by our *Reaſon and Underſtanding* demonſtrate it is *impoſſible* they ſhould *diſagree*. This is plainly the Caſe in moſt Queſtions, concerning *Eternity Immenſity*, &c.

You declare your ſelf of another Opinion; And, that you think, *whatever can be demonſtrated, can be*
Pag. 14. perfectly cleared *from all Objections and Difficulties*; *And, that all the Difficulties that may be urged againſt the Immenſity and Eternity of God*, &c. *which Mr* Clark *ſays cannot be clearly anſwered, are to be clearly anſwered*; *And, in order to anſwer them clearly, you would only require theſe equitable Conditions of him, that he would define the Terms, Immenſity, Eternity, Immaterial Being* &c. It is a pleaſant Inſtance of an *Equitable Condition*, that you deſire me to give a

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Definition, that is, to expreſs the Idea, of things whereof I contend we have no Ideas or very imperfect ones, (ſeeing we can only give Negative Deſcriptions of them;) though we have certain Demonſtrations of their Exiſtence. And tis no leſs remarkable, that notwithſtanding all this ſtir about the *Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of Ideas*, yet you yourſelf, when you come to diſcourſe more particularly concerning the nature of Thinking, talk of a *Power in Matter unknown* to us, page 33. and of which, *have no Idea*; of which nevertheleſs you venture to affirm that it may *comprehend under it Thinking and its Modes*, as *Figure does Roundneſs*. But, to paſs this over: Since it is your declared Opinion, that all the Sorts of Difficulties now-mentioned, may be *clearly* anſwered; I cannot but think you would very much oblige the World, in anſwering them *clearly*. And I will offer you a fair Opportunity of doing it; by reconciling, if you pleaſe, the two following Accounts together; or elſe by maintaining either of them, and anſwering *clearly* the Objections and Difficulties contained in the other.

It is evident to me, that God muſt be an Immaterial Being, that is, a proper Immaterial Being, a Being without any of the Properties of Matter; without Solidity, Extenſion, or Motion; and that exiſts in No Place; and not a Being that has Extenſion, and conſequently exiſts in Place and has Parts. — Thinking in God, cannot be founded on any Objects acting

The next Abſurdity charged on the Attribute of Eternity, is, How God ſhould co-exiſt with all the Differences of Time, and yet there be no SUCCESSION *in his Being. This I own to be as abſurd, as ——; and that there is a manifeſt Contradiction in this Notion or Conception. For if by* Succeſſion *in God's Being, is underſtood, (and I know not what other*

upon him ; nor can Thinking in him be SUCCESIVE *or consist of Parts ; nor can his Thinking have any* MODES, *because Modes of Thinking are* DISTINCT ACTS *of Thinking. But as his Essence is eternal and immutable, without any the least Variation or Alteration ; so his Thinking is one Numerical* INDIVIDUAL *Act, comprehending all Things and all the Possibilities of Things at one View ; and is as fixt and permanent and unvariable, and as much without* SUCCESSION *and parts, as his Essence.* Answer to Mr. *Clark's* 3d Defense, *pag.* 33, 34.

*Sense to put upon it,) co-existing with all the Differences of Time ; then the Difficulty is, how to conceive God to co-exist with all the Parts of Time, and yet not to co-exist with all the Differences of Time. Now I acknowledge I cannot do This. But in behalf of Gods Eternity I beg leave to plead, that if God does * co-exist with the Differences of Time, then he does co-exist with the Differences of Time ; and it by no means can be said, that he does not co-exist with all the Differences of Time, if it be true, that he does co-exist with all the Differences of Time.---To say, God exists all at once, is to say that he actually exists in time past, present, and to come ; that is, that Time past is not past, and that Time to come is come, and was always come. But to give some Satisfaction to those who think it an Imperfection for God to co-exist with the several Parts of Time, I desire it may be considered, that if God Operates at different Times, and takes up the Space of Six Days in the Creation of the World, redeems Mankind* 4000 *Years after, and will judge Men in a Time not yet come ; then he Operates not all at once : And if he Operates not all at once, then he Exists not all at once : For if*

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* *Note :* All that is here argued concerning Gods co-existing with the Differences of *Time*, may in the very same manner be applied to his co-existing with the different Parts of *Place* or *Extension*.

he

he exiſted all at once, there could be no diſtinction of Time in his Operations Paſt, preſent, and to come, muſt be attributed to the Being that Operates, as well as to its Operations, becauſe Operations at different Times ſuppoſe Succeſſion *in the Nature of Things and Exiſting all at once, ſuppoſes* no Succeſſion: *and conſequently, if there is a* Succeſſion *in the Nature of Things, there is no ſuch Thing in Nature as Exiſting all at once. Now if there is no Imperfection in ſuppoſing that God Acts at different Times; as there is not: What Imperfection can there be in ſuppoſing that he does not exiſt now at the time of the general Judgment, any more than that he is not now judging the World?* Eſſay concerning the Uſe of Reaſon, &c. pag. 53, 54.

This Difficulty you muſt by no means paſs over unſatisfied; becauſe the Author of the Eſſay here cited, is believed to be a Perſon, whoſe Reaſoning you cannot ſlight.

But to *proceed now* (as you ſay) *to the Queſtion* it ſelf My Argument, you pretend, is inconcluſive; becauſe, in my Enumeration of the poſſible Qualities of Matter; individual Modes of Figure, Motion, and other Qualities: (ſuch as are the *Roundneſs of a Circle*, the *individual Mode of Motion of a Clock*, and, in your Opinion, *Conſciouſneſs or Thinking*;) are omitted: not being reducible to any of the three Heads there mentioned.

Anſw. *pag.* 16.

3d Def. *pag.* 153, 154.

Anſw. pag. 17, 18.

I anſwer: *Whole Roundneſs* (as you call it,) that is, the Name of the Sum of the Curvities of the little Arches that conſtitute a Circle; And, the *whole Mode of Motion of a Clock*, that is, the Name of the Sum of a certain Number of Motions; And, *Conſciouſneſs or Thinking*, that is, as you ſuppoſe, the Name of the Sum of *ten Thouſand diſtinct Motions*,

pag. 19.

tions, or of a number of any other Qualities void of Conſciouſneſs: do all plainly belong to the *Third* ſort of Qualities I mentioned; That is, they are all plainly nothing but bare *Names of Wholes*, mere *external Denominations*, ſo far as their Idea is different from that of their conſtituent Parts; and are nothing at all really in the Things themſelves. Which whether it can poſſibly be the true Notion of Conſciouſneſs, making it nothing at all really in the Thinking Subſtance it ſelf, but a mere empty and foreign Name; I leave every Man to judge from his own Experience.

See 3d Def. pag. 151. 152, 153, 154, 155, 156.

For my contending that *Thinking* was not ſuch a bare external *Name* of a number of Qualities, but it ſelf a *real diſtinct Quality* in the Thinking Subſtance; you before called my Idea of *Thinking* a *mere Chimera of my own framing*, (though I believe no Man can help being conſcious of the like *Chimera* in himſelf;) And now you repeat it again. In anſwer to which, I refer you to what has been already ſaid, 3*d Defenſe*, pag. 168, 169.) and to what you will preſently give me Occaſion to add further upon this Head.

Reflect. on 2*d* Defenſe, *pag.* 60. *Anſw. to* 3*d Defenſe*, *pag.* 19.

You *allow that no Quality can reſide in a Syſtem of Matter, but what muſt be always* in a certain Senſe *of the ſame kind with the Whole that reſults from the Parts*: (that is to ſay, *of the ſame kind with It ſelf*; But I ſuppoſe you mean, *of the ſame kind with its conſtituent Parts*;) Namely that *the Parts muſt be ſo far of the ſame kind, as to have a* Tendency, *&c. And* that *in That Senſe*, you *have always allowed Conſciouſneſs to conſiſt of Powers of the ſame kind.*

Anſw. *pag.* 20. *pag.* 20. 23.

But I have proved at large in my *Third Defenſe*, that *Motions* (or any other Qualities void of Conſciouſneſs) can be *in no Senſe* of the ſame kind with

3d Def. *paſſim.*

Con-

Conſciouſneſs. And I have ſhown *juſt now*, that they cannot poſſibly in any Senſe have any *Tendency* towards it, any more than *Colours* or Modes of Colour, can have any Tendency to *Sound* or *Smell*. See *above*, pag. 202, 203.

The diſtinct Beings in a Syſtem of Matter, contribute, you ſay, *towards Thinking*; *as the Pieces of a Circle do towards a Circle*. Anſw. pag. 21.

That they cannot do ſo; and that there is no Analogy, no Similitude in the leaſt, between the Things you compare together; I have ſhown at large in my *Third Defenſe*; and particularly *pag.* 148, 149. to which I refer you and the Reader.

You allege, that in order *to contradict you, it muſt be affirmed, that every Quality that inheres in a Syſtem of Matter, muſt inhere* Wholly *in each Part of it*: pag. 21.

That *Roundneſs* is *an Inſtance, that a Power may inhere in a Syſtem of Matter without being the Sum of Powers of the ſame kind*, that is, of Whole Roundneſſes: pag. 23.

That *it is as impoſſible that* Whole *Conſciouſneſs ſhould exiſt in each of the diſtinct Parts of a Syſtem of Matter, as that* Whole *Roundneſs ſhould exiſt in each Part of a Circle*: And that, *unleſs in a round Figure each part muſt be* Wholly *round*; *and in a conſcious Syſtem of Matter, each part muſt be* Wholly *conſcious*; *and* in that Senſe *conſiſt of Powers of the ſame kind*: *not one ſtep can be taken in defenſe of Mr* Clark's *Argument*. pag. 19. page 24.

To all this, I think I have already given a clear and diſtinct Anſwer. *Third Defenſe*, pag. 148, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155.

In repreſenting Part of which Anſwer, you make it amount to this ridiculous Propoſition; that *though Roundneſs conſiſts of Parts, none of which can poſſibly* pag. 26.

be Round; *yet, if Conſciouſneſs inheres in a Syſtem of Matter in like manner with Roundneſs*; *that is, if it conſiſts of Parts, none of which can poſſibly be Conſcious*; *there muſt be as many diſtinct Conſciouſneſſes, as there are Parts:* Whereas the plain Strength and Sum of the Argument, was this; that *as Roundneſs conſiſts of Parts, none of which can indeed be the* Whole *Roundneſs, but yet every one of them muſt of neceſſity be* Pieces *of Roundneſs*: *ſo Conſciouſneſs, if it inhered in Matter in like manner with Roundneſs, muſt likewiſe conſiſt of Parts, none of which could indeed be the* Whole *Conſciouſneſs, but yet every one of them muſt of neceſſity bear the ſame* Analogy *to the Whole Conſciouſneſs, as the Curvity of a Semicircle bears to the Curvity of two Semicircles, or the Curvity of one Quadrant to the Curvity of four Quadrants.* And whether ſuch Parts can be *wholly* void of Conſciouſneſs, becauſe they have not in them ſingly the *Whole* Conſciouſneſs; any more than the Arches of a Circle can be *wholly* void of Curvity or Roundneſs, becauſe they have not in them ſingly the *Whole* Curvity or Roundneſs; I leave to your ſelf to judge. Herein therefore you are guilty of a very great Miſrepreſentation; in charging me with a Contradiction, which ariſes only from *your own* ludicrous Interpretation of *my* Words. For if you abſurdly, and in defiance of the moſt perſpicuous Expreſſions, put *your contrary Senſe* upon *my* Words; what wonder then is it, if they become contradictory to *my own evident Meaning*?

What you repeat (*Anſw.* to 2d Def. *pag.* 28, 29, 30.) concerning your uſing it as a *Suppoſition* only, and not declaring it your *Opinion*, that *Thinking* may be a Mode of *Motion*; I only deſire the Reader would be pleaſed to compare, with what I offered,

offered, (3*d Defenſe*, pag. 160). And, if in your *Suppoſition* you pitched upon the likelieſt Quality of Matter you could find, to make Thinking a Mode of; and I proved the Abſurdity and Impoſſibility of Thinking's being a Mode of *That* Quality; and, at the ſame time, made it evident that the ſame Arguments proved equally the Abſurdity and Impoſſibility of Thinking's being a Mode of *any Other* Quality or Power of Matter whatſoever; and yet you declared it poſitively to be your *Opinion*, that Thinking *was* a Mode of *Some* Power in Matter: I preſume, your denying your ſelf to be accountable for the Abſurdity I charged you with, and complaining of my *Diſingenuity* in charging it upon you, (or, as you are pleaſed to expreſs your ſelf, in *putting it upon you*;) will not be looked upon as of any Weight, till you can Anſwer the *Argument* by which I proved it to be juſtly chargeable upon you; which Argument you have not taken the leaſt notice of, as I might reaſonably have expected an *Ingenuous Adverſary* would have done.

3*d Defenſe* page 160.

Reflect. on 2*d Defenſe*, page 22.

Anſw. *to* 3*d Defenſe*, page 28 & 48.

ibid.

You proceed to offer ſome Conſiderations, concerning the *Nature of Thinking*; from whence to deduce Arguments, to prove that it is merely an *Affection of Matter*.

Anſw. page 30.

The Sum of your Firſt Argument, is this.

The Mind is operated upon by Matter, and Senſations are excited in it by the Operation of Matter, and all our Senſes depend on Material Organs.

Matter likewiſe is operated upon by Matter, and Motions are excited in it by the Contact and Impulſe of Matter.

Therefore the Mind is Matter, and Thinking a mere Affection of Matter.

This Argument, I think, deſerves no Anſwer. Yet the Reader may, if he pleaſes, conſult upon this Head *the Third Defenſe*, pag. 175, 176.

pag. 31, 32. I ſhall only obſerve here, by the by; that whereas you ſay, "*Thinking follows the Motion of Matter in our Senſes, we have juſt as much reaſon to conclude that It is a Power or Affection of Matter occaſioned by the Action of Matter, as we have to ſay that Fire is a Power or Affection of Matter, when it is produced by the rubbing of a Wheel and its Axle-tree:* it is evident on the contrary, that we have all the reaſon in the World to conclude there is no Similitude between theſe two things: Becauſe Fire, as it exiſts in the Matter it ſelf, (ſeparate from the Senſations it excites in our Minds,) is confeſſedly nothing but mere Motion: But Thinking cannot poſſibly be mere Motion; as I have abundantly proved in my *Third Defenſe*; and will ſtill further appear, when I come to conſider in their proper place the Exceptions you have made to the Proofs there urged.

3d Def. pag. 160, &c.

page 33. Your Second Argument, is this.

Human Thinking has Succeſſion and Parts.
Material Actions likewiſe have Succeſſion and Parts.
Therefore Human Thinking is a Material Action.

This Argument alſo, I think, deſerves no Anſwer.

ibid. Your Third Argument, is.

Thinking has its Modes.

Qualities

Qualities of Matter have likewiſe their Modes.

Therefore thinking is a Quality of Matter.

This is juſt as if I ſhould argue.

Sound has its Modes.

Colour has likewiſe its Modes.

Therefore Sound is a Colour.

Or thus:

Spirit has Exiſtence.

Matter alſo has Exiſtence.

Therefore Spirit is Matter.

That I have not in the leaſt miſrepreſented your Senſe in theſe Arguments, I appeal to whoever pleaſes to compare our Papers together.

Your Fourth Argument, is this. *ibid.*

Thinking, in God, who is an Immaterial Being, is without any Succeſſion, Modes, and diſtinct Acts.

Thinking in Man, has, on the contrary Succeſſion, Modes, and diſtinct Acts; as the Powers of Matter have.

Therefore Thinking, in Man, is a Power or Quality of Matter.

In this alſo there is no Conſequence, though the Premiſes were true. But, that Thinking, in God, is without *Succeſſion*, I know not whether you will continue to affirm, or not; when you have conſidered and compared together the two different Accounts of this Matter, which I juſt now tranſcribed; and ſhall have reſolved which of them you will adhere to, by anſwering clearly the Objections contained in the other. See *above*, *pag.* 209, 210.

In the mean time I cannot but take notice, that you uſe a very ſtrange Expreſſion, when you ſay *it is evident to* you, *that God muſt be an Immaterial* Anſw. *pag.* 33.

terial Being, that is, a proper Immaterial Being, a Being without Any of the Properties of Matter, without Solidity, Extenſion or Motion, and that exiſts in No Place; that is, in other words, *which exiſts not at all:* For, if he exiſts at all, 'tis certain he exiſts in *every Place.* I ſhould not have made this Remark, but that I am ſure you are no Friend to Unintelligible Diſtinctions, and Words that have no Signification; and that you will be aſhamed to give me the School-mens Anſwer, that God exiſts in every *Ubi*, but not in any *Place*; that is, that in Latin he exiſts *every where*, but in Engliſh *no where.* And yet, unleſs you give either this Anſwer or a better, (for it is a thing of too great importance to be paſſed over without any Anſwer at all;) it cannot be help'd, but your Words will ſignifie, what it is not poſſible to ſuppoſe you could mean.

pag. 34. Nor is it a leſs wonderful Expreſſion, when you affirm that *Thinking, in God, cannot be ſucceſſive, nor have any Modes or diſtinct Acts of Thinking*; *but* that *it is one numerical individual Act, fixt and permanent and unvariable, and without Succeſſion*, &c. That is to ſay; that God cannot vary his Will, nor diverſify his Works, nor act ſucceſſively, nor govern the World, nor indeed have any *Power* to *will* or *do* any thing at all. I do not *charge* you with Conſequences; but I affirm they *are* too plain Conſequences of what you profeſs.

pag. 35. You obſerve that I allow *Matter to Act upon the Soul*; Which ſince it cannot do by *Contact*, it muſt be by a *Power whereof we have no Idea*; and if there be in Matter any ſuch *Power whereof we have no Idea*, why may it not as well be capable of *Thinking?*

I anſwer: The Power by which Matter acts upon the Soul, is not a *real Quality* inhering in Matter, as *Motion* inheres in it, and as *Thinking* inheres in the thinking Subſtance; but 'tis only a Power or Occaſion of exciting certain *Modes* or *Senſations* in another Subſtance; Which Power, is one of thoſe Qualities I ranked under the *Second* Sort; And there is no Analogy at all, between a Subject's being it ſelf capable of Senſation, and its being the Occaſion of certain Senſations being excited in another Subject. 3d Def. page 134.

However, as to the thing it ſelf, there is no more difficulty in conceiving how *Matter* may act upon *Immaterial Subſtance*, than in conceiving how it acts upon *Material Subſtance*. When a Globe, ſuppoſe, of a Foot Diameter, in Motion; ſtrikes upon a Globe of a foot Diameter, at Reſt: Tell me how *Matter* acts upon *Matter*, by *Contact*; why the Quieſcent Globe makes a *certain determinate* degree of Reſiſtance; why it *does not* make an infinitely great Reſiſtance; or why it *does* make any Reſiſtance at all. And when Light is reflected and refracted by Bodies, which it never touches; nay, at a diſtance from them evident to Senſe; and, in ſome Circumſtances, the nearer the Medium, whoſe Surface it reflects from, approaches to a Vacuum, the greater and ſtronger the Reflection is; (of which there are convictive Experiments publiſhed to the World:) Or when Matter acts, by the Cauſe of Gravitation, upon other Matter, in proportion, not to the bigneſs of the Superficies, but to the Quantity of the ſolid Matter it ſelf; that is, acts upon the very Centers of the original ſolid parts of Matter; (of which, Mathematicians know there are Demonſtrations extant;) Tell me how, in theſe caſes, *Matter* acts upon *Matter*, *without Contact*;

and

and I will undertake to tell you, how Matter acts upon *Immaterial Subſtance.*

Anſw. *pag.* 34, 35, 36, 38. It is worthy of Remark, that, both here and elſewhere, you ſeem willing to allow, that That Power in Matter, whereof you contend Thinking to be a Mode, is a Power you *pretend not to know*; a Power *unknown to us*. and *of which we have no Idea, no diſtinct Conception* in our Minds; and which you *know not* whether it *be Motion or no*. Whatever it be, I have ſhown that the ſame Arguments hold equally againſt Thinking's being a Mode of that unknown Power, as againſt its being a Mode of Motion. But that which I would here remark, is this. If *it is abſolutely impoſſible* (as you elſewhere affirm) *to prove that there are two different Subſtances in the World, becauſe we have not Ideas of them*; how can we know there is any ſuch unknown *Power* in Matter, without having an *Idea* of it? And if it can be known that there is a *Quality* in Matter, of which we have *no Idea*; why can it not as well be known that there is a *Subſtance* in the World, of which we have *no Idea*? If there be (as you ſay) *no other Teſt of Truth, but the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of Ideas*; how can we affirm any thing concerning a *Quality*, of which we have *no Idea*? If *Difficulties which cannot be perfectly cleared*, are (according to you) *Contradictions and Abſurdities*; why is this important Difficulty left *uncleared*? Again: If it be true (as you affirm in another place,) that *unleſs we have an Idea of the Creation of Matter out of Nothing, we muſt inevitably conclude Matter a Self-exiſtent Being*; how comes it not to be as evident, that, unleſs we have an *Idea* of the formation of a Thought out of ſuch Qualities of Matter as we have *no*

See *above*, *pag.* 214, 215

Anſw. *pag.* 78.

pag 9, 13.

pag. 16.

pag. 91.

Idea

Idea of, we muſt inevitably conclude that Matter cannot think? and, that, unleſs we *have Ideas* of thoſe Qualities which we *have no Ideas of*, there can be no ſuch Qualities in Matter? But all this, is only upon your *own Suppoſitions:* For the *unknown Quality* you make *Me* to aſcribe to Matter, *pag.* 35. in order to enable it to act upon immaterial Subſtance; is not (as I juſt now ſhew) a real *inherent Quality*, but only a *Power* or *Occaſion* of exciting *Modes in another Subject.* *See above, pag.* 219.

You obſerve further, that if the Soul be an Immaterial Subſtance, it is *a great Difficulty to conceive how by a mere Preference of the Mind* we can move our Hand, and cauſe it to reſt again, when we will: Whereas, *if Thinking be nothing but a Mode of Motion, or Matter in Motion, That Difficulty is entirely at an End*; there being then nothing in it harder to be underſtood, than how the Hand of *a Clock* is moved by the *Weights or Spring.* *Anſw. pag.* 35.

'Tis very true: If there be *no Liberty of Will at all*, then all the Difficulties concerning the *Manner* of it, are *entirely at an End.* Thus *Des-Cartes* put an End to all the *Difficulties* concerning the *Knowledge and Perception of Brutes*, by denying that they have any ſuch thing as *Senſe, Knowledge, or Perception* at all: And if *you* had deprived your *human Machines*, as he did his Brutal ones, of all *Senſe and Perception*, all *Knowledge and Underſtanding*, as well as all *Liberty of Will*; ſome further *Difficulties* ſtill, concerning the Nature of *Thinking* and *Perception* in general, would have been alſo *entirely* at an End. And thus, if I ſhould ſay I could *entirely put an End* to all the Difficulties about *Opticks*, by ſuppoſing that Men have *no Eyes at all*, I ſhould likewiſe ſay very true: But who would

would thank me for the notable Discovery, I cannot tell.

And yet there is a Difficulty even upon your own Supposition, greater than you seem to be aware of. For by what *Impulse*, by what *Preference*, by what *Power*, That Matter *first and originally began* to move, which you suppose impells both the *Weights of a Clock* and the *Thinking Materials in a Man*; is just *as difficult to conceive*, as how, by a *mere Preference of the Mind*, without any external Impulse, we can cause our *Hands* to *move*.

See *Boyles Lecture for the year* 1704, *pag.* 96, &c. *2d Edit. pag.* 122, &c. *1st Edit.*

You go on in the next place to consider my Arguments against the Possibility of Thinking's being a Mode of Motion.

To my first, viz. *that Modes of Motion are nothing but particular Motions, and cannot contain any thing in their Idea beyond the Genus of Motion; and that therefore we have the same intuitive certainty that Consciousness cannot be a Mode of Motion, as we have that any one thing is not another, whose Idea is the most remote from it that is possible*: You reply; That *we have no Idea of all the possible Modes of Motion*; That though *we have* indeed *Ideas of the more simple Modes of Motion*, yet of the *very complex* ones *we have no distinct Conception in our Minds*; That therefore we *can no more prove or know that* Thinking *is not one* of these more complex Modes of Motion, *than* we *can know whether two things agree or differ from one another, that* we *have no Idea at all*; That *it is not possible for us to say that Thinking does not consist in the peculiar Motion of the Spirits in the Brain, till we have a particular Idea of the Motion of those Spirits, and an Idea of Thinking as something distinct from a Mode of Motion*; That *Thinking has the genus of Motion*,

Answ. *pag.* 36, 37, 38.

by

by arising from Motion, by being varied by Motion, by producing other Motions, by having Succession and Parts and innumerable Modifications; That *no Idea of human Consciousness can be produced beyond the genus of Motion*; That *saying we have an intuitive Certainty that Consciousness cannot be a Mode of Motion, is only affirming the Question in debate, which can signify nothing to any Body that wants Conviction*, &c.

Now in all this, you have at last plainly declared the πρῶτον ψεῦδος of your whole Hypothesis; namely, that you intend to make *Thinking* not a *real Quality*, but a *mere empty Name* or *external Denomination*, such as I at first ranked under the *Third Head*. For the most complex Modes of Motion possible, whatever *Name* we call them by, are still nothing but Motions; and the *Name* we give them, is nothing but a *mere external Denomination*. *Thinking* therefore, according to you, being only a *very complex Mode of Motion* [or *of any other Quality of Matter*] is likewise nothing but a *mere external Name or Denomination* of that Mode. Which Notion of yours concerning Thinking, is certainly a mere *Chimera*; and a very absurd one.

3d Def. pag. 134.

See Answ. to 3d Def. pag. 19.

Every Man has within himself the *Idea*, (or, in your Language, the *Chimera*) *of Consciousness*; which, tho' he cannot *produce* as you absurdly require,) that is, cannot *define*, nor *describe*, any more than you can describe your Idea of any *Colour* or *Sound*; yet he as certainly knows *it* not to be any complex *Mode of Motion*, as you know your Idea of *Colour* not to be any complex Mode of *Sound*: Which intuitive certainty, if it be *only* a bare *affirming the Question in debate* in one case,

See above, pag. 212. Answ. to Third Def. pag. 37.

and

and can ſignify nothing to any Body that wants conviction; 'tis ſo in the other likewiſe: And then there's an end of all human Knowledge, and no Man can pretend to know any one thing not to be any other.

Ibid. *Thinking* has indeed *Succeſſion and Modes*, and many other things in common with *Motion*; and ſo has *every thing*, with *every thing*: The thing I affirmed, was not that *Thinking* has *no Property* that Motion has; but that it has ſomething in its Idea, which Motion has not; that it has ſomething *beyond*, and *totally different from*, the Genus of Motion: And this, I ſtill affirm, every Man has an *intuitive* Certainty of: Which *Intuition* you yourſelf allow to be one Way, (*Anſw.* pag. 78,) and, I add, 'tis of all others the moſt infallible way, of knowing a thing to be true.

See *Third Defence, pag.* 161.

Anſw. pag. 36. We cannot indeed frame in our Minds diſtinct *Images* of the more complex Modes of Motion, as we can of the more ſimple Ones: But are we not, nevertheleſs, equally certain that they are all alike *Imaginable*, though our *narrow Imaginations* cannot comprehend them? And that, if we could repreſent them to our Imaginations, they would all appear as remote from the Idea of *Thinking*, as any One of them does? Becauſe we cannot comprehend in our Imagination a diſtinct Conception of a *vaſt number in Arithmetick*, as we can of a *ſmall one*; do we not therefore know, but that a *vaſt number* may poſſibly prove ſo different from a Small one, as to turn into a *Plant* or an *Animal*? Becauſe we cannot form in our Minds an *Image* of a Space *Ten thouſand Millions of Miles* ſquare, as we can of *ten foot* ſquare: are we not therefore ſure, but that the great ſpace may poſſibly be ſomething, whoſe true Idea ſhall have

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no Simlitude, no Relation to Extenſion? If I ſhould plead in Favour of *Motion*'s being a Mode of *Figure*, (as you do for *Thinking*'s being a Mode of *Motion*,) that, *though we have indeed Idea's of the more ſimple Modes of* Figure, *yet of the very complex ones we have no diſtinct Conception in our Minds*; and that therefore, though we are ſure indeed that a *Triangle* or a *Square* is not a *Motion*, yet we *can no more prove or know that* Motion *is not one of the more complex Modes of* Figure, *than we can know whether two things agree or differ from one another, that we have no Idea of at all:* If I ſhould argue thus, I ſay, I know well what Mathematicians would argue concerning Me: And I can gueſs what Anſwer I ſhould deſerve, if I ſhould tell the World further, that *it is not poſſible for us to ſay that* Colour *does not conſiſt in a peculiar* mixture of ten Thouſand various Sounds, *till we have a particular diſtinct Idea of* the reſult of the mixture of thoſe ten Thouſand Sounds. *I* may *call Scarlet-colour*, if I pleaſe, a very complex Mode of *Sound*; and who ſhall confute me, by *producing* the *particular diſtinct Idea* of the reſult of a *peculiar* mixture of ten Thouſand Sounds? And *you* may *call Thinking*, if you pleaſe, a very complex Mode of *Motion:* Yet neither of them will, by either of our Confidence in giving Things *Names*, be ever the nearer becoming ſuch in reality. This I think, clearly ſhows your Notion to be ſomething *more* than a *difficulty that cannot be perfectly cleared*; that is, (according to *you*,) ſomething *more* than *an Abſurdity and Contradiction*; But *I* will be content to look upon it, as being but barely *contradictory and abſurd.*

pag. 35.

page 37.

pag. 28 & 37.

pag. 37.

To my ſecond Argument, *viz. that, if Thinking was a Mode or Species of Motion, it would follow that all Motion would be a degree of Thinking:* You
pag. 40. reply, that you *do allow, that every Motion is a degree of Thought, in that Senſe* wherein *it is proper to ſay that every Motion is a degree of Fire*, &c. That is; you *allow* every Motion, to be as much a degree of the *Senſation it ſelf*; of *Heat*, for inſtance, or of any other *Senſation* or *Thought* ariſing in the *Mind*; as it is a degree of that *Mode of Motion* in *Matter*, which excites in us ſuch or ſuch a particular Senſation: You *allow* every the ſloweſt Motion of a *Needle* to be as much and as properly a degree of *Pain*, as it is a degree of *that Motion* which cauſes it to prick the Skin: You *allow* every Motion of a particle of Air, to be as truly a degree of the *Thought and Reaſon* of a Man; as it is a degree of that *Mode of Motion*, which, ſtriking the Ear, excites in us the Senſation of *Sound:* You muſt by the ſame reaſon have *allowed*, if it had been deſired of you; that a *Streight Line* is as much a Piece of a *Motion*, as it is a piece of the *Figure of a Triangle*. But I accept contentedly what you *do allow*; and I do not deſire to be *allowed* any more.

To my third Argument, viz. *that if Thinking was a Mode of Motion, then Motion would be a more generical Power than Thinking; whereas on the con-*
pag. 40. 41, 42, &c. *trary*, &c. Your Reply is ſo uncertain and obſcure, that 'tis hard to know what to make of it. The Strength of the Argument, which you pretend you cannot underſtand, was plainly this: That *no particular Mode of any Power, can contain under it ſo great a Variety of Modes, as the Superiour Power it ſelf does; for the ſame reaſon that Quadri-*

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lateral Figure, which is a Mode of Figure, cannot contain under it ſo great a Variety of Modes, as Figure in general does: And that therefore, if Thinking was a particular Mode of Motion, there could not poſſibly be ſo many Modes of Thinking, as there are of Motion. But now, on the contrary, 'tis evident there are more Modes of Thinking, than there are of Motion; becauſe every Mode of Motion has a Mode of Thinking [an Idea] anſwering to it, and there are innumerable other Modes of Thinking beſides: Thinking therefore cannot poſſibly be a Mode of Motion. [And *the ſame Argument holds againſt the Poſſibility of its being a Mode of any other Power of Matter whatſoever.*] This is in ſhort the Sum of that Argument, which, you ſay, *you are perfectly at a loſs to know what it means. To know what it means*, I believe every Man, except your ſelf, is very able; But to *know what to anſwer to it*, you might well be *perfectly at a loſs*. Inſtead of anſwering it therefore, you were reſolved to be even with me for offering you an Argument you could not underſtand; and would needs ſay ſomething in oppoſition to it, which you were ſure neither *I* nor *any Body elſe* could underſtand; namely, that *Ideas* are not *Modes*, but *Objects* of *Thinking*. However, this being manifeſtly abſurd, you contradict your ſelf again in the next page, and ſay *it muſt be allowed that every diſtinct Thought*, [that is, every *Idea*] *is a particular* Mode *of Thinking*; *and ſo Thinking muſt in us have a great number of Modes. But yet, for all that*, you ſay, *our Thoughts are finite and limited*; and *we comprehend only the more ſimple Modes of Motion and Figure*; and, *ſince our Thoughts are all limited in point of Number*, you *ſee no reaſon from their Variety neceſſarily to conclude, that human Thinking cannot be a Mode*

pag. 43. lin. 9, 13, 22, 23.

pag. 44.

pag. 45.

of Motion. You ſeem reſolved indeed not to *ſee the Reaſon:* But the Reaſon is *viſible* enough, and will force any Man to ſee it, that does not ſhut his Eyes; *viz.* that, there being more Variety of *Modes of Thinking*, than there is of *Modes of Motion*; and all the *Modes of Motion* (though we cannot *actually* attend to them, becauſe their Number is infinite,) anſwering only to *one ſpecies* of the *Modes of Thinking*, (which Modes of Thinking under that *one ſpecies*, are likewiſe infinite in number;) 'tis plainly, and for the very ſame reaſon, as impoſſible that *Thinking* ſhould be any one of the infinite Number of the *Modes of Motion*, as that *Figure in general* ſhould be any one of the infinite number of the *Modes of Quadrilateral Figure.*

pag. 45. You add: *If we conſider but the prodigious Variety of Sounds, which are called diſtinct Modes of Sound; it is as eaſy to conceive, that upon ſuppoſition of Thinking being a Mode of Motion, it ſhould have the ſeveral Modes that we are conſcious it has; as that Sound ſhould have all the diſtinct immumerable Modes which That has.* But from what has been ſaid, 'tis evident, that as all the Modes of *Sound*, though infinite in Number, yet bear no Proportion to the infinite Variety of the Modes of infinite other things put all together; ſo the infinite Modes of *Motion*, and their correſpondent Ideas, bear no proportion to the infinite Variety of infinite other Modes of Thinking: And that therefore *Thinking* with its infinite Variety of Modes, can no more poſſibly be a *Mode of Motion*, though the *Modes of Motion* be allowed to be capable of infinite variation; than *Colours*, or *Smells*, or any other thing that has no ſimilitude

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to theſe, can be any of the infinite number of the Modes of *Sound*.

My fourth Argument, was drawn from the *Authority*, and from the *Reaſoning* of Mr *Lock*.

The *Authority*, you profeſs to deſpiſe. pag. 45.

To the *Reaſoning*, you anſwer; that Mr *Lock's* pag. 45. *whole deſign in the Paſſage* I cited, was not to prove *that* Human *Thinking cannot be a Mode of Motion*, but that *Thinking in the* Deity *cannot depend on the Motion of the Parts of a Corporeal Syſtem*; and that, *as the Queſtion is not the ſame, ſo ſome of the Conſequences that Mr* Lock *draws from thoſe Principles, affect only that really abſurd Suppoſition of Thinking's being a Mode of Motion in God.*

I reply: 'Tis very true, that Mr *Lock* indeed is not there proving that *Thinking in Man*, but that *Thinking in God* cannot be a *Mode of Motion*; and that *Some* of the Conſequences he there draws, do indeed affect only the latter Queſtion, and not the former. But, if the *Reaſoning* he uſes, be as ſtrong in one caſe, as in the other; and the *Conſequences* I made uſe of from him, were only ſuch as affect both Queſtions alike; (for which I appeal to every Reader;) 'Twas by no means conſiſtent with Ingenuity and Candor, for you to indeavour to impoſe upon your Readers with ſo weak an Anſwer. See 3d *Defence*, pag. 165, 166.

• To my laſt Argument, (which alſo you ſeem unwilling to *underſtand*,) *viz.* that, *if Thinking was a Mode or Species of Motion; then, in like manner as it is a proper Expreſſion to ſay, that Circularity is one Species of Figure, and Squareneſs a ſecond, and Cubicalneſs a third, and Ellipticalneſs a fourth; ſo it would be proper alſo to ſay, that Circular* Anſw. pag. 46.

cular Motion is one Species of Motion, and Motion in a Square a ſecond, and Motion in an Ellipſis a third, and Thinking or Conſciouſneſs a fourth; (which Conſequence, I think, is abundanty abſurd:) You reply, by quibbling upon the word *proper*, that the Argument has relation only to *propriety of Language*, and that you ſee not what ground I have to *conteſt this Language* with you: Whereas the Queſtion was not whether it was *proper* with reſpect to the *Language*, but with reſpect to the *Senſe*; that is, whether it was *True* according to your Hypotheſis, and a *juſt and neceſſary Conſequence* from it, to ſay that *Thinking* differs no otherwiſe from *Circular Motion*, than *Circular Motion* does from *Elliptical Motion* or from *Motion in a Square*: And this, it ſeems, (as you are indeed this time very liberal in your Conceſſions,) you are willing to grant; And I am well contented with the Conceſſion.

pag. 47.

Anſw. pag. 50, 51, &c.

Upon the Queſtion, *whether individual Perſonality can be preſerved by a continual transferring of Conſciouſneſs from one parcel of Matter to another, in ſo flux a Subſtance as the Brain or Spirits*; you repeat what you had before advanced in your *Reflexions*. In anſwer to which, I ſhall not repeat, but only deſire the Reader to compare what I offered in my *Third Defenſe*, pag. 176--182 & 195--198. And I ſhall here make only ſome brief incidental Obſervations on what ſeems new in your reply.

See 3d Defenſe, pag. 176. &c. 195, &c.

In the firſt place you diſown none of the Abſurd Conſequences I charged on your Hypotheſis. You deny not, but *One Subſtance may be Conſcious of an Action's having been done by it ſelf, which really was not done by It, but by Another Subſtance*; you make

make *Individual Perſonality to be a mere external imaginary Denomination, and all Self-Conſciouſneſs a mere Dream and Deluſion*; you own that *One Man may poſſibly be two Perſons, and 2 or 200 Men one Perſon*; that is, *not Perſons exactly Like one another, but all really and truly one and the ſame individual Perſon, at the ſame time that they continue ſo many diſtinct, intelligent, rational Men.* Theſe Abſurdities, I ſay, you have not denied to be unavoidable Conſequences of your Hypotheſis; nor have you done any thing towards clearing them from being Abſurdities; but inſtead thereof, have only offered ſome looſe Objections againſt what I propoſed under this Head. Anſw. *pag* 66, 67, 74. compare 3d *Defenſe*, *pag.* 179, 180. and Anſw. *pag.* 72, 74.

You ſay you *are ſure*, that my *calling* your *Hypotheſis* an *impoſſible* one, *and inſtead of ſaying a Word to prove it impoſſible, immediately arguing on the ſuppoſition of its Poſſibility*; *is begging the Queſtion, and ſuppoſing what I was to prove.* The particular Hypotheſis here referred to, *(viz. that Memory may be preſerved in a fleeting Subſtance, by continually repeating the Idea's, and imprinting them afreſh upon new particles of Matter perpetually ſucceeding in the room of thoſe that paſs away,)* was, I ſaid, an impoſſible Hypotheſis; And an impoſſible Hypotheſis it will always appear to be, till you can find out ſome new Hypotheſis, by which to make it intelligible, how it is poſſible that new Ideas printed upon new Particles, ſhould be a *Memory* of old Ideas printed upon old Particles. But I did not enlarge upon this; becauſe, ſuppoſing the *Poſſibility* of it, yet it would avail nothing towards your main purpoſe: the Queſtion being, not whether the *Memory* in general of ſuch or ſuch an Action's having been done, might poſſibly be preſerved in the manner you ſuppoſe; *Anſw. pag.* 52.

but whether the *Conſciouſneſs* of its being done by *Me*, by *my own Individual Self* in particular, could in this manner be continued. Now how it was in me a *begging of the Queſtion*, to argue, that, even on Suppoſition of the Poſſibility of the Hypotheſis now mentioned, yet it would nevertheleſs be impoſſible for you from thence to make out the Concluſion you were to prove; I confeſs, I underſtand not: Neither do I underſtand how you can prevail upon your ſelf to diſpute in ſuch a manner.

pag 65. *A Man*, you ſay, who, during *a ſhort Frenzy, kills* another. *and then returns to himſelf, without the leaſt Conſciouſneſs of what he has done; cannot attribute that Action to Himſelf*; and therefore *the mad Man and the ſober Man are really two as diſtinct Perſon as any two other Men in the World, and will be ſo conſidered in a Court of Judicature.* Extraordinary Reaſoning indeed! Becauſe in a *figurative* Senſe a Man, when he is mad, is ſaid *not to be Himſelf*; and in a *forenſick* Senſe, is looked upon as not anſwerable for his *own Actions*; therefore in the *Natural and Philoſophical* Senſe alſo, *his Actions* are not *his own Actions*, but *another Perſons*; and the *ſame Man* is *really two diſtinct Perſons!*

pag. 67. You add: *Should there be ſo ſtrong a Repreſentation to my Underſtanding, of a Murder done by me, which was really never done at all; ſo that I could not diſtinguiſh it in my Mind from ſomething really done by me; I can no more help attributing this to my ſelf*, &c. 'Tis true, I could not *help* it indeed; But it would be, (as Mr *Lock* well expreſſes it,) a *fatal Errour*; and not (as you would have it) a making me to be really the Perſon I am not. *So that 'tis evident* (you go on,) *that Self or Perſonal Identity conſiſts ſolely in Conſciouſneſs*, though a falſe one; that is, it con-

See *Third Defenſe*, pag. 180. *Anſw.* pag. 67.

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ſiſts in a *Falſe Repreſentation*, in *a Dream*, as Mr *Lock* well expreſſes it again. And ſo all Mankind, it ſeems, are nothing but a Dream: Unleſs rather your Opinion it ſelf be a Dream; as, I preſume, it will be found to be, by every Man whoſe Reaſon is awake.

The reſtoring, you ſay, *the Power of Thinking to the ſame or to a different Body at the Reſurrection, with a Memory or Conſciouſneſs extending to paſt Actions, will be a raiſing the ſame Perſon and not a Creation of a new one.* If ſo; then the reſtoring the like Power of Thinking to 20 different Bodies with a falſe Memory (a Dream,) or a Conſciouſneſs extending to imaginary paſt Actions, will be a making them all (as I ſaid, and as you expreſſly allow.) to be, not Perſons like one another, but one and the ſame individual Perſon, at the ſame time that they continue different, intelligent, rational Men. That is to ſay; if twenty of your Clocks happen to go exactly alike, they are no more 20 Clocks, but one and the ſame individual Clock. pag. 63. pag. 72.

Your Diſtinction between *raiſing the ſame Perſon* and *creating a new One*, is a Diſtinction without any the leaſt Difference. For the *Memory or Conſciouſneſs extending to paſt Actions*, which you ſuppoſe makes the *ſame Perſon* in the one caſe; does exactly as well make the ſame Perſon in the other caſe: It being evidently as eaſy for God to add an imaginary *Conſciouſneſs extending to paſt actions that never were*, to a new created Body *now*; as to add an imaginary *Conſciouſneſs extending to paſt Actions that were done by one Body*, to another Body at the *Reſurrection*. So that from your Opinion it unavoidably follows, that I may now at this preſent Time as poſſibly be created a-new and have another *Self* exiſting at the ſame time with ibid. See Anſw. pag. 67.

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me, by God's adding to *the Understanding* of a new-
See Answ. made Body *so strong a Representation* of my past
pag. 66 & 67. Actions, that That Other My-self *could not distinguish them in his Mind from things really done by him*; (as you express your self in a like Case:) This, I say, is exactly as possible, in your Hypothesis; as it is for me to be raised again at the Resurrection.

pag. 69, 70 & 76. Your Argument, by which you endeavour to retort upon me, that, according to my Notion of Individual Personality, there can be no Resurrection, nor any such thing as Personal Identity at all; is founded upon a fallacious Representation, as if, by the *same individual numerical Conciousness*, I understood the *same individual numerical Act of Thinking*: Whereas the *individual numerical Consciousness*, which Identifies the Person, is that Perception, by which the Person is sensible, that his *Past Acts of Thinking* were his *own Thoughts* and not *another's*; Which *Perception*, in the same continued Being, is a *true Memory*, and can be *true* in that one numerical Being only; But in your fleeting Being, it would be a *false Memory*, a *mere Delusion*, and might be impressed on any number of Beings at one and the same time: All which, distinct, intelligent, rational Beings, because they happened to be in the
pag. 72. same *Dream*, you would affirm to be one and the same individual Person; And, for the same reason, if twenty Pieces of Money happen to be stampt with so like an Impression, that they could not be distinguished one from another; you must affirm them all to be one and the same *Individual Shilling*, notwithstanding their being different *Pieces of Silver*.

Having

Having granted, that if *ever ſo many Thinking Beings* have, (not *one and the Same numerical Conſciouſneſs*, as by your Compariſon of a *vaſt bulk of ſenſeleſs Matter* being added to a Man's Body, you would very artfully inſinuate, in contradiction to the whole courſe of your Argument and moſt expreſs Conceſſions: but) having granted, I ſay, and contended, that if *ever ſo many diſtinct Thinking Beings* have within themſelves a Like *Conſciouſneſs*, or a Like *preſent Repreſentation of paſt Actions*, they *can all conſtitute but one and the ſame Perſon*; You ask me, whether each of theſe diſtinct Thinking Beings muſt not unavoidably *think* himſelf the *ſame Perſon* that did the Action, and the *ſame Perſon* that every one of the reſt will likewiſe diſtinctly think himſelf to be? I anſwer, as before; They muſt indeed *unavoidably think* ſo; But in ſo doing, they muſt alſo *unavoidably be miſtaken*: And ſo, according to your Notion, we are all *unavoidably we know not who*, and do but *fancy and dream* our ſelves to be the Perſons we think we are, and write and read about *we know not Whom nor What*.

pag. 71, 72.

See *above*, pag. 232.

3d Def. pag. 180.

To your taking Refuge in the *Juſtice* of God, I have already anſwered; that the Queſtion is not, whether God *will* do an abſurd thing, but whether in the nature of things it be *poſſible* to be done. And whereas you allege that *if God ſhould cauſe to exiſt twenty preſent Repreſentations of the ſame paſt ſinful Actions in ſo many diſtinct Beings, the conſequent Puniſhment would be twenty times as much as the ſinful Actions deſerved and his Juſtice required*; and that therefore God *will not* do any ſuch thing: I reply; The Difficulty does not lie there; Becauſe the Puniſhment due to the ſingle Perſon's ſinful Actions, might be divided proportionably among

Anſw. pag. 73.

among the twenty distinct intelligent Beings, which in your way are One and the Same Individual Person; and so *according to you*, there would be no Injustice done, because the Punishment would not be more than the Offences deserved: And yet 'tis manifest, that *in reality*, 19 at least of these 20 distinct intelligent Beings would be punished unjustly, how small a proportion soever they bear of the Punishment; because they would be punished for what they had never been guilty of at all, however by a false *Consciousness* they might *imagine* themselves to have *done* what they *never did*.

pag. 74, 75. The Case you put, of a Person living well for some Years, and afterwards forgetting that he had done so, and then living for the future in all manner of Debauchery; is so far from being an *Absurdity*, as you call it, upon my Notion of Personal Identity; that, on the contrary, there is no manner of Difficulty in it. The Man is not *two Persons, as much as any two Men in the World are two Persons*; (which you declare he must be, in consequence of *your* Principles; A Consequence sufficient to have convinced almost any Man, of the Falsity of the Principles from which he sees and owns such an Absurdity to follow:) But he is, I confess, (as you add in the next Words,) *as much two Persons as the same Man Mad and Sober is two Persons*; that is, he is *not at all two Persons*, but plainly *one and the same Person*; and shall justly be punished as his Iniquities deserve.

pag. 53, 54. You urge, that my Argument is no more useful to the *Ends of Religion*, than yours; because, *unless the Soul, as an Immaterial Being, did perpetually*

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ly Think; *a Proof of the Immateriality of the Soul*, would not neceſſarily *prove a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments:* And upon this you are pleaſed to make your ſelf merry, in a very needleſs manner. Now what Connexion there is between the Soul's *Immateriality*, and its *Perpetual Thinking*; has been conſidered elſewhere. In this place it may be ſufficient to add, that whether the *Immateriality and Immortality* of the Soul neceſſarily infer its perpetual actual Thinking, or not, yet *my* Argument is evidently *uſeful* to Religion, by proving at leaſt the *Poſſibility* and *great Probability* of a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments; And *yours* is evidently *deſtructive* of Religion, by making a Future State of Rewards and Puniſhments not only *Improbable*, but *Impoſſible*; ſeeing it infers (as I have at large ſhown) an abſolute *Impoſſibility* of a *Reſurrection of the ſame Perſon*; And if a Reſurrection were poſſible, yet, by introducing ſuch an abſolute and fatal *Neceſſity* of all human Actions, as Mr *Hobbs* and *Spinoza* formerly attempted to eſtabliſh by the ſame *numerical* Argument, (though from your *Thinking in the ſame way*, I would not conclude you All to be the ſame *Individual* Perſon;) it manifeſtly makes all future *Reward unreaſonable*, and all *Puniſhment unjuſt*: Of which more, immediately.

1ſt Def. pag. 85, &c. and 2d Def. pag. 114, &c.

My firſt Argument to prove your Notion deſtructive of Religion, was, that *by inferring the Neceſſity of all Human Actions, it makes Men to be Subjects no more capable of Religion, than Clocks and Watches are.*

To this you reply, Firſt, that *Thinking's being a Mode of Motion in any Syſtem of Matter*, (which is the Suppoſition I refer to, that deſtroys all Liber-

Anſw. to Third Defenſe, pag. 55.

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ty of Will,) *is no where affirmed by you.* But this is a mere Quible; as I have ſhown at large, *Third Def.* pag. 159. And *above pag.* 214, 215.

ibid. In the next place therefore, you anſwer ſeriouſly: that *Men and Clocks Agreeing in being neceſſarily determined in all their Actions, does no more prove them to be alike incapable of Religion; than an Immaterial Subſtance and a Clock's agreeing in being* * *extended, proves them to be alike incapable of Religion.* Had I not ſeen it, I could not have believed that either you or any reaſonable Man could have given ſuch an Anſwer. *Neceſſity*, if Men and Clocks agree in it, muſt make them both alike incapable of Religion; becauſe *Neceſſity* is the very thing, that makes any Being incapable of Religion: But *Extenſion*, ſuppoſing Immaterial Subſtance and Clocks to agree in That, would not make Them both alike incapable of Religion; becauſe *Extenſion* is not the thing, that makes any Being incapable of Religion.

* See *above, pag.* 205.

Neceſſity, you *muſt reply*, is not the thing that makes any Being incapable of Religion; What is it then, that incapacitates for Religion? *Want of underſtanding*, you ſay: For *What excludes a Clock from being a proper Subject of Religion, but the Want of a human Underſtanding?* and *What is it that makes a Man a proper Subject of Religion, but his Underſtanding?* I anſwer: 'Tis not *Underſtanding*, but *Will*, that makes a Man capable of Religion; and 'tis not *Want of Underſtanding*, but *Want of Will and of a Power of acting freely*, that makes a Clock incapable of Religion. For, ſuppoſing a Clock to have the Underſtanding of a Man; yet if, for all that Underſtanding, it continued to be moved by the Weights as neceſſarily as it is Now, 'tis manifeſt it would Then have no more Power of doing either *good or evil*, than it has Now; And

Anſw. *pag.* 55.

the

the only difference would be, that it would then Know and underſtand it ſelf to be incapable of Religion, whereas now it is incapable of Religion without underſtanding or being ſenſible that it is ſo.

And to make it appear, that *Neceſſity* in an Intelligent, as well as in an Unintelligent Being, incapacitates for Religion; and that there can be no Religion without *Freedom of Will*; I offer only the following Argument. *Religion* ſuppoſes a *future State of Rewards and Puniſhments*; and a *future State of Rewards and Puniſhments*, ſuppoſes that God is *pleaſed* and *diſpleaſed* with the different Actions of Men; and God's manifeſting his *diſpleaſure* towards certain Perſons by *puniſhing* them finally, ſuppoſes that ſuch *Puniſhment* is *juſt* and that the Perſons *deſerved* it: For *God cannot err*. Now, if Men, with all their *Underſtanding*, were under the ſame *Neceſſity* in all their Actions, as a Clock is in its Motions; then, though you would unreaſonably imagin perhaps it might ſerve *ſome Deſigns* of human Government, to *pull* and *draw*, to *drive* and *puſh* ſuch neceſſary Agents with the *Screws* and *Springs* of *Rewards and Puniſhments*, as Men govern their Clocks by the Addition and Subſtraction of Weights; yet neither from the Hands of *God* or *Men* could the good or evil Actions of ſuch intelligent Machines *Deſerve* either Reward or Puniſhment: nor could there poſſibly be any *Juſtice* in Gods final diſtribution of Rewards and Puniſhments; nor is there any reaſon why any Man ſhould *reproach* himſelf, or be *blamed* by others, (even by thoſe who would be ſo unreaſonable as to *puniſh* the Machine,) for any Profaneneſs, Impiety or Wickedneſs whatſoever, for murdering a Man (for inſtance) with his Sword, when his Hand was moved *neceſſarily* to

do

do it, by the Action of Subtle Matter upon his Brain and Spirits; any more than if he had done it by another Man's *forcibly* using his Hand and Sword: Neither is it poſſible that God ſhould be *pleaſed* or *angry* with any Man, for doing what he could not avoid doing; any more than a Man can be *angry* with his Clock for going wrong, even ſuppoſing the Machine indued with Underſtanding enough, to feel and be ſenſible that its Weights neceſſitated it to do ſo. The Notion therefore you maintain, of Mens Actions being all *Neceſſary*, is totally deſtructive of Religion.

Till you can give a *clear* Anſwer to this Argu-
pag. 56. ment, you ſtand obliged by Promiſe to *allow that Man is no more a Subject of Religion, than a Clock; nay, to go further, and allow that there can be no ſuch thing as Religion.* Though, I hope, you will be better than your Word; and own rather, that there is no ſuch thing as *Neceſſity*.

pag. 61, 62. Before we diſmiſs this Argument, you will expect I ſhould anſwer the two Queſtions you put to me *ad hominem*. Though indeed you have no reaſon to expect it; becauſe you knew, (but, for Reaſons beſt known to your ſelf, took not the leaſt notice of it,) that they were Both of them *directly* and *clearly* anſwered in the places from whence you had them.

Firſt, you *deſire Mr.* Clark, *who maintains* (you ſay) *the* Certainty of all Events, *to ſhow what different Influence the ſuppoſed* Neceſſity *of our Actions can have on the* Power of Self-determination, *that the Suppoſition of the* Certainty of our Actions *has not*. I anſwer: Your ſuppoſed *Neceſſity* is directly contradictory to the *Power of Self-determination*, and therefore manifeſtly inconſiſtent with it; But the *Certainty* I ſpeak of in the place you cite, has

no

no inconsistency at all with the *Power of Self-determination*, because it means (as is there largely explained) only that *mere Futurity*, which you your self must confess all Actions had while they were *yet future*, even upon Supposition of the *Power of Self-determination*. For you can *suppose*, what you will *not grant*, a *Power of Self-determination*. And, I presume, you cannot deny but every *past* Action *had*, and every *future* Action *has* a *Futurity*, (which is all that was meant by *Certainty of Event* in the place now referred to,) notwithstanding that supposed *Power of Self-determination*.

Boyle's Lect. Vol. I. 1st Ed. pag. 215, 217. 2d Edit. pag. 169, 170.

Secondly; You ask, *if* (as Mr *Clark* affirms) the necessary and eternal different Relations, which different things bear to one another, always and *necessarily* do determin the Will of God; *and* God is *unalterably* determined to do always what is best in the whole; then *how can he have* a *Power of Self-determination?* I answer; The *Necessity* there spoken of, is only a *Moral* Necessity; which, as to the *Effects*, may be depended upon with infallible Certainty, (*viz.* that a *Wise* Being *will* not act *foolishly*, and a *Good* Being *will* not do *Evil*;) but, as to the *thing it self*, 'tis in the *natural and philosophical* Sense, (of which we are now treating,) *no Necessity at all*, but *mere Self-determination:* As is at large explained in the Book you refer to. Which, if you would have * *taken to your self the Character of an Ingenuous Adversary*, certainly you ought to have taken some notice of. For † *when Terms are defined, and Instances agreeing to those Definitions given, whereby all Doubtfulness about one anothers meaning is in the most effectual manner excluded*; To cite an Author's Words, notwithstanding this, and apply them to a Sense directly contrary to what the Author

Boyle's Lect. Vol. I. 1st Ed. pag. 256, and 128. 2d Edit. pag. 200, & 101.

Ibid. 1st Edit. *pag.* 140, 237, 243, *&c.* 247, *&c.* 2d Edit. *pag.* 110, 111, 115, 190, *&c.* 194, *&c.*

* *Answ.* to 3d *Defense, pag* 28.

† *Ibid. pag.* 21.

thor largely and expreſsly explains he intends they ſhould be taken in, is no fair way of managing a Controverſy.

My ſecond Argument to prove your Notion *deſtructive of Religion*, was drawn from the Conſideration of the Nature of *Perſonal Identity*, and of the *Reſurrection of the ſame Perſon*. To which all the Reply you have made, has been conſidered already.

pag. 230, &c.

To your Argument, that, *if we have no Idea of the Subſtance of Matter and of the Subſtance of Spirit, 'tis impoſſible to prove that one is not the other*; It might be ſufficient to Anſwer, that an unprejudiced Perſon would be apt to think it as eaſy to prove, that there is a *Subſtance* in the World, of which we have *no Idea*, totally different from the *Subſtance of Matter*; as that there ſhould be a *Quality* in Matter, of which we have *no Idea*, totally different from all the known *Qualities of Matter*. But to paſs this over: I affirm, that from our Knowledge of any Being's having certain Properties incompatible with the *Eſſential Properties* of Matter, we may certainly infer that the Subſtance of that Being and the Subſtance of Matter are not the ſame, though we have no Ideas of the Subſtances themſelves. We have no Idea of *Infinite*; and yet every Mathematician can demonſtrate concerning Many Infinites, that one is not another; and in ſome, the exact Proportion between One and Another; without having an Idea of either. And to *your ſelf*, you ſay, *'tis evident that God muſt be an* Immaterial *Being*, becauſe he is *without Any of the Properties of Matter:* (I hope you mean the *peculiar* Properties of Matter; Otherwiſe *Exiſtence* will be one of its Properties, as much as any of thoſe you

Anſw. pag. 77, &c.

pag. 34, 35, 38.

pag. 33.

you mention.) The moſt *Eſſential Properties* of Matter we know, are, I think, *Impenetrability*, *Diviſibility*, and that which Mathematicians call its *Vis Inertiæ*. If you will ſay, that though theſe Properties belong indeed univerſally to all the Matter we have any knowledge of, yet, for ought we know, there may be other Matter which wants theſe Properties; and ſo theſe Properties may poſſibly not be *Eſſential*, but only *Accidental* to Matter; Then, I ſay, you either mean nothing at all by the Word *Matter*, or elſe you mean by it the ſame as you do by the Word *Subſtance*; and then your affirming God to be *Immaterial*, will be as much as affirming him to have *no Exiſtence*. And, as to the *Thinking Subſtance* in Man; When you ſhall declare, that by the *Thinking Syſtem of Matter in the Brain*, you mean a Syſtem of ſuch *Matter*, as has no *Impenetrability*, no *Diviſibility*, and no *Vis Inertiæ*; we ſhall then diſpute upon a new Foot. pag. 33.

In the mean time, *nothing ſeems clearer* to you at *preſent*, *than that the Eſſence or Subſtance of Matter conſiſts in Solidity*; and that, to be *Solid*, is *to be co-extended with the Parts of Space*. If ſo; Then the *Omnipreſent God* cannot co-exiſt with all the Parts of Space, without being *Material*: And I deſire you would be pleaſed in your next, to Anſwer the Difficulties objected againſt your Notion of *Gods Immateriality*, as they are expreſſed in the paſſage I before-cited out of the *Eſſay concerning the Uſe of Humane Reaſon*; ſubſtituting only the words [*co-exiſt with all the different Parts of Space*] all along inſtead of the words [*co-exiſt with all the Differences of Time*,] and [*Immenſity*] inſtead of [*Eternity*.] And this I inſiſt on the rather, and deſire it the more earneſtly; becauſe (as I before obſerved,) it is generally believed that That Eſſay was written by a pag. 83. See above, pag. 209.

Perſon, with whoſe *Reaſoning* (for we are not to give any deference to *Authority*) you are thoroughly acquainted.

As to what I ſaid againſt material Impulſe being the Cauſe of Gravitation; the *Whole*, you ſay, *is founded on this, that becauſe a Bullet, a Feather, and a Piece of Leaf Gold deſcend with equal Swiftneſs in Vacuo, therefore material Impulſe cannot be the cauſe of Gravitation.* Whereas, on the contrary, this was only an incidental Inſtance, to ſhow by a groſs and vulgar Experiment, (what Mathematicians know there are Proofs enough of in Nature,) that Gravity is exactly proportionable to the Quantity of *Solid* Matter contained in Bodies, and not at all to the Quantity of their *Superficies*. This Proportion it is, that evidently ſhows Gravitation not to be cauſed by Material Impulſe. And unleſs you could have found an Hypotheſis, whereby either the Quantity of *Solid* Matter in Bodies, and the Quantity of their *Superficies*, could be made one and the ſame; or, upon Mechanical Principles, Bodies could, by *Superficial* Contact, receive Impulſes proportional to the Quantity of *Solid* Matter contained in them; you would much more advantagiouſly to your ſelf, have acknowledged the firſt palpable Errour; than by a heap of things beſide the Purpoſe, have indeavoured to amuſe only ſuch Readers, as want Skill in Mathematicks.

Anſw. *pag.* 83, 84.

My ſaying that you indeavoured to inſinuate to your Reader, that That excellent Perſon, Sir *Iſaac Newton*, was of your Opinion in the preſent Queſtion; you *aſſure the Reader, is a pure Fiction.* But I hope you will take it in good part, that I was ſo complaiſant to you as to imagin, that you were

pag. 85.

were not your ſelf ſo ſenſible of the *Needleſneſs* of your Citation out of his Book, as you now acknowledge that you were.

You tell us; *If we have not an Idea of the Creation of Matter out of Nothing, we muſt inevitably conclude Matter a Self-exiſtent Being:* I anſwer; By the ſame Argument it follows on the contrary, that *if we have not an Idea of the Self-exiſtence of Matter,* [that is, that every diſtinct particle of Matter in the Univerſe, is a Neceſſary, Independent, Self-exiſtent Being,] we muſt inevitably *conclude Matter to be a Created Being:* And by a better Argument it follows; *if we have an Idea of the Poſſibility of the Non-Exiſtence of Matter,* that is, *if we have an Idea that Space can (without a Contradiction) exiſt without Matter in it; we muſt inevitably conclude Matter not to be a neceſſarily exiſting, but a created Being.* In like manner: By the ſame Argument with yours, it follows, that, *if we have not an Idea* (as * you own we have not) *of the inherence of Thinking in Matter, we muſt inevitably conclude it to inhere in ſomething Immaterial:* And by a better Argument it follows; *if we ſee a diſagreement of Ideas in ſuppoſing Thinking to inhere in Matter, we muſt inevitably conclude it to inhere in Immaterial Subſtance.* pag. 91. * pag. 35.

What the reſt of your looſe and uncertain Diſcourſe about *Creation* and *Self-Exiſtence* tends to, I do not well underſtand: Only, I am ſure, it is foreign to our preſent Queſtion. Yet two things there are in it, which, I think, deſerve to be remarked incidentally. pag. 87. &c.

The firſt, is; that from theſe Words of mine, [*On whatever Hypotheſis they* (that is, Atheiſts) *proceed, Nothing is ſo certain, as that Man, conſidered without the Protection and Conduct of a ſuperior Be-*

ing, is in a far worſe caſe, than upon the ſuppoſition of the Being and Government of God, and of Mens being under his peculiar Conduct, Protection and Favour; you moſt uncandidly infer, that *Atheiſts,*
pag. 89. *according to Mr* Clark, *even while they continue ſo, have no reaſon to fear any thing for their disbelief.*

pag. 88. The ſecond, is this; that, *to gratify that Deſire which even Atheiſts have to ſee a Truth eſtabliſhed, ſo much for the Benefit of Men*; you *ſhall conclude this*
pag. 89. *debate* (you ſay,) *with an Eſſay, ſhowing a way how*
pag. 90. *to demonſtrate the Exiſtence of God*; viz. *by proving the Creation of Matter out of Nothing:* And this you
pag. 92. do, by *omitting for the preſent ſo uſeful a Deſign,* and *leaving it intirely to ſome of thoſe Gentlemen that are appointed annually to preach at the Lecture founded by the Honourable* Robert Boyle.

Inſtead of concluding therefore, as you promiſed, with *an Eſſay ſhowing a way how to demonſtrate the Exiſtence of God*, you almoſt in the ſame Breath repent of ſo noble an Undertaking, and end your Diſcourſe with a pretended *Compliment* to *Me*; that you *will give* me *upon this Occaſion a Teſtimony* in my *Favour*; viz. *that* you *verily think* I *neither believe too little nor too much*; *but* am *perfectly and exactly Orthodox, and in all likelihood will continue ſo.* And
pag. 49. conſidering *we have had* (you ſay) *the Happineſs in* England, *to have ſuch rational Parliaments and Convocations, that have eſtabliſhed nothing but Truth*; I ſhould have taken this as a Teſtimony very much in my Favour indeed; had you not elſewhere
pag 45. dropt ſome expreſſions concerning *proſtituting Conſcience ſo far as to ſubmit to any mere human Autho-*
pag. 46. *rity*, and *to the Deciſions and Determinations of thoſe Men, that in every Country have worldly Preferments to beſtow:* Which yet ſince you make no Applica-

tion

tion of, neither ſhall I. Only, in return for your *Favour*, I ſhall, inſtead of giving *any* Teſtimony concerning *You*, conclude with moſt hearty Wiſhes, that you would be very careful, while you are diſputing about *Metaphyſicks*, not to oppoſe the Intereſt of *true Religion and Virtue*, without which nothing is truly valuable or praiſe-worthy among Men.

POSTSCRIPT.

WHereas there has lately been publiſhed a rude and ſcurrilous Book, entituled, *The Holy Spirit the Author of Immortality*, Or, *A Vindication of Mr* Dodwell's *Epiſtolary Diſcourſe*.

Which Vindication the Learned Mr *Dodwell* has been ſo far from diſapproving, (as there was Reaſon to expect he ſhould have done,) that on the contrary he has referred to it in the following Words. *The Defenſe of what I have formerly produced from the Fathers, I left to the* Abler *Advocate for my Cauſe, raiſed up for me by Divine Providence.* And again: *I ſhould now have proceeded to have Vindicated my Interpretation of, &c. if God himſelf had not partly ſuperſeded that part of my Work, by raiſing me up a* more Able *Patron.* —— *that ſo* Excellent *a Perſon, ſo utterly unknown to me, ſhould prevent me with a Defenſe ſo much* Better *than I could have made for my ſelf.* ——*I leave ſo much of* —— *my Task, to him* *The Scripture-Account of the eternal Rewards or Puniſhments, &c. pag. 1. & pag. 291.*

who is ſo much Fitter *for it* —— *It looks to me, like a Divine Interpoſition, &c.* And again: *How*
Page 293. *much I am indebted to Providence that has appeared on this occaſion, and to the* Worthy Inſtrument *who has ſo readily anſwered the Call of Providence,* &c.

It cannot therefore be improper nor unſeaſonable, to give the World a few Inſtances of the *Great Abilities* That Author has diſcovered in his ſo highly commended Performance.

In that Part which relates to the Fathers.

Vindicat. of Mr Dodwell's *Epiſtolary Diſcourſe.* Preface, pag. 27.

THEY (*ſaith he*) [the Philoſophers] *maintained it* [the Immortality of the Soul] *by way of Anticipation, by the* Inſtinct of Evil Spirits.

pag. 37. *To what purpoſe, the pretended natural Immortality? To exiſt vitally for ever,* for nothing!

pag. 43. *The Original Belief of a Natural Immortality, ſuggeſted by* the Devil, *was a* Lie.

* Οὐ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῆς ἐστι τὸ ζῆν, ὡς τοῦ Θεοῦ. [Thus rendred, Vindicat. very learnedly.] *It is not ſo of it ſelf to live, as it is of God.* pag. 6, 7.

* i. e. *The Soul hath not Life from* It ſelf, as *God has from* Himſelf.

Ἀνάστασις ἐστι τοῦ πεπτωκότος σαρκίου, πνεῦμα γὰρ οὐ πίπτει. *The Reſurrection is of the Fleſh that fell; for the Spirit doth not fall.* ——What then? if it doth ſomething * *analogous* to falling, it's as much to our Purpoſe. pag. 8, 10.

* *That is, if it dies, though without falling to the Ground, as the Body does.* A very learned Diſtinction.

The Soul in its natural ſeparation—, *though* Alive, *is no more to the Man, than the* Dead Carkaſs. pag. 11.

No created Beings can be naturally immortal, *becauſe by being ſuch they would be* † Equal unto God, *not* interiour *or* ſubject *to him, but* independent *on him.* pag. 25.

† *Contrary to common Senſe, and to the expreſs Declarations of All that defend the Soul's Natural Immortality.*

Quemadmodum igitur Apoſtolus, &c. ——*Sic & Deus &c.* [Thus rendred, without any Senſe.] *Whereas the Apoſtle &c,* ——*So God &c.* pag. 27.

* *In eo quod dicunt &c.* [Thus tranſlated, with no Senſe.] *At the ſame time they affirm &c.* pag. 45.

* i. e. *In* or *by* their affirming.

If [*the Soul be*] a God in *one* reſpect, or as to * *One* Attribute; why not as to *all* the reſt? pag. 49. (& 2d Part, pag. 14.)

* *Viz*, a Created Immortality, owing wholly to the Good Pleaſure of God.

Though

pag. 61. Though he [*Athenagoras*] ſays indeed, that Men have *Perduration* without any Interruption, with reſpect to the *Soul*; yet this is not to be taken in a *proper*, but in a * *figurative* Senſe.

* *What is living for ever, in a Figurative Senſe?*

pag. 120. Then from this Opinion [*of the Souls natural Immortality,*] it will follow that its Life is * *neceſſary*, or its *Exiſtence*; and why not its *Propenſions* and *Inclinations?* If ſo; then the Man is in conſequence *Incapable* of Sin, and no way *Obnoxious* to *Judgment* or *Penalties* on that account.—— Then hence it will follow, that to be *Virtuous* or *Vicious*, is an *Indifferent* thing, &c.

* *Nothing leſs.*

pag. 123. ‖ Ex rebus igitur diverſis ac repugnantibus HOMO factus eſt; ut, ſi *&c*,—— ſit Immortalis. Si autem *&c*.—— ſit in tenebris ſempiternis & in morte. [*Thus rendred*] * The SOUL is made of different and repugnant Principles: So that, if *&c*; IT ſhould be Immortal: But and if, *&c*; SHE ſhould be in everlaſting Darkneſs and Death.

‖ i. e. MAN *is made up of two different and contrary Parts,* (viz. *Soul* and *Body*:) *That if,* &c; *then* HE *ſhould be immortal, and injoy perpetual Light: But if,* &c; *then* HE *ſhould be in everlaſting Darkneſs and Death. The Effect of which Death is not to* Kill *wicked Souls, but to* puniſh *them eternally; &c.* And much more follows, to the ſame purpoſe.

* *Note,* In the *Errata* he has put [*Man*] for [*the Soul*]. But even That Correction does not make the whole Senſe right.

pag. 130. I am ſenſible this Paraphraſe of mine, will be looked upon as *Forced*, by the * prejudiced and ignorant: But I *matter not That.*

* *That is, by all but Himſelf.*

Tunc

Tunc cum Anima ſocietate Corporis liberata, in ſolo Spiritu vivit : *When the* Soul *being delivered from the Society of this Earthly Body, lives or exiſts in the* Spirit alone. *That is*, (ſuppoſing *Lactantius* to ſpeak in a * *Chriſtian* Senſe;) when the *Soul* and *Body Both* ſhall be *Spiritualized*, *Immortalized*, &c. pag. 130 & 131.

* i. e. In Mr *Dodwel's* Senſe.

Homo configuratus eſt ex —— Animo, & Corpore ;—Æterno, ac Temporali: *Man is faſhioned*, of,—— Soul *and* Body,—— Eternal *and* Temporal, *&c.* There may be ſome advantage taken from this Place, I foreſee : But I think it's eaſily anſwered by this Diſtinction : Either *Lactantius* here argues from Principles allowed by the Philoſophers ; Or elſe * owns an Actual Eternal Principle in Man, reſulting from the Spirit of God, the τὸ θεῖον, the *quid divinum*, ſuperadded by *Baptiſm*. pag. 140.

* i. e. *Supposing him*, again, *to speak in Mr.* Dodwel's *Sense* ; *it will then follow indeed, that he* does *speak in Mr.* Dodwel's *Sense.*

Cum poſſet ſemper ſpiritibus ſuis immortalibus innumerabiles animas procreare, ſicut Angelos genuit : *Whereas he might always have procreated innumerable Souls with their Immortal Spirits, as he generated the Angels.* I cannot queſtion, whilſt he * mentions *Spirits* in conjunction with *Souls* as cauſes of their *Perduration*, and *immortalizing* them ; but he means their being united with the *Eternal Divine Spirit* ; And becauſe He is collated on every Individual in *Baptiſm* : ſpeaks of him improperly, as if He was a *particular Spirit* to every *Soul* that is *Immortalized*. pag. 141, 142.

* *The Author evidently means no ſuch thing.*

Ἡ δὲ ἀλόγων [Ψυχὴ] —— ἐπίσης ἅπα —— συναπο- θνήσκει τῷ σώματι —— τῶ δ' ἀνθρώπω ἡ Ψυχὴ, ἀεί ζωος ὑπαρ. pag. 73.

ὑπάρχει καὶ ἀπαίωνος. [Thus interpreted.] *The* ‖ irrational *Soul,——being earthly as to its Origination,* ——dieth *together with the Body: But the Soul of* (The Ἄνθρωπος or) Man, (*under ſuch limitations as are here* * *ſuppoſed of——being united with and under the guidance of the* Spirit,)——*exiſts for ever, and ſhall have no End of its Exiſtence.*

‖ The Soul of irrational Creatures, *he ſhould have rendred it.*
* *Supposed by his own Imagination.*

pag. 177. Σύνθετος ὁ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ οὐχ ἁπλοῦς, οὐδ' ἐξ ὁμοιομερῶν μερῶν, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀσωμάτου νοῦ, καὶ σώματος τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ ἤ τοι ἐμψύχου: [Thus explained.] *Man is a compounded, not a ſimple Being, not conſiſting of ſimilar Parts, but of an* incorporeal Mind (*or* Spirit,) [*he doth not ſay,* Ψυχὴ, *Soul, and of a* Concupiſcible Body *or* animated by Ψυχὴ, Soul.] (*Excellently diſtinguiſhed!*)

pag. 179. *I am well aware that ſome may be ready to carp at this my Paraphraſtical Verſion*; viz. *that it's* Forced and Extorted. *All I ſhall ſay by way of Anticipation, is only this*; *that either the Senſe I have given, is genuine*; *or that it's impoſſible to reconcile it to a** Chriſtian *Senſe.*

* That is, to Mr Dodwel's Senſe. *And ſo every Author muſt needs ſpeak* Mr Dodwel's *Senſe*; or *elſe the ſame great Abſurdity will certainly follow*, viz. *that he does* not *ſpeak* Mr Dodwel's *Senſe.*

pag. 234. *Granting any Being to be actually* Immortal,—— *there's no need of ſuppoſing it* any further dependent on its Creator *for Exiſtence*; *but is now as* Self-ſufficient *and* Independent; *as That Being that produced it.*

Had

Had he been ſo created, Man would have been a God. pag. 235.

The natural Immortality of any created Being, will imply * neceſſary Exiſtence *to all Eternity* a parte poſt, *as much as of* God himſelf. pag. 236.

* *Nothing leſs.*

To ſay that the Soul is naturally Immortal, *and can in its own Nature, in conſequence of the* Deſign of God *in its Creation, perſevere in vital Exiſtence for* ever, *and ſhall* never die; *is to make it in a ſtrict and proper Senſe* neceſſarily-exiſtent, independent, *and its* Death *it ſelf or* Annihilation *impoſſible even to* * Omnipotence *it ſelf.* pag. 237.

* *Though it exiſts only in conſequence of God's* Deſign and Will *in creating it; as is expreſſed in the very ſame Sentence.*

In the Other Part.

Such a Criticiſer (he ſays) *as* Mr Clark, *I foreſee may take ſome Advantage of my* * ſeeming Miſ-application *of this Text: But,* &c. pag. 37.

* *Nay, very* real.

Might not this very Notion [the Heathens Notion] *of* The One God, *terminate even in the* Devil *himſelf, the very Source of Error and Idolatry?*

This pretended univerſal Conſent of the Heathens, of owning One God, the Creator of all things; *in them is plainly a* Lie, *though in Us the grandeſt* Truth: pag. 74.

Be-

Becauſe by this One God, * *they meant* the Devil. —*The actual Knowledge of* God, *muſt be from Revelation, either by* God *or* the Devil; *nay, by* Both; *and cannot be obtained by mere* Natural *Light. And that this* two-fold Revelation, *&c.*

* *God forbid.*

pag. 135. *Hath Mr* Clark * *proved* —— *that Men are any way* INTERESSED *in the* Vital *Exiſtence of the* Soul *after Death, any more than in their* dead Bodies?

ibid. *Or can he* * *prove* —— *that the* Ἄνθρωπος [the Man] *is* Concerned *in the* happy or miſerable *exiſtence of one Eſſential Part, ſuppoſe the* Soul; *whilſt the other* [the Body] *is in a ſtate of Inſenſibility? or* [that the *Man* is concerned] *in the* happy or miſerable *ſtate of* Both *the eſſential Parts, whilſt actually ſeparated from each other?*

* *One would think, theſe needed no proof.*

pag. 135. *So then we have gained* One Soul: *The other* [*the Rational*] *he muſt yield us; Then here are* Two Souls, &c.

pag. 146, 147. *Is it poſſible for a Compoſitum to conſiſt of contrary conſtituent Parts? Would it not be monſtrous for Man to conſiſt of two eſſential conſtituent Parts, whereof one is dead, the other alive; or one* Subject to diſſolution, *the other* not? *Or, is it not certain that* the Soul is naturally mortal, * *BECAUSE* the Body is? *Or, is it not certain, that* —— *Both his conſtituent eſſential Parts, as animal and reaſonable, muſt partake of the ſame Nature as to* Mortality *and* Immortality? *Is not this* SELF-EVIDENT *as to both States, This and the future?*

* *A moſt clear and Self-evident Conſequence indeed!*

What

What ſignifies the ſeparate *VITAL *exiſtence of* pag. 149.
the Soul, *to the* Man? *If the* ΑΥΘΡΩΠΟΣ [the Man] *be dead, the* Soul *is dead to him as actually as the Body*, &c.

* *That is*; *there is, no difference between being* Alive *and* Dead.

When he [*Adam*] was puniſhed for his Tranſ- pag. 157.
greſſion,— The Breath of Life, that is, the Spirit of him who ſaith *I am the Life*, withdrew from this *Fleſh* of an earthly original, and the *Animal* dropt into *Death*; the *Immortality* of the *Soul* being preſerved, becauſe it was only ſaid to the *Fleſh*, *Duſt thou art*, &c. Cyril. Alex.] *Here I can confeſs*, St Cyril *differs ſomewhat*; *but agrees, in the main — that the Immortality of the* Soul *was preſerved, becauſe he ſuppoſes the* Spirit * *did not recede from* It.

* *That is to ſay*; The *Soul* at death did not recede from the *Soul*, as it did from the *Body*.

Neither did theſe Antient Philoſophers, as our Im- page 196.
materialiſts, opine, that the Spirituality *or* Immateriality *of any Being argued its* Rationality, *or on the other hand its* Rationality *argued its* Immateriality *in the Senſe of our Neotericks, or that its* Spirituality *inferred its* Immortality. *At this rate, the very* ÆTHER, *nay* WINDS *would be* Rational *and* Immortal.

Theſe are ſome few of the innumerable Inſtances of the *Singular Abilities* of that Author, whom the Learned Mr *Dodwel* ſo highly commends. Whoever caſts his Eye upon this Specimen, 'tis preſumed will not expect that any One ſhould think it worth his while, to follow more particularly ſo *ſtrangely Stupid* a Writer, through twice 200 Pages of *thick Darkneſs*, even *Darkneſs that may be felt*.

SOME

SOME REFLECTIONS

On that part of a Book called

AMYNTOR,

OR THE

Defenſe of *Milton*'s Life, which relates to the WRITINGS of the Primitive Fathers and the CANON of the New Teſtament.

SIR,

THE Deſign which the Author of the *Defenſe of Milton's Life* profeſſes that he had, in writing that part of his Book which relates to the Writings of the Primitive Fathers, and the Canon of the New Teſtament, was only to vindicate himſelf from the Charge of *denying the Scripture and declaring his doubt that ſeveral pieces under the name of Chriſt and his Apoſtles, received now by the whole*

Chriſtian Church, are ſuppoſititious; by ſhewing that what he had ſaid in the Life of *Milton*, concerning the ſpuriouſneſs of *ſeveral pieces under the name of Chriſt and his Apoſtles*, was meant not of thoſe Writings which are *now received by the whole Chriſtian Church*, but of thoſe Apocryphal Pieces, which were in many places received *and approved in the Primitive Times*. This is what the Author profeſſes to be the only deſign of this part of his Book: And though for his own ſake I cannot but heartily wiſh it were really no other; yet becauſe there are ſeveral Paſſages, wherein he either ſo expreſſes the very ſlight eſteem that he has for the Primitive Fathers, as ſeems to reflect upon our Religion it ſelf; or raiſes ſuch doubts about the authority of the Canon of the New Teſtament, as *Hereticks* (to uſe his own words) *may draw miſchievous inferences* from, and by which *Scruples* may be put into the minds of *Sincere Chriſtians*; I have therefore ſent you ſuch ſhort remarks as upon reading the Book have occurred to me, and as I hope may be of ſome uſe to others on this Occaſion.

The Principal Propoſitions which our Author maintains, and which I thought moſt to deſerve conſideration, are theſe three.

Pag. 38, 39. *Firſt*, That *the Books aſcribed to the Diſciples and Companions of the Apoſtles, which are ſtill extant, and at this time thought genuine, and of great Authority; ſuch as the Epiſtle of* Clemens *to the* Corinthians, *the Epiſtles of* Ignatius, *the Epiſtle of* Polycarp *to the* Philippians, *the Paſtor of* Hermas, *and the Epiſtle of* Barnabas; (for about the reſt which he mentions, there is no great Controverſie;) *are all very eaſily proved to be ſpurious, and fraudulently impoſed upon the credulous.*

Secondly,

Secondly, That *'tis the eaſieſt task in the world, to* pag. 39.
ſhew the ignorance and ſuperſtition of the Writers of
theſe Books: That *Barnabas* has *many ridiculous paſ-* pag. 45.
ſages; and by *ſaying that the Apoſtles before their*
Converſion were the greateſt ſinners in nature, robs us
of an argument we draw from their integrity and
ſimplicity againſt Infidels: That *the Paſtor of* Hermas
is the ſilliest Book in the World: And that *Igna-* pag. 46.
tius ſays, *the Virginity of* Mary *was a ſecret to the*
Devil; which, I ſuppoſe, he cites as a ridiculous
ſaying.

Thirdly, That *they who think* theſe Books *genuine*,
ought to *receive them into the Canon of Scripture,*
ſince the reputed Authors of them *were the Com-*
panions and fellow-labourers of the Apoſtles, as well
as St. Mark, *or St.* Luke, which is the *only reaſon*
he *ever heard of*, why *theſe two* Evangeliſts are pag. 48.
thought *Inſpired.* For *to ſay that theſe Books ought*
not to be received now into the Canon, becauſe the
Ancients did not think fit to approve them, is but a
mere evaſion; ſince *many Books now received as Cano-*
nical, were not approved by the Ancients; and ſome pag. 57.
received by the Ancients, are now *rejected by the Mo-*
derns; and *Mr. Dodwel* owns, that anciently *no*
difference was put by the Church between the Apocry- pag. 73.
phal and Canonical Books of the New Teſtament:
and beſides, *no ſtreſs can be laid on the Teſtimony*
of the Fathers; ſince they *not only contradict one* pag. 80.
another, but are often inconſiſtent with themſelves in
their relations of the very ſame facts; were divided
into *various Sects*, who *in thoſe early days did, like* pag. 56.
us, condemn one another for damnable Hereticks;
uſed to *reaſon precariouſly*, (*as* Irenæus *the famous* p. 50, 51.
Succeſſor of the Apoſtles, argues from the *four Re-*
gions of the World, and the four Winds, that there
cannot be more nor fewer than four Goſpels) *and*

give hard names to thoſe who contemn ſuch *precarious reaſoning.*

Theſe are the principal Aſſertions of our Author, which becauſe they ſeem to me not only to be falſe, but alſo to be propoſed with too bold a liberty of paſſing cenſures upon the judgment both of the ancient and modern Church; I ſhall therefore in anſwer to them, and for a Vindication of the Primitive Fathers and Modern Doctors of the Chriſtian Church, with ſubmiſſion advance theſe three Propoſitions.

Firſt, That though we are not infallibly certain, that the Epiſtles of *Clemens*, *Ignatius*, *Polycarp* and *Barnabas*, with the Paſtor of *Hermas*, are Genuine; yet that they are generally believed to be ſo, upon very *great Authority*, and with very *good Reaſon.*

Secondly, That therefore, though they are not received as of the ſame Authority with the Canonical Books of the New Teſtament, yet they ought to have a *proportionable Veneration* paid to them, both with reſpect to the *Authors* and to the *Writings* themſelves.

Thirdly, That neither the Belief of the Genuineneſs of theſe Books, nor the Reſpect paid to them as ſuch, does in the leaſt *diminiſh from the Authority of the New Teſtament*, or tend to *make the number of the Canonical Books Uncertain or Precarious.*

I. *Firſt*, That though we are not infallibly certain that the Epiſtles of *Clemens*, *Ignatius*, *Polycarp* and *Barnabas*, with the Paſtor of *Hermas*, are Genuine; yet that they are generally believed to be ſo, upon very *great Authority*, and with very *good Reaſon.*

1. The

1. The Epiſtle of *Clemens* to the *Corinthians*, a * *great and wonderful Epiſtle*, ſaith *Euſebius*, was *unanimouſly and without any controverſie received* by the antient Church; and † *read publickly in moſt Churches, both antiently, and in his time.* And that the Epiſtle now extant is the ſame with that which was ſo commended by the Antients, has not been queſtioned by any Learned Man theſe many years, and has been lately proved at large by the Learned *Doctor Wake* in his *Genuine Epiſtles of the Apoſtolical Fathers*, and by *Grabius* in his *Spicilegium*, p. 261. whom I ſhall not now tranſcribe.

* Τάτε ὃ ἐν τῶ κλήμεντι ὁμολογεμένη μία ἐπιστολὴ φέρεται, μεγάλη τε καὶ θαυμασία *Euſeb. Hiſt. l. 3 c. 16.*

Ἀναμολογημένη παρὰ πᾶσι. *Id. l. 3. c. 38.*

Ἰγνατίε γραφαὶ. *Id. l. 5. c. 6. ex Ireneo. l. 3. 3. c. 3.*

† Ταύτῃ δὲ καὶ ἐν πλείσταις ἐκκλησίαις ἐπὶ τῶ κοινῶ διδασκαλείῳ παλαιτε καὶ καθ' ἡμᾶς αὐτὲς ἔγνωμεν. *Id. l. 3. l. 16.*

2. That *Ignatius* wrote ſeveral Epiſtles, * one to the *Epheſians*, one to the *Magneſians*, one to the *Trallians*, one to the *Romans*, one to the *Philadelphians*, one to the *Smyrnæans*, and one to *Polycarp*; *Euſebius* expreſly teſtifies; quoting a large paſſage out of his Epiſtle to the *Romans*, which paſſage is now extant word for word in that Epiſtle, being publiſhed with the reſt above-mentioned. And that all the Epiſtles now extant under theſe Titles, are the ſame with thoſe mentioned by the Antients; is ſufficiently proved by the very Learned Biſhop *Pierſon* in his *Vindiciæ*, *Cotelerius*, and others.

* Μίαν μὲν ἐπιστολὴν τῇ κατὰ τόπον Ἐφεσίων ἐκκλησίᾳ γράφει, —— ἑτέραν δὲ τῇ ἐν Μαγνησίᾳ, —— καὶ τὴν ἐν Τράλλεσι δὲ ἄλλην, —— πρὸς ταύταις καὶ τὴν Ρωμαίων ἐκκλησίαν γράφει, —— τοῖς τε ἐν Φιλαδελφίᾳ αὖθις διὰ γραφῆς ὁμιλεῖ, —— καὶ τὴν Σμυρναίων ἐκκλησίαν, ἰδίως τε τῷ τύπῳ χρησαμένω Πολυκάρπῳ. *Euſeb. Hiſt. l. 3. c. 35, 36.*

3. The Epiſtle of *Polycarp* to the *Philippians*, is mentioned by † *Irenæus* that knew him living, and by * *Euſebius*, ‖ *Hierom* and others, whoſe Teſtimonies ſet down at large by *Cotelerius* I need not tranſcribe: And that the *Epiſtle* now extant under his Name, at leaſt the greateſt part of it, is the Genuine one, is acknowledged by * all Writers eminent for Judgment and Learning.

† *Lib.* 3. *c.* 3.
* *Hiſt. l.* 3. *c.* 36.
‖ *In Catalogo*, &c.

* See Dr *Wake*'s Genuine Epiſtles, and *Cotelerius*, Not. 1. in Epiſtolas Ignatii.

4. The Paſtor of *Hermas* is inconteſtably a moſt antient work, being cited by almoſt all the Primitive Fathers extant, that lived in or near the ſecond Century; *viz.* by † *Irenæus*, by * *Tertullian*, by ‖ *Origen*, by *Clem: Alexand.* &c. whoſe Teſtimonies are ſet down at large by *Nicol. de Nourry* at the end of his *Apparatus ad Bibliothecam maximam veterum Patrum*, and præfixed to the *Oxford* Edition of *Hermas*, and to that of *Cotelerius*. Whether the Author of this Book be the ſame *Hermas* that is mentioned by *St. Paul*, though it is affirmed by many of the beſt and moſt judicious writers, yet is it not ſo certain, nor of ſuch conſequence, that we ſhould be obliged to defend it.

† *L.* 2. *& 4. & 6.*
* *De Orat. c.* 12. *& de Pudic.*
‖ *Hom.* 8. num. *lib.* 1, 2. *& 3. de Princip. Comment. in* Mat. *Hom.* 37. *in* Luc. *multiſq; aliis in locis.*

5. The Epiſtle of *Barnabas* is alſo without controverſie antient, a Work of the Apoſtolick Age, being quoted by almoſt all the * Primitive Fathers; as you may ſee by the Teſtimonies ſet down at large, in all the ſame Authors with the Teſtimonies concerning *Hermas*.

† *Clem. Alex. Strom.* 2. *& Strom.* 5. *Origen. contra Celſ. lib.* 6, *&c.*

Upon

Upon theſe *great Authorities* then, though we cannot be abſolutely ſure that theſe Writings are Genuine, yet we may well conclude and believe them to be ſo, notwithſtanding the ſuſpitions which ſome have raiſed to the contrary. There are alſo ſundry other Arguments, which may be drawn from the ſimplicity of the ſtile and way of arguing uſed in theſe Writings, agreeable to the cuſtom of the Age in which they are ſuppoſed to be written; from the conformity of the matters contained in them, to the Doctrine and Diſcipline of thoſe times; and from the exact Agreement of all the Quotations of the moſt antient Authors, to the Copies extant at this day: All which taken together, afford ſo *good Reaſon* to believe theſe Books to be genuine, that whoſoever conſiders them, may very well wonder at the confidence of Mr. *T.* who is pleaſed to affirm that *'tis the eaſieſt Task in the World to prove all theſe Writings ſpurious, and fraudulently impoſed upon the credulous.*

II. *Secondly*, Though theſe Writings are not received as of the ſame Authority with the Canonical Books of the New Teſtament, yet ought they to have a *proportionable Veneration* paid to them, both with reſpect to the *Authors* and to the *Writings* themſelves.

Clemens was a Companion of the Apoſtles, and *Ignatius* and *Polycarp* their immediate Succeſſors; and if the Authors of the Epiſtle of *Barnabas* and of the Paſtor of *Hermas* were not the ſame with the Fellow-Labourers and Contemporaries of the Apoſtles, known by thoſe Names, yet are they ſo undeniably antient, (being certainly of the firſt Age,) as to challenge all the reſpect that can poſſibly be due to any Writers upon the ac-

count of Antiquity. And as to the Writings themſelves, though Mr. *T.* will not be perſuaded to grant with the Learned Dr. * *Wake*, that *they contain the true and pure Faith of Chriſt, without the leaſt Error intermixt with it*; yet this we may be bold to affirm, that in general they are ſo far from betraying either the *Ignorance* or *Superſtition* of their Authors, which Mr. *T.* ſo confidently charges them with, that they contain a very good account of *that Doctrine and Diſcipline* of the pureſt ages of the Church, *which* all learned and good Chriſtians heartily wiſh could be reſtored at this day.

* In his Diſcourſe of the Authority of the genuine Epiſtles, *page* 175.

1. The Epiſtle of *Clemens* is ſtiled by *Euſebius*, (as I have already obſerved) *a great and admirable Epiſtle*; and was publickly read in the Chriſtian Churches both before and in his time: "And "indeed it does not at all come ſhort of the "higheſt Praiſes which the Ancients have given "to it; being a Piece compoſed with ſuch an "admirable ſpirit of Love and Charity; of "Zeal towards God, and of Concern for the "Church; of the moſt excellent exhortations "delivered with the greateſt plainneſs and ſim-"plicity of ſpeech, and yet preſſed many times "with ſuch moving eloquence too; that I can-"not imagin what could have been deſired in "ſuch an Epiſtle, more proper for the end "for which it was compoſed; what could have "been written more becoming an Apoſtolical "age, and the Pen of one of the moſt eminent "Biſhops of it. Thus the Learned Dr. *Wake*.

His making the *Scarlet thread* hung out by *Rahab* to the Spies, a Type of the *Blood of Chriſt*; however it may poſſibly ſeem ſtrange to ſuch as

Mr. *T.*

Mr. *T.* was yet in the Opinion of the Ancients very agreeable to the Tenour of the Scripture, and particularly to that Type of the *Scarlet Wool*, wherewith the Blood of the Sacrifice was ſprinkled on the People under the Law, *Heb.* 9. 19.

The Hiſtory of the *Phœnix*, mentioned in this Epiſtle, is confeſſedly a Fable. But he that conſiders that it was a Story at that time generally told and believed, as *Tacitus* largely relates; and that the beſt of Men never had any aſſurance of being preſerved from vulgar and innocent Errors; will not be haſty in cenſuring an excellent Man, and an excellent Book, for making ſuch a vulgar error the Topick of a popular Argument.

2. The Epiſtles of *Ignatius* are written indeed in a plain, ſimple, and unaffected ſtile; as are moſt of the Books of the Holy Scripture it ſelf: but, whatever Mr. *T.* ſays, there is nothing in them either of *Ignorance* or *Superſtition*; unleſs a *Firm belief of Divine Revelation* muſt be eſteemed *Ignorance*, and a *ſtrict Obſervance of the Laws of Chriſt* is to be called *Superſtition.*

One Paſſage indeed there is in his Epiſtle to the *Epheſians*, which Mr. *T.* cannot but ſmile at: *viz.* that *the Virginity of* Mary *and her delivery, was kept in ſecret from the Prince of this World.* But he that conſiders the manner of our Saviour's temptation, and how the Ancients conſtantly, and (in the judgment of the very Learned * *Grotius*) not without good Grounds, denied the Devil to have known any thing at firſt of the great Myſtery of the Incarnation, will not for this paſſage condemn *Ignatius* of *Ignorance.*

* Sanè Diabolum majus aliquid homine in Chriſto agnoviſſe hoc quidem tempore, conſtanter, *nec ſine magnis argumentis*, negant Scriptores antiqui. *Grot.* in Mat. 4. 3.

3. The

3. The Epiſtle of *Polycarp* to the *Philippians* is a very valuable Monument of Antiquity, containing nothing in it unworthy the Character of ſo great a Father. * *Irenæus* calls it *a moſt compleat Epiſtle; out of which they that are careful of their own Salvation, may learn what was the Belief of* that Apoſtolical Man, *and what the form of ſound Doctrine which he delivered in his Preaching.*

* Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐπιστολὴ Πολυκάρπου πρὸς Φιλιππησίους γεγραμμένη, ἱκανωτάτη ἐξ ἧς καὶ τὴν χαρακτῆρα τῆς πίστεως αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὸ κήρυγμα τῆς ἀληθείας, οἱ φροντίζοντες τῆς ἑαυτῶν σωτηρίας δύνανται μαθεῖν. Euſeb. Hiſt. l. 4. c. 14. ex Irenæo.

4. The Paſtor of *Hermas* is a Book full of very excellent Moral Inſtructions, delivered for the moſt part in eaſie and natural Similitudes, and theſe alſo explained at large to the apprehenſion of the meaneſt capacities: For which reaſon, though it was not received into the Canon of Scripture, yet (as *Euſebius* teſtifies) it * *was judged by the Ancients a moſt neceſſary Book, eſpecially for thoſe who were to be inſtructed in the firſt Principles of Religion; and was therefore accordingly read in Churches:* And *Origen* (who was far from being an *ignorant* Man) judges it to * be a *moſt uſeful Book.* But Mr. *T.* ſaith it is *the ſilleſt Book in the World.* Why he ſhould think ſo, I cannot apprehend, unleſs it be becauſe there are here and there ſome few odd Paſſages ſcattered in it, very different from our modern way of Writing, which perhaps he can ſingle out and expoſe: And ſo there is hardly any Book extant in the World, which a witty Man may not turn into ridicule.

* Πρὸς μηδὲν πάνυ ἀνεπιλέκτως δὲ ἂν εἰκὸς ἂν εἴη ὁμολογουμένοις τεθεῖσθαι ὑφ' ἑτέρων ἢ ἀναγκαιότατον, οἷς μάλιστα δεῖ στοιχειώσεως εἰσαγωγικῆς κεκρατῆσθαι· ὅθεν ἤδη καὶ ἐν ἐκκλησίαις ἴσμεν αὐτὸ δεδημοσιευμένον. Euſeb. Hiſt. l. 4. c. 3.

* In *Rom* 16, 14.

All

All the Objections which I think have been hitherto made to this Book, are these: That * *it contains fabulous Visions*: That *it makes too much for Free-will*: That *it assigns to every Man two Angels*: That *it favours the* Novatians *in allowing but one Repentance*: That *it favours Monkish Solitude*: and, that *it speaks of Purgatory*. The three first of these Objections we shall consider immediately; But the three latter are so *directly false*, that one would wonder how prejudice could possibly be so strong as to make Men see in any Author these things, of which there is not the *least syllable or hint* in the whole Book.

* Libri *fabulosi* sunt, in quibus contra Apostolicum consensum adstruitur *Liberum Arbitrium, una Pœnitentia, Solitudo Monastica*, &, quod memoratu dignum, purgatorium ab anu quâdam in visione tertiâ profertur. *Scultetus de Script. Apoch.*

That the *Visions* contained in it are *fabulous*, we ought not to say, unless we be sure, either that God never afforded any Visions to the first Christians; or that these Visions have some particular Circumstances, which prove that they could not come from God. But if it were so, yet taking that which is used in this Book to be no other than a Parabolical way of Writing, wherein the Church is introduced as representing its own Doctrine and Discipline to a Person in a Vision, it ought not to be stiled fabulous, any more than * other Books of that kind which are written in our Age.

* Parable of the Pilgrim of the Prodigal, &c.

That maintaining the *freedom* of Mans *Will*, in the sense that *Hermas* asserts it, is a good Objection against a Book, I suppose neither Mr. *T.* nor any Man else, at this time of day, will contend.

That

That *Hermas* aſſigns *to every particular Man two Angels*, if the Titles of the Chapters were of any Authority, could not indeed be queſtioned. But in the Book it ſelf there is no ſuch thing *expreſly* affirmed: All that the Author there ſays, is only in general, That * *there are two Angels with Man; one of Righteouſneſs, the other of Iniquity*; and that *when good thoughts ariſe in a Mans heart, then the Angel of Righteouſneſs* (that is, ſome good Spirit) *is with him*; *and when evil thoughts ariſe in his heart, then the Angel of Iniquity*, (that is, ſome evil Spirit) *tempts him*: Which, perhaps is no more, than what all Chriſtians believe. So that *Cotelerius* in his Notes upon the place, might have ſpared the pains of proving other Fathers to have been of the ſame opinion with *Hermas*, till he had ſhown that theſe words do *neceſſarily* ſignifie that *Hermas* himſelf was of that Opinion.

* Duo ſunt nuntii cum homine; unus æquitatis, & unus iniquitatis. *Mandat.* 6.

That *Hermas* by allowing *but One Repentance* for great and ſcandalous Crimes, favours the *Novatians*, whoſe Hereſie conſiſted in allowing *no* other *Repentance at all*, than that of *Baptiſm*, is ſo far from being true, that he in expreſs words oppoſes his *One Repentance* to *Baptiſm*, and ſays more for the validity and efficacy of that after-Repentance for Crimes committed by Baptized Chriſtians, in this one little Book, than perhaps is to be found in all the other Writers of the three firſt Centuries put together; inſomuch that *Tertullian*, after he turned *Montaniſt*, and had embraced the Opinion of the *Novatians*, * exclaims with all imaginable

* Cederem tibi, ſi ſcriptura Paſtoris, quæ ſola mœchos amat, non ab omni ſconcilio Eccleſiarum inter Apocrypha & falſa judicaretur, adultera & ipſa, & inde patrona ſociorum. *De Pudicitia.*

ginable bitterneſs againſt this Book for that very reaſon becauſe it was more favourable than any other Book then extant, in allowing Repentance to Adulterers after Baptiſm, which the *Novatians* denied.

That this Book favours *Monkiſh Solitude*, is alſo ſo far from being true, that on the contrary it even expreſly allows * *Second Marriages*, which was more than moſt Writers of that Age were willing to do. * *Mandat.* 4.

Laſtly, So far is this Writer from eſtabliſhing the Doctrine of *Purgatory*, that there is not *one ſyllable* about it in the whole Book: All the places where he ſpeaks of Mens undertaking many hardſhips, and ſo *purging* themſelves from their ſins, being as plainly meant of the Penances to be gone through, according to the then eſtabliſhed Diſcipline of the Church, as 'tis poſſible for any thing to be expreſſed by words.

5. The Epiſtle of *Barnabas* was very much eſteemed among the Antients: And though, it muſt indeed be confeſſed, that it contains ſome very ſtrange and allegorical Interpretations of Scripture; yet he that conſiders how much that manner of Interpretation was antiently in uſe among the Jews in their Targums, and how many important truths were that way conveyed, ſo that the Apoſtles themſelves in their arguing with the Jews did often make uſe of it, as we ſee in their uncontroverted Writings; I ſay whoſoever conſiders theſe things, will rather chuſe modeſtly to ſuſpend his Judgment, than raſhly to upbraid this Author with the Terms of fooliſh and *ridiculous*.

And

And as to his saying that *the Apostles before their Conversion were the greatest sinners in nature*; this does not at all *rob us of the Argument we use to draw from their Integrity and Simplicity against Infidels.* For supposing them to have been never so wicked, were they the less *Simple and Illiterate* for that? Or is their Wickedness before their Conversion any way inconsistent with their Integrity after it? But besides, these Words might be spoken with relation to such sins, as though very great in themselves, yet sincere and well-meaning Men might be guilty of in their Ignorance; as St. *Paul* says of himself, that before his Conversion he was the *chief of sinners*, in respect of his blaspheming Christ and persecuting Christians even to Death, for Christ's sake.

In short, though it must after all be confest, that the Authors of these Writings used a plain, popular and unpolite Stile; that they were guilty of some Mistakes, in things wherein the whole world at that time erred with them; (for which Mr. *T.* is pleased to stile them *Ignorant*;) and that they delivered divers things, which tho' very agreeable to the strictness of their Discipline in the Primitive Church, yet the present times will not so well bear: (for which Mr. *T.* calls them *Superstitious*;) Tho' I say, all this must be granted; yet since in general the Matter of these Writings is such, that not only the Ancients thought fit to cite them in their Books and read them in their Churches, but also the Learnedst and most Judicious Criticks of our own times, as well Laicks as those of the Clergy, have received them as genuine, and recommended them as *containing the true and pure Faith of Christ*; I cannot but think that the very great scorn and con-

contempt, wherewith Mr. *T.* hath thought fit to treat them, is a very bold aſſuming to himſelf, and undervaluing the Judgment of the greateſt Men both of the Ancient and Modern Church, and conſequently a Reflexion upon our Religion its ſelf; and that after all, we have very *good Reaſon*, as well as very *great Authority*, though not to receive theſe Writings as of the ſame Authority with the Canonical Books of the New Teſtament, yet to pay them a *proportionable Veneration*, both with reſpect to the *Authors* and to the *Writings* themſelves.

III. *Thirdly*, Neither the Belief of the Genuineneſs of theſe Writings, nor the reſpect paid to them as ſuch, does in the leaſt diminiſh from the Authority of the New Teſtament, or tend to make the number of the Canonical Books uncertain or precarious.

This is the difficulty, on which Mr. *T.* ſeems particularly to inſiſt, as if it were impoſſible for thoſe who believe the Genuineneſs of theſe Writings to give any tolerable reaſon why they do not admit them into the Canon of the New Teſtament, as well as ſeveral others, which are now received: And therefore I ſhall indeavour to be ſomewhat more exact and particular in giving an Anſwer to it.

1. Firſt then, tho' we have great Reaſon to believe theſe Books to be Genuine, yet have we not the ſame *certainty* of it, as we have of the Genuineneſs of the Books receiv'd into the Canon of the New Teſtament. The Books of the *New Teſtament*, as it might be proved of every one of them particularly, were received at their firſt coming forth as being written by Divine Inſpiration, and were quoted as ſuch by *Irenæus* and others

thers of the Ancienteſt Fathers: And though upon occaſion of ſome Diſputes that aroſe afterwards among Chriſtians, the Authority of ſome few of thoſe Books came to be called in Queſtion; (not to ſpeak at preſent of thoſe Hereticks, the *Cerinthians*, *Marcionites*, *Manichees*, and others, who rejected whatſoever made againſt their abſurd Opinions;) yet thoſe few Queſtioned Books were ſo far from being (as Mr. *T.* falſely aſſerts) *rejected a long time by all Chriſtians almoſt with univerſal conſent*, that even thoſe Books were not only kept entire from the beginning, but (as *Euſebius* expreſly teſtifies) were * owned by *moſt* Doctors of the Church, and were all along read together with the other Scriptures; and at laſt, upon the full and exact examination of all Circumſtances, the matter being put out of Queſtion, they were unanimouſly received, as well by thoſe Churches where they were doubted before, as by all other Chriſtian Churches, into the Canon of Scripture; and ſo have been continued ever ſince by univerſal conſent, and by the uninterrupted Succeſſion of Chriſtians in all Ages. Whereas of thoſe Writings which we are now ſpeaking of, that which is the leaſt controverted, *viz.* the Epiſtle of *Clemens*, was for many Ages thought to be uttterly loſt: and though upon its appearing again, the beſt Criticks in the World thought they had *good reaſon* to pronounce it *Genuine*; yet they could not be ſo ſure that it was free from corruption and interpolation, as we are of thoſe Writings which were never loſt. And now

* Γνωείμων δ' ἓν ὅμως τοῖς πολλοῖς. — ὅμως ὑ πρὸς πλείσοις τῆς ἐκκλησιαστικῶν γιγνωσκομένας. *Hiſt. l.* 3. *c.* 25.

Πέτρε δεύτερον, ὁ κ ἐνδιάθηκον μὲν, εἶναι παρειλήφαμεν, ὅμως ὑ πολλοῖς χρήσιμ φανεῖσα, μετὰ τῆς ἄλλων ἐσπουδάσθη γεγραφῶν. *lib.* 3. *c.* 3.

now this Argument is of peculiar force againſt Mr. *T.* For if he thinks, as he ſays, that he can with all the eaſe in the World prove theſe Writings ſpurious; (which notwithſtanding his vain boaſt, he will never be able to perform;) he may at leaſt allow thoſe, who do not doubt but they are Genuine, yet not to advance them above their own rank, and place them among thoſe which by the Univerſal Church have been received into the Canon of the New Teſtament.

2. *Secondly*, Though the matter of theſe Writings be ſuch, as that they do therefore deſerve very great veneration and reſpect; yet is there plainly ſomething *humane*, ſomething of *infirmity*, ſomething of *fallibility* in them, for which they are with all reaſon thought inferior to the Writings of the Apoſtles. And this Argument is alſo peculiarly ſtrong againſt Mr. *T.* For if he thinks, as he ſays, that he can with all the eaſe in the World ſhow the *Ignorance* and *Superſtition* of the Authors of theſe Writings; well may he allow thoſe, who ſo far differ from him in this, as to think they deſerve the high Character of Primitive, Holy, and Apoſtolical Men, yet not to preſume to equal them with the Apoſtles themſelves.

3. *Thirdly*, When we have made the beſt judgment of things, that we can poſſibly at this diſtance of time, we cannot after all but pay ſome deference to the judgment of the Ancients, eſpecially when aſſembled in a Council; and allow them to judge ſomewhat better in the Ages next after our Saviour, what Writings were of Authority to be made the Standard and Rule of Faith, than we can after ſeventeen hundred

years : Eſpecially ſince of the doubted Books, which were ſometime read promiſcuouſly with the uncontroverted, tis plain they received ſuch only into the Canon, whoſe ſtile, and matter, and agreement with the reſt of the Apoſtolical Writings, do ſufficiently prove them to have judged wiſely and upon good Grounds. But this Argument is of no force with Mr. *T.*

4. *Fourthly*, Therefore, and which is a direct deciſion of this Queſtion, I add, that the true reaſon why ſuch a certain and determinate number of Writings are received as the Canon of Scripture, that is, as an Authoritative Rule of Faith and Manners, is becauſe they were *written by the Apoſtles themſelves*, (who are acknowledged to have been guided by an infallible Spirit,) or which is all one, were *dictated, reviewed and approved by them or ſome of them.* All the Books of the New Teſtament, except the Goſpels of St. *Mark*, and St. *Luke*, and the *Acts of the Apoſtles*, are therefore received as Canonical, becauſe the Church upon undoubted Grounds believes them to be *written immediately by the Apoſtles themſelves*; and theſe three Books are therefore received as Canonical likewiſe, becauſe we believe them to have been *dictated, reviewed and approved by ſome of the Apoſtles.* And this is a plain and direct reaſon, though Mr. *T.* is ſo
pag. 48. modeſt to ſay *he never heard* of it why the Writings of St. *Mark* and *Luke*, who were only Companions of the Apoſtles, are received among the Canonical Writings of the Apoſtles; and yet the Epiſtles of *Clemens* and *Barnabas*, who were Fellow-labourers with the Apoſtles, are not. And that this is indeed the true reaſon, why ſome Books are received as of infallible Authority, and others not;

not; may be ſufficiently proved to any unprejudiced perſon, from what we find in the Ancients concerning this matter. That *all Books acknowledged to be written by the Apoſtles, were always received as of unqueſtionable Authority* is evident. The Queſtion concerning any doubted Book, being not whether the Writing of an Apoſtle ſhould be received as of good Authority or not, but whether that Writing ſaid to be an Apoſtle's, were indeed the Writing of him whoſe name it bore. That *the reaſon why the Writings of St.* Mark *and St.* Luke *were always received as of certain Authority*, was not becauſe they were Contemporaries with the Apoſtles, (for ſo were *Clemens* and *Hermas*, and *Barnabas*,) but *becauſe* their Writings were particularly approved and authorized by the Apoſtles, is plain from *Euſebius*; who tells us expreſly that St. *Peter* received and approved the Goſpel of St. *Mark*, and that ‖ *it was this approbation that authorized it to be received by the Churches*: In like manner, * *That St.* John *reviewed all the Goſpels, and confirmed the truth of them*: *Irenæus* likewiſe tells us * that *what St.* Mark *wrote, was dictated by St.* Peter; and that † *the Goſpel of St.* Luke *was only a Tranſcript of St.* Paul's *Preaching*: St. *Paul* himſelf plainly refers to it, 1 *Cor.* 15. 5. where declaring unto the *Corinthians* the Goſpel which he had before Preached, he puts them in mind *how that Chriſt roſe from the dead acccording to the Scriptures, and that he was ſeen of Cephas, &c.* which appearance

‖ Κυρῶσαί τε τῷ γεγραφῷ εἰς ἔντδξιν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις. *l.* 2. *c.* 15.

* Ἤδη δὲ Μάρκυ τῷ Λυκᾶ τὰ κατ' αὐτὸς εὐαγγελίων τὸν ἔκδοσιν πεποιημένων. ἰωάννης — ἀποδέξασθαι αὐτὸν φασιν, ἀλήθειαν αὐτῆς ἐπιμαρτυρήσαντα. *l.* 3. *c.* 44.

* *Marcus* diſcipulus & interpres *Petri*, quæ à *Petro* annunciata erant, edidit. 3. *cap.* 1.

† *Lucas* ſectator *Pauli*, quod ab illo prædicabatur, Evangelium in Libro condidit. *Ibid.*

of our Saviour to *Peter*, is no where mentioned but in Saint *Luke*'s Goſpel, *Luke* 24. 34.

And in the firſt Epiſtle to *Timothy* 5. 18. he quotes it with the *expreſs Title of* Scripture; *The Scripture ſaith, The Labourer is worthy of his Hire*; which words are no where found in Scripture, but in St. *Luke*'s Goſpel, *Luke* 10. *v.* 7. So that 'tis *not* without great reaſon, that Learned Men have judged it to be St. *Luke*'s Goſpel, which the Apoſtle calls *his own Goſpel*, 2 *Tim.* 2. 8. and elſewhere. And then for the *Acts of the Apoſtles*, 'tis plain they are an Account of St. *Paul*'s Travels, ‖ written before his Death; ſo that they are with all reaſon believed to have been approved by him; and if they were not, yet * being anciently the ſame Book with the Goſpel of St. *Luke*, they were undoubtedly reviewed by St. *John*, together with it, and their Authority was hardly ever, that I know of, called in queſtion by any, but † *Marcion* the Heretick. Laſtly, *That no other Books, however written by the Contemporaries of the Apoſtles were received by the Ancients as of infallibile and deciſive Authority in matters of Diſpute* is evident. *Euſebius* tells us expreſly that the Authority of the Epiſtle to the *Hebrews* was queſtioned by ſome, not becauſe they doubted whether it was written in the Age of the Apoſtles, (for that they could not,) but * becauſe the Church of *Rome* thought it not to be written by St. *Paul*. The Paſtor of *Hermas* alſo (as ‖ the ſame

‖ Baron. ad ann. 61.

* Sunt enim Acta δευτερεῖα ejus operis λόγος cujus πρῶτον λόγον ipſe ſuum agnoſcit Evangelium. Acta poſtea ab Evangelio divulſerunt, quibus commodius viſum, ob locorum faciliorem expeditioremque invicem comparationem, Evangeliſtas ſeparato codice complecti, & ab Actis ſecernere. *Dodwell.* Diſſertat. 1. in *Irenæum*.

† Vid. *Tertull.* adverſus Marcion. lib. 5. ſub. initio.

* Τινὲς ἠθετήκασι τὸ πρὸς Ἑβραίους, πρὸς τὰ Ῥωμαίων ἐκκλησίας ὡς μὴ Παύλου ἂν αὐτὸ συγγεγράφθαι φάσκοντες. lib. 3. cap. 3.

‖ Idem ibidem.

ſame Author tells us) was eſteemed ſo much as to be read publickly in Churches and yet never received as of infallible Authority: Nay *Origen* goes farther, and thinks it to be not only a *uſeful* Book, but written * even with ſome degree of Inſpiration; and yet ‖ impoſes it not upon any one to be received as Scripture.

* Quæ ſcriptura valdè mihi utilis videtur, &, ut puto, divinitus inſpirata. *Origen.* in Rom. 16. 14.

‖ Si cui tamen Scriptura illa recipienda videtur. *Origen.* Hom. 8. in *Num.*

In like manner the Epiſtle of *Clemens*, though the moſt unqueſtioned Piece in all Antiquity, and (as *Euſebius* ſtiles it) * ἀναμφιλογημένη παρὰ πᾶσι, yet it is by the ſame Author † elſewhere reckoned up among the Apocryphal Pieces: that is, as *Cotelerius* well obſerves, not that any one doubted of its Genuineneſs or Excellency, but only that they would not reckon it among the Books τῆς θείας γραφῆς, to which *Euſebius* there oppoſes it.

* *Lib.* 3. *c.* 38.
† *Lib.* 6. *c.* 13.

The Truth is, the unqueſtioned Works of the Apoſtles were not anciently (as Mr. *Dodwel* confeſſes) kept in a diſtinct Book from the Apocryphal, but read and cited promiſcuouſly with the Works of their immediate Succeſſors: But then 'tis alſo certain, that as unqueſtioned Works of the Apoſtles, *whenever* they were cited, were looked upon by all as infallible and deciſive; ſo the other Pieces, whilſt they were quoted and urged by ſome, might as freely be denied or not yielded to by others.

Vainly therefore doth Mr. *T.* object, *That they who believe the Epiſtle of* Clemens *and* the reſt *to be genuine, cannot give any reaſon why they do not admit it into the Canon of Scripture.* And as falſly does he inſinuate, that the Eſtabliſhment of that Canon is uncertain and precarious. Could it be

proved,

proved, *That the Epiſtles of* James *and of* Peter, *and of* Jude, *or any of them, were not written by thoſe whoſe Names they bear*; we ſhould indeed be obliged to reject them: And could the *Preaching* and *Revelation of Peter* be proved to be genuine, we ſhould be obliged to receive them into the Canon of the New Teſtament. But ſo far is it from being true, That the *Preaching and Revelation of Peter* were *ſo* receiv'd by the Ancients, as by more than a *parity of Reaſon*, to claim admiſſion into the Canon with his ſecond Epiſtle, and the reſt of the ſome time queſtioned Books, that on the contrary theſe Pieces (beſides the arguments that may be drawn from the Writings themſelves) were received by ſo few of the Ancients, as to make *Euſebius think, (though in that indeed he was miſtaken,) that they were never quoted by any of the Ancients at all.

* Τὸ, τε λεγόμενον αὐτοῦ κήρυγμα, καὶ τὴν καλυμένην ἀποκάλυψιν, οἴδ' ὅλως ἐν καθολικοῖς ἴτμεν παραδεδομένα. Ὅπου μήτε ἀρχαίων, μήτε τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς τις ἐκκλησιαστικὸς συγγραφεὺς, ταῖς ἐξ αὐτῶν συνεχρήσατο μαρτυρείαις. *Hiſt. l.* 3. *c.* 3.

What Mr. *T.* has invidiouſly urged about the Diviſions among the Fathers, and their want of exactneſs in their Reaſonings, I ſuppoſe will not move thoſe, who know that Truth is nevertheleſs ſuch for being ſurrounded with a multitude of Errors; and that Men did not then write in a Nice and Scholaſtick way, but in a plain and unpolite Stile, mixing *Arguments*, *Similitudes* and *Illuſtrations* promiſcuouſly, which is the way of repreſenting things popularly, and to mean Capacities.

Thus I have indeavoured to give a ſhort Anſwer to the Difficulties *which M.* T. *has with great freedom propoſed: Hoping that what I have here very briefly and with*

with Submiſſion hinted, may give occaſion to ſome abler and more learned Pen, to treat of this Matter with that largeneſs and clearneſs, with which ſo great a Point *well deſerves to be handled.*

I am, Sir,

Yours.

FINIS.

BOOKS *Written by the Reverend Dr* Clarke; *And Printed for* James Knapton, *at the* Crown *in St* Paul's *Church-Yard.*

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The Author having been at a distance from the Press, the Reader is desired to correct the following

ERRATA.

Page	*Line*	*instead of*	*read*
10	13	πονερῷ	πονηρῷ
12	4	henious̃nes̃s	heinous̃nes̃s
13	29	Ψυκη	Ψυχη
18	16	ἰσάλλελοι	ἰωαγγελοι.
21	15	avouring----in othfer	avowing----in other
22	29	Indepentden	Independent
25	11	than	then
	15	yet	yet)
	19	poſſible	poſſibly
29	7	actully	actually
	32	Ψὺκη	Ψυχη
	33	nunquidam	numquidnam
30	3	ζοποιοῦν	ζωοποιοῦν
33	18	nec	nè
35	32	poſſible	Paſſible
	34	Omnis	Omnes
37	18	animatum	animarum
	25	fractus	fructus
39	24	moliter	molliter
40	18, 19.	devitali----que	de vitali------quæ
43	15	ἀναγκαῖνο	ἀναγκαῖον.
	27	ἀγκη	ἀνάγκη.
44	15	τῶν Θεία	τοῦ Θείου.
46	1	Τοῦτο	Τύτου
	11	τοῖς θανάτου	τοῦ θανάτου
	32	τοῖς ἀνθρώπου	τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
47	8	ἀποθαανῆ	ἀποθανῆ
49	32	Principal	Principle
50	7	then atural	the natural
	ult.	fit dicere	fit dicere.
52	17	Notion of the Divine	Notion of Divine
52	29	Mortality	Immortality
53	29	not all	not at all
54	22	incorporaliæ	incorporalia.
	30	laturit	laturi.
59	26	Tranſgreſſions	Tranſgreſſion.
61	19, 20.	Annibilation or bear	Annihilation or bare
65	8	*Numeris apup*	*Numenius apud*
75	28	recide	reſide
79	27	not all	not at all
80	7	of Figures	or Figures
82	27	*ſine qui non*	*ſine quâ non*
95	4	after the word, [*ſuppoſed,*] Add	*to conſiſt of Parts, and Thinking being ſuppoſed*
102	6	Figureand Motions	Figure and Motion.

Figures

pag.	*Line*	*instead of*	*read*
	7	Figures and Motion	Figures and Motions
	21	conſtitute a	conſtitute, a
116	26	effect	affect
118	16	theſe particular Hypotheſis	theſe particular Hypotheſes
119	35	ſo to that purpoſe	ſo that to ſuppoſe
121	2	Capaci	Capacity.
124	1	Heat Colour	Heat, Colour,
127	3	Competent	Component
129	*penult.*	unavoidable,	unavoidably,
130	8	Quality,	Quantity.
136	12	Conſciouſneſs	Conſciouſneſſes
140	2	of Figures	Figures
141	6	parts of	parts One of
	ult.	paſt	part
144	1	poſition	oppoſition
154	21	par	part
155	4	Inſtance	Inſtances
	25	ſame whole	ſame Wholes
190	11	ought	ought not
192	31	deſperate	diſparate
193	4	deſperate	diſparate.
209	11	of we which	of which we
211	2	in its	in His
216	7	*Thinking*	*ſeeing Thinking*
222	30	*at all*	*of at all.*
233	*ult.*	*Self*-exiſtent	*Self, exiſting*
234	11	Idenity	Identity
250	9	Man in	Man is in
252	1	ἀτολεύτητ☉	ἀτελεύτητος
	16	Soul.]	Soul.
254	12	Man	Man]
	22	for	for a
255	15	nor	not
261	20	Ἔφησαν	Ἔφεσον
	25	τοῖου τε	τοῖ; τε
	30	*c.* 36.	*c.* 35, 36.
266	24	κέκριτα	κέκριται.
	26	δεδημοσιουμένον	δεδημοσιουμένον.
273	15	*infallibility*	*fallibility*
	33	Stantdard	Standard
274	33	Fellow-labours	Fellow-Labourers
275	23	κατ̓	κατ̓
276	7	'tis	'tis not
	18	ob	ab
	33	Γωμαίων	Ρωμαίων
277	11	in *Num.*	in *Num.*
	17	Genineneſs	Genuineneſs
	25	unqueſtioned	the unqueſtioned
278	21	μὴ τῶν	μητε τῶν